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ABSTRACT OF nm DISSERTATION

Business and Politics in Costa Rica. 1849-1860:

Consensus and Conflict within the Coffee Planter and Merchant
Elite during the Mora years

by

Carmen Maria Fallas Santana
Doctor of Philmophy in History

University of California. Los Angeles, 1988
Professor Robert N. Burr. Chair

The politics of the period from 1849 to 1860 are analymi in this dissertation in
the context of the politi~ economic, and social relations among the members of the
Costa Rican ruling elite. This elite was made up of planters who were also merchants and
whose economic interests were closely related to the expansion of an export agriculture

based on coffee cultivation. These coffee planters and merchants were the architects of the
political institutions of the second half of the nineteenth centmy and shaped them to foster
the continued growth of the export agriculture. The presidency of Juan Raf~el Mora. a
leading coffee planter and merchant. serves as a basis to illustrate that the effon to
transform· the government into the fundamental agent for the development of coffee
exports created political consensus among the elite.
The military coup that ousted Mora in 1859 shows that despite the consensus, the
relations of the coffee planters and merchants were marked by periodic outbreaks of

vi

conflicts. The analysis of the coup points out that the elite's struggle for control of the
govmunent was intensified as a result of the role assigned to it as the main promoter of

economic development. The government became inaeuingly important for the elite from
the economic point of view because it fulfilled that task in two ctifferent ways. As the

entity in charge of creating the infrastructure fer the expansion of coffee exports, it
maintained public order, enacted laws to regulate commert.e and 1abcr and built roads and
port facilities. The government also acted indirectly as supplier of capital for the elite

through the panicipation of its members in the economic activities that were under the

government's control or through their misuse of the national treasury as public officers.
The fullfiiment of both tasks created conttadictiom that frequently put the personal
interests of some coffee planters and merchants against the general interest of elite-and

gave rise to political cont1icts. The study demonstrates that because the coffee planters
and merchants constituted an elite made up of in1CrCOlmeeted families their members were

able to resolve their political conflicts through negotiation and comp,omkie. It contends
that elite's capacity to abate political conflicts accounted in larp part fer the relative
stability of Costa Rica in the second half of the nineteenth century.

vii
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INTRODUCilON

1be name of Juan Rafael Mora always comes to mind when Costa Ricans evoke
the memory d the countty's most prominent political figures of the Dinea=nth century.

Mora, who came to power in 1849, is remembered as the president who wrote a very
important page of Costa Rica's and Central America's history, when he took the lead in

the war that defeated the American filibusacr William Walker in Nicaragua in 1857.
Mora, indeed, is pra•sed as the founding father whose deu:rmination to fight for keeping
Costa Rica's independence played a pivotal role in the consolidation of the national
sovc=ignty.
The political legacy of Mora., nonetheless, went beyond the defense of the
countty's independence in a critical manent of its history. The nearly ten years that Mora
was in office marked a very important period in the development of the infrastructure of
the Costa Rican national state. The administtadon of Mora. in fact, was charac1mzcd by
significant achievements in the centralization of power, the ?COrpnization of the

government's revenue sources, the strengthening of the military appararus, and the
development of political and legal institutions. These accomplishments were the outcome
of Mora's effons as a leading member of a ruling planter and merchant elite, to transfonn
the state into the fundamental agent of the development of an export agriculture based on
coffee cultivation.
Mora's facet as one of the statesmen who contributed substantially to the
dewlopment of Costa Rica's economic and political institutions has been obscured by the
tendency to analyze his administration from the pmpectivc of the war against Walker.

The epic desaiptions of that war haw led to the idealization of Men's figure and to
present him both as a hero and, because of his execution in 1860, as a manyr for later
generations.1 This idealization of Mora bas led to see him isolated from the social,
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economic, and political context in which he acted. The epic approach to the
administration of Mora has contributed to leaving unanswered the main issues behind the

historiographical question of why Mora was overthrown in 1859 by a military coup
sponsored by the coffee planter and mc::rchant elite and executai a year later.

The overthrow of Mora and his premature and tragic death have been explained as
a reaction of the coffee planter and merchant elite to Mora's intention to perpetuate himself
in power. It has been claimed that Mora's prominent participation in the war against
William Walker had a negative effect upon his personality. His defeat of Walker,

according to that view, led Mora to regard himself as the only person capable of
preserving Costa Rica's independence. The inaeasing arbitrariness and authoritarianism

with which Mora managed public affairs in the last years of his administration have been

interpreted as a manifestation of his determination to remain in power by any means to
fulf°ill what he thought was his mission.2
Mora, to be sure, showed an increasing tendency ~ the monopolization of

political power through arbitrary means after the victa:ious military campaigns against
Walm. Nonethel~ that explanation does not clarify completely the issue of Mora's

overthrow because throughout all his years in office Mora used an iron hand to manage
public affairs. Very often during the 18SOs Mora's sttong approach to the administration
of government went far beyond the limits imposed by constitutional principles and into
the realm of arbitrariness and illegality. Regardless of that. the coffee planter and
mechant elite supported Men's government without raising major objections to bis

political behavior until the last years of his $0VemmeDt.
This study approaches the issues of the overthrow of Mora and his execution

from the perspective of his political and economic roles as leading coffee planter and
merchant and in the context of his relations with the elite. It demonstrates that Mora's

political ambition in the late 1840s was nurtured to a large extent by a temporary reversal
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in his cormnetcial ventures that led him to seek office to cope with financial troubles. The

study contends that Mora's financial motivadons to get involved in politics were
combined with a strong character, leadership qualities, and a clear undemanding of the
political measures that it was necessary to implement to fosier the growth of the export
agriculture. The combination of these three elements created a political formula that gave
singular charactcri3tics to the period between 1849 and 1859.

The study points out that that fommla established the basis for a political
consensus among a small and closely rewed coffee planter and merchant elite which
made the administration of Mora one of the most stable periods in the second half of the
nineteenth centmy. The important achievements in the development of the political and

economic institutions of Costa Rica during the Mora years were the result of that political
formula. The war against Walker, however,

was an event that changed significantly the

nature of the relations of Men with the test of the leading members of the elite.

The political fcrmula that had wcxkcd so efficiently dming the first half of the

govc:mment of Men entered into a crisis after 1857. Crucial in the gradual deterioration
of that political formula wu the fact that the public treasury wu almost depleted as a
result of the military campaigns in Nicaragua. The extraadinary military expenses
created a deficit in the public treasury for the first time in the 1850s which stopped the

implemenwion of Mora's agenda aimed at fostering the growth of coffee cxpons. The

clashes between Mora and the prominent members of the elite which preceded rupture of
the political consensus in the latel850s. howeva:-, did not sum entirely from the
tempOIII) neglect of some points of that agenda.

At the ccre of those clashes was the

financial crisis that had bampc:rcd substantially the capabilities of the public treasury to

serve indirectly as the main financial agent of the elite. The public treasury fulfilled that
task before coffee expon:s created a solid financial infrastructure to foster its own

continued growth. In fact, the economic activities related to the government, such as the
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operation of the national distillery, enabled the members of the eli1e to earn some money

which they lab:r invested in their exporting and importing busineaes. Dming the early
decades of the development of expcxt agricultme, indeed, the prominent members of the
elite depended significantly upon the protics they obwned from the contracts to supply

sugar cane and tobacco to the goyemment, concessions to exploit natural resources such
as forests and advances of cash

to work their mining ventures.

After the national financial crisis bad significantly reduced the resources of the

public treasury Mora, compelled by his own financial troubles, began to exclude other

members of the elite from the profits derived from activities related to the government
through an increasing arbitrariness and corruption. Serious conflicts of interests

emerged, f<r example, between Mora and the concessionmcs of the distillery about
profits and losses derived from liqucr production. The rupture of the consensus was due
also to Mora's determination to use his power to cope with his personal difficult financial
situation at the expense of the capital of several Jeading members of the elite . Hence, the
coup of 1859 was a reaction of the coffee planter and merchant elite aimed at stopping
Mora from using his power in ways that were very detrimental to the economic interests
of many of its most prominent members.
The enmination of the causes of the overthrow of Mora points out that the line
separating political consensus from conflict among the elite, indeed, was very thin when
major economic issues were at stake. However, the political struggles of the coffee

planters and merchants in the second half of the nine1eenth ccntmy, no matter how
intense, never evolved into bloody and prolonged civil wars and usually were not

resolved by violent means such as executions. 1bc execution of Mora marked such a
radical deviation of the usual ways in which the elite resolved its intcrnal differences that
the government was forced to explain it. The explanation of the circumstances
surrounding the decision to execute Mora reveals the crucial role in abating political
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conflicts that wu played by an elite constitu1ed of in1ere0nnected leading families. The
homogeneous nature of the elite with its common political goals and kinship links, in
fact, prevented the periodic outbreak of conflicts from dividing the coffee plancers and
merchants into several imconciliabJe factions. The analysis of the clements that were at
the basis of the political consensus and the mechanisms through which the elite resolved

its conflicts contributes impcxundy in understanding Costa Rica's history as a politically
stable country in the second half of the nineteenth century. Moreover, that analysis

contributes to the explanation of the role played by those mechanisms of conflict
resolution in the development of the democratic institutions of twentieth-century Costa
Rica.

6

NOrES

!Among the boob that illustraie the 11:0dency to approach Men's life from the
epic perspective are: Junta patri6tica pro Juan Rafael Mora. El CQtW,arig del bent;mmto
de ta pagja ex-presidcJue GeneraJ dQn Juan Rafael Mgrp,, ts1+1214 (San Jose, 1915);
Octavio Castro, Laude, fvnracmn de; Mora, EJ hombre, el esooista, el heme y el martir
(San Jose, 19S5); Anuro Echevema. Juan Rafael Mora, el heme y su pueblo (San Jose,
19S6).

20eto Gonzalez, Obras hjst6ricas 2d. cd (San Jose, 1973), pp.211-212.
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CHAPTER.ONE

nm COFFEE PLANTER AND MERCHANT ELITE
AT MID-NINETEEN1H CEN1URY

When Juan Rafael Mora was elected president in 1849. Costa Ri~ a country of
20,704 square miles, had a population of about 100,000 people. The capital city of San

Jose was the center of the political life and the major economic activities. There were
three other main urban centers located relatively close to San Jose. Canago, the former

colonial capital. was located twenty-one miles east of San Jose while Heredia was seven
miles north and Alajuela fourteen miles west. San Jose, however. was where most of the

leading members of the elite resided. In fact, regardless of the relatively shon distances

between San Jose and the three other main towns, traveling between them was difficult
because of the conditions of the roads. These conditions were so bad. especially during

the rainy season, that it took several hours and sometimes days to travel between towns.
The only good road at that time, in fact, was the one that conncctcd these main

urban centers. all located in Costa Rica's central valley. with the port of Puntarenas on the
Pacific. situated seventy•seven miles from San Jose. This road became Costa Rica's
lifeline after the first regular shipments of coffee to Great Britain firmly incorporated this
country into the world market in the early 1840s. Puntarenas became the port from
which coffee was exported until the late nineteenth century when the construction of a

railroad to the Atlantic established a moo: direct route to the markets abroad. Before that,
the tropical rainy climate of the Atlantic coastal region. its vegetation. and topography set
obstacles that the capital and technology availab~ in the 1840s and 1850s could not

overcome easily. Consequently, Costa Rica strengthened its contacts with the outside
world through the Pacific even though this meant that the coffee had to travel down the

coast of South America and around Cape Hom before getting to the marlccts in Europe
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and along the Atlantic coast of the United Swcs.

The favorable ecological conditions of Costa Rica's central valley were a
determining factor in the concenttarion there of mmt of the population and the major
activities since the colonial period. This valley, at an elevation of 3,000 feet, has fertile

volcanic ~ an annual average temperature of sixty-five degrees Fahrenheit and two
well defined seasons, of eight months of rain and four of dry season. These
characteristics were propitious for agricultural activities, first for the production of
subsistence crops and later for growing high quality coffee. The absence of a large
population was another important factcr that prevented the expansion of settlements out
of the central valley. By the mid-nineteenth century, in fact, most of Costa Rica outside
the central valley remained virgin lands. There were small settlements along the road to

Puntarenas and cattle-raising ranches and small towns in the Guanacaste province,
contiguous to Nicaragua, but the rest of the countty was forests. unoccupied plains, and
mountains.
The geographical stage in which the elite developed its activities, therefore, was
relatively small The prominent members of the society maintained rural and urban
properties in Cartago, ~ Alajue~ and their neighboring villages, as well as in
other pans of the countty, but spent most of the time in the capital. San Jose was a town
of approximately 12,000 people and had a perimeter of eighty-one blocks. The accounts
of foreign visitors and travelers of the mid-nineteenth century described the capital as a
city of one-story buildings and houses, most of them of adobe with red tiled roofs,
whose center was the main plua. Across the street from the plaz.a on the east was the
main church. Facing the plaza on the north east was one of the military barracks, the

Cua,nel Principal Two blocks north of the western corner of the plaza were the
government offices, the Congress, and the Court. Not far away from the government
offices were the stores and businesses of the principal merchants. Within a radius of a
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few blocks were the houses of the leading families. I
Juan Rafael Men and the odler leading figures who had a main role in the political

and economic events of the 1850s were members of these prominent families. The eli~
in fact, constituted a group of about twenty-two leading families by the uud-nm=enth
centmy. These families were the Mora. Monteale~ Aguilar. Castro. Camnza,
Escalante, Quiros, Iglesias, Fenwl~ Guti=Tez, Salazar, Oreamuno, Carazo, Bonilla.
Jimenez. Gallegos, Solares. Alfaro, Bmoeta, S~nz. Ulloa, and Moya.2
The members of these principal families which became the largest coffee planters

and mechants after Costa Rica was firmly incorporaled into the world mamt constituted
an elite closely related by kinship. The exis1cnce of groups of intcrconneded prominent
families which dominated entire geographical regions and economic activities, to be sure,
was a common phenomenon in most of Latin America during in the nineu:enth cennny.3
The netwa-k of leading families. however, gained even mote strength in Costa Rica

because it was a fringe area. pocx- and neglected throughout the colonial period. Costa
Rica lacked significam silver and gold mines, a large sedentary Indian population and a
strategic geographical position in relation to the central colonial areas of Mexico and Peru.

The absence of the most important elements fer becaning firmly incorporaled into the
Spanish colonial system. indeed. Jed Costa Rica to play a very marginal role within the
economic and political life of that system. The isolation from the main colonial markets

gave origin to the development of an agriculture of subsistence that only pe:rmiaed limited
exchange. As in other fringe colonial areas where the structures ex the Spanish system
were weak. the Costa Rican elite took control over the bureaucratic apparatus to have

access to a steady source of income and the econanic benefits derived from the exercise
.of power. This elite also developed and strengthened a network of kinship links in order
to expand its possibilities of economic survival amid an economy of subsistence. The

need to consolidate resources through kinship created a monolithic elite that managed to
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transfer its political power to successive aencntiom of its descendants. The meticulous
and massive genealogical research of the Colla Rican sociologist Samuel s~ in fact,

bas shown that most of the coffee planters and merchants were descendants of the

conquerors and early settJers of Costa Rica.•
Juan Rafael Mora was among these leading coffee plantas and merchants who
inherited his political and social position. Bom on February 8, 1814, he was the eldest of
the nine children of Camilo Men and Ana Benita Porras. The genealogical tree of Mora

has been traced back to the sixteenth-century caiqueror Juan Vuquez de Coronado.S
The ancestors of Men also held posts in the civilian and militaJy bureaucratic apparatus
during the colonial period. Men's great-grandfather, f<r insaance, was captain and

lieutenant governor of the villages of Asem and San Jos6 in the mid-eighteenth century.6
Mora's father Camilo was a member of Congress from 1829 to 1833. In addition,
Camilo Mora was among the group of men who in the early 1820s regwered the first
claims to exploit the gold and silver mines in Montes del A ~ located west of the
central valley not far from the road to Puntarenas.7 The lack of proper technology,

machinery, and substantial capital hindered the full exploitation of these mineral
resources. Nonetheless, the mining ventures of the Montes del Aguacatc generated ~
capital which latcr was invested in coffee cultivation.8 Camilo Mora also dedicated
himself to commerce and had business parmcrships with two leading members of society

Jose Santos Lombardo and Rafael Gallegos. Santos Lombardo and Gallegos, who was
Juan Rafael Mora's godfather, participated prominently in the independence movement
and the political life of the early national period.9

Juan Rafael Men demonstra1Cd inclinations more towards c:ommca:c than
intellectual pursuits. Mora, in fact. did not have any formal education beyond elementary
school because from an early age he became actively involved in his father's businesses
and opened his own store when he was nineteen years old. He combined his commercial
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ventures with investments in mining, sugar cane plantations, and 1ata' with coffee
cultivation. Mora had a strong but at the same time affable charac1a' which gained him
the appreciation of the people who dealt with him. Men, indeed, seemed to have been

very popular among bodl the ordinary people who bought merchandise at his store and
woria:d at his haciendas and the elite to whom Men was tied through an intricate network
of kinship and other relations. IO
Through his marriage to Ines Aguilar in 1847, Mora became pan of the family of
Manuel Aguilar, who wu chief of state in the late 1830s. Mora's brothers and sistcn
also were married to members of the leading families. His sister Ana Mana Men was the

first wife of Jos6 Mana Montealegre. Mora's brother-in-law Jose! Mana was born in
1815 and was the oldest of the nine children of Mariano Montealegre and Jer6nima

Fernandez. Mariano Montealegre, who wu Guatemalan. mived in Costa Rica in the
early nineteenth centmy to serve as an accountant for the Royal Tobacco Monopoly.
His participation in Costa Rica's polirlcal life was outstanding. Mariano Montealegre was
involved in the events that prompted the separation from Spain in 1821, and later served
as vice-chief of state and held other important public posts. Montealegre was also one of
the main investa"S in the mining ventures of the Montes dd Aguacatc and later the owner

of large coffee haciendas.11

Jose! Mana Montealegre studied medicine in Sa>dand and became the first Costa
Rican graduate from an European university in the nineteenth century. In contrast, the
rest of the members of Montealegre's·generation who pursued a career, which was

usually in law or medicine, studied at the University ofLedn in Nicaragua or at the
University of San Carlos in Guatemala It wu not until the end of the last ccntmy when
an increasing number of Costa Ricans began attending uni'ICl'Sities in Europe and the
United Statcs.12 Nonetheless, the wealth and especially the contacts that Mariano
Montealegre acquired through his mining ventures enabled him to educate his sons Jose
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Mana and Mariano junicr in Europe. The two MonaJep brothers spent about twelve

years in Great Briiain since they were very young when they were sent there. But when

· Jose Maria and Mariano, who became an engineer, returned 10 COiia Rica in the late
1830s they mca-poraled rapidly in10 the local society. Both combined the practice of their
professions with coffee cultivation and politics. J~ Maria Montealegre wu appointed
tempoimy president after Mora's

overthrow in 1859 and later was elecu:d in 18(,() fa- a

three year tenn.13 Mariano and his other brother Francisco also participated actively in

politics as ministers and members of Congress. Both of them married into the Gallegos
family.14
The maniages of Mora's brother Jose Joaquin and his sisier Rosa to members of
the Gutierrez family significantly increased the kinship netWaic of the Moras. Just as his

older brother Juan Rafae~ Jose! Joaquin Mora owned large coffee haciendas, was very
active in the expon and import business. and had investments in the mines of Montes del
Aguacate. Jose Joaquin was ooe of the top aides of President Mora and served in several
military and civil positions during the 1850s. Dolcres O u ~ Jose Joaquin Mora's

wife, was the daughter of Agustf'n Gutierrez and Josefa Penamonge, natives of Nicaragua
who settled in Canago. The eleven children of this family inherited large cattle ranches in
the Ouanacaste province contiguous to Nicaragua but had also important coffee haciendas
in Canago and investments in other ventures. The Outierrezes constituted one of the best
examples of how the Costa Rican elite consolidaa:d its economic, socia4 and political

position through mmiage. All of them marled members of the leading families. In fact,
the Ouderrczes became related to the Iglesias, the Bonilla, the Oreamuno, the Barroeta,
the Mora, and the Oiralt families. IS These maaimonies established indirect kinship links
that were also important in the relations of the coffee planters and merchants.

Jose

Joaquin Mora's marriage to Dolores Gutierrez, for instance, linked him to Francisco
Oreamuno, a member of the one of the leading families of Canago. Oreamuno served as
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vice-president during the administration of Juan ~ael Men until be died in 1856 victim
of a cholera epidemic. The marriage of I~ Joaquin Mora also n:wed him to Francisco
Mana and Demettio Iglesias, whose sister Ramona. as well. was married to a member of

the Gutim'ez family. This relationship very likely facilitaied Iglesias' acquisition of a

contract from President Mora to operate the government's liquor distillery in the early
1850s. •
Francisco Mana Iglesias and his brother Demetrio were the sons of Joaquin
Iglesias, who was important in the independence movement and contributed to drafting
Costa Rica's first constitution. The father of the Iglcsiases also was part of the group of
the leading miners in the 1820s and 1830s.16 Demettio Iglesias studied law in Guatemala

but dedicated himself to coffee cultivation and c o ~ as well. Francisco Maria was
an energetic coffee planter and merchant who did not pursue a formal education but was
well-n:ad and published scwral booJcs.17

Francisco Mana Iglesias established a business firm with Satumino TlDOCO,
which was known as "Tinoco & Co." Tinoco was a native of N'icaragua who
befriended members of the Iglesias family when they moved leDipotllily to that COWltry
during the mid- l 830s after Joaquin Iglesias got involved in a failed coup against the then

President Braulio Carrillo. Tinoco married Mana Iglesias, one of the sisters of Francisco
and Demettio, and moved back with the n:st of the family to Costa Rica in1839.18
Having mived in Costa Rica. Tinoco bought several rural properties and later

transformed some of them into coffee haciendas at the same time that be was dedicated to

commerce. Tinoco succeeded rapidly in his commercial ventures and by 1842 was

•

among the twelve leading impar reu of the country.19
The Iglcsiascs had a very influential wicle on the maternal side, Anselmo

Uorentc, who was Costa Rica's bishop from 1851 to 1871. Bishop Llorentc was very
close to Francisco Mana and Demetrio Iglesias as well as to another of his nephews,
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Julian Volio. Certainly, the financial support of Bishop Uorcnte enabled Volio to study

law at the University of San Carlos in Guatemala. Afa:r bis graduation Volio returned to
Costa Rica and married Cristina Tmoco, one of the daughten of Satumino Tmoco, who

was also bis second cousin. Francisco mmied bis niece Emiqueu Tinoco. Demetrio
Iglesias was married to Eudoxia Castro, the daughter of Jose Mana Castro another
leading political and economic figure of the nineteenth century.
Born in 1818, Jose Mana Castro was the only child of Ramm Castro and

Lorenza Madriz. He was an intellectual who studied philosophy and law at the
University ofLe6n in Nicaragua. Castro was president twice, from 1847 to 1849 and
from 1866 to 1868, and held important offices in several administrations. Like most
members of the elite, Castro combined bis participation in politics and intellectual

pursuits with the management of bis coffee haciendas and cattle ranches. Castro was
married to Padfica Fe:rmndez who was a second cousin of the Montealegres and the

Carranzas.20
Bruno Carranza, a medical doctcr trained in Guatemala was one of members of
the Carranza family who participau:d lD>St actively in the economic and political life of the
country during the 1850s. He was born in 1822 and was one of the twelve children of
Miguel Carranza and Joaquina Ramirez. Like most of the progenitors of the main coffee
planters and merchants, Bruno's father Miguel was among the leading miners of the
1820s and 1830s and as well as a member of Congress. Likewise, Miguel Carranza
imported Costa Rica's first printing press in 1830 and began the publication of a

newspaper soon after that. This newpaper titled El Com;o de Costa Rica was the first of

a long series of newspapers that the Cammza family published throughout the rest of the
nineteenth centmy. Beginning in 1847 and for a period of many years, Bruno Carranza
was the editor of several of these newspapers.21 Carranza, nonetheless, combined his
duties as newspaper editor with the attention of bis coffee haciendas and other

15

businesses, including am:mg other things the operation of the national liqu<r distillery
from 1856 to 1859.22 Carranza was mmied to his second cousin Jerdnima Montealegre,
the sister of

Jme Mana, Mariano and Francisco Montealegre.

Vicente Aguilar was another very impcx1ant member of the elite. A native of

Cartago, he was b<Xn in 1808 to Alejo Aguilar and Joaquina Cubero. Aguilar along with
his brother RamSn wen: the only members of their large family that became leading
~ economic

and political figures. Vicente Aguilar learned the three R's when he

worked as an apprentice to a tailer. In 1839 he married Dolores Salazar, the daughter of a

prominent and wealthy Nicaraguan family that had mived in Costa Rica in 1835 after
fleeing from a volcanic eruption. Through his marriage Aguilar became related to the
members of the Fenwtdcz and Gallegos families who were also married to others of the
Salazars.
Aguilar began his business activities growing cacao in Matina. a region located on
the Atlantic coast and carrying it to the market in San

Jme.

Aguilar lare:r invested in the

mining industty of Montes del Aguacaic, and in pearl fishing in the Gulf of Nicoya in the

Pacific Ocean. He also had haciendas on the outskirts of Cartago, Heredia and San Jose,

as well as several properties in those urban centcrs.23 Through his divene enterprises
Aguilar was able to accumulate some capital which enabled him afterwards to invest
heavily in coffee cultivation and become one of the largest planters and exporters.
Aguilar exported coffee initially in association with Juan Rafael Mora with whom
he established a business partnership in 1842. Mora and Aguilar did business together

for a period of six years until 1848 when they dissolved their partnership by mutual
agreemcnt.24 This business partnership, nonetheless, became the central issue of a
dispute between Mora and Aguilar almost ten years after the firm was dissolved. The
animosity that this dispute generated between the two former business panners and

friends nnned Aguilar into Mora's main political enemy in the late 1850s.
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There were, however, no bad feelings between Aguilar and Mora when they
decided to scpamte and do business on their own after 1848. Aguilar was among the

group of men to whom Mora reSOl'1l:d fcx- advice on political and economic affairs during
the 1850s. Aguilar served briefly as Mora's vice-presjdent at the same time that he
remained active in the export and import business. He benefited importantly from the
boom brought about by the establishment of strong links to the European markets which
enabled him to amass a fortune that was considered substantial in the local context.
Aguilar, who died on April 23, 1861, in fact, was reputed to be one of the wealthiest men
of his time.25 Table 1 which lists the total value assets of other prominent members of
the elite demonstrates how wealthy Aguilar was relative to other coffee planters and

merchants.

...
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TABLE 1

TOTAL AND NET VALUE OF
ASSETS OF SELECTED MEMBERS OF1liE ELITE
IN COSTA RICAN PESOS

Vicente Aguilar
Juan Rafael Mora
Manuel Jose Caram
Cecilio Umana
Cecilio Quesada
Jos6 Mana Montealegre
Calixto Acosta
Jos6 Mana Castro
Leonzo De Vars
Rafael Gallegos
Jose Joaquin Men

TOUll
Value

Net
Value!

Date of the
Inventory

714,065
221,236
213,001
191,191
123,298
96,895
82,674
80,913
57,005
51,647
43,622

657,553
109,920
166,056
154,318
121,298
79,2Ci/
67,037

1861
1862
1877
1871
1857
1890
1874
1893
1882
1857
1861

17,396
51,387
32,860

!Total value of assets less outstanding debts.
Source: Archivo Nacional de Costa Rica, Mortuales de San
nos. 9124, 1689,
10001, 9648, 9661, 7608, 9394, 9362, 10022; Protocolos Lara y Ownorro, no.152.
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Manuel Jose Carazo, was also umng the most influential political figures of the
1850s. He sened as Mora's MinisterofFmance from 1849 to 1856. Caram was an
autodidact whose culture and erudition imp,.essed many foreign visiiors who met him.
These visiiors Wrote that most of the members of the eliu: lacked foreign language skills.

Those fcrcignen remarla:d, however, that Caram spoke English very well because he
had lived in the Unib:d StaJes for a few years and had a good command of French and

German.26 These skills and his trips abroad had enabled Caram to oven:omc the cultural
Uarirarims of the local society. But while his inu:Ilectual inclinations and erudition in

some matters set him a bit apart from the majority of the coffee planters and merchants,
Carazo was in no way an outsider to the eliu:. Caram, indeed, was a leading merchant
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and had imponant coffee haciendas. He WU descendant cl two pcmineut f.amilies of
Canago, the Carazos and the Bonillu and mmicd inlD the Peralta family, who was also
imponant in that city.

A good number of the foreigners mived in Costa Rica throughout the Dineu:enth

century fleeing political turmoil in their pJaces of aigin or in search cf new economic

oppcxtunities. Many of these foreigners became part cf the local eli1e through marriage
and commercial links • By the mid-nineteenth, most of the immigrants from Central

America were mainly from Nicaragua and Gwuemala with only a few natives cf El

Salvador and Honduras. The most notable among the small nmnber of Salvadorans was
Jose Mana Canas. He was bom in 1809 in the village cf Suchicoco and was one of the
eight illegitimate children of Francisca Canas and Jose Marcelo Avil~ the local priest.Tl

Canas pursued a career in the military. He had a distinguished participation as an officer
in the Central American army during the 1830s when the fiw countries ~ 1l:mp01'3rily

united and formed a federal republic. Canas met the Honduran General Francisco
Monmn while he was serving in the federal army. He fought side by side with Monmn

who wanted to keep the Centtal American nations united at a time when the collapse of
the federation was imminent. It was as a result of the military defeat of Morazan's cause
that Canas arrived in Costa Rica in 1840.

Canas was granted political asylum in Costa Rica by President Braulio Canino
and was appointed military commandant in the Atlantic port of Moin. A&r three years,

Caiias was moved to Carta.go and then to Puntarcnas to serve as customs inspector.

Around 1845 Canas bought some land in the Gu.anacaste province and planted sugar

cane. He also dedicated himself to commerce and purchased a sailboat to transport
mcrchandisc and passangers along the Pacific coast of Central America. Simultaneously,

Canas took on an increasingly important role in the political and military life of Costa
Rica. In fact, President Jose Mana Castro appointed Canas as colonel of the army in
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1847. Likewise, in early 1848 Castro sent Caftas to Centtal America on a diplomatic
mission to improve Costa Rica's commercial rclatiom with the other countries of the
region. Later in 1849 Castro named Caftas u his MiniS1er of Fmance and War, and be
served in that post until May, 1850.28

Cadas's marriage to Guadalupe M~ the sister of Juan Rafael Mora established a
very close link between Canas and his brother-in-law. Mora, in fact. had in Canas one of
his closest aides and an unconditional supporter who was willing to accompany him in
any enterprise or project that he undertook. Canas. indeed. was Mora's minister of
finance, served as commanding officer of the anny and held other offices dming the
1850s. After Mora was overthrown Cadas went also into exile with him and met his
death in October, l 8fJO as a result of Mora's failed attempt to recover power.
Among the Guatemalans who had a prominent place in Costa Rica's political and
economic life were Nazario Toledo, a physician who arrived in °1835, and Lorenzo
Montufar. Toledo was distinguished in the 1850s as Mora's diplomatic envoy to Centtal
and South America. Montufar, who first got to Costa Rica in 1850, was a strong
advocasc of the liberal cause and lived there when the political siruation at home was
adverse to his party. He moved back to Guatemala on several occasioos only to return to
Costa Rica when liberals suffered other setbacks in their struggle with conservatives for
the control of power. Montufar's training as a lawyer enabled him to make an important

contribution to the organization of the Costa Rican judiciary system and the revision of

codes and the drafting of new ones. Montufar was fmeign minisu:r during the last years
of the Mora administration, was justice of the Supreme Court and served in different
offices in the 18fJOs and 1870s.29 He established kinship links to the Costa Rican elite
through his marriage to Marla de Jesus Ennquez. who was a cousin of Jose Marla

Castto.

Toribio Argilcllo was ooe of the distinguished Nicaraguan immigrants. A native
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of the city ofLecSn, Argiicllo studied law at that city's university. He married Mercedes
Mora, one of Juan Rafael Mora's sisters. The premature deaths of Argilello and his wife
led Men to take care their three young children. The oldest of these children wu Manuel
ArgUello who wu born in 1834. Mora sent Arg(lello to study law at the Univenity of
San Carlos in Guatemala. He returned to Costa Rica after his graduation in 1857 and
Mora appointed him as judge in San Jose. 30 ArgOello regarded his uncle Juan Rafael
Mora as his father. He defended vehemently Mora's political actions and was a witness
of the events that led to the execution of his uncle. Argilello's effons to vindicate the
memory of Mora resulted in the publication of a first hand account of the major political
events of the late 1850s.31
Manuel Arg(lello married Mariana De Vars, the daugther of Leonzo De Vars. De
Vars was among the first French nationals who established themselves in Costa Rica in
the nineteenth century. De Vars initial ventures revolved around the export of
brazilwood but he became a coffee planter after the expansion of the export agriculture.

In 1851 he established a business partnership with Jose Duran another of bis sons-inlaw. De Vars got the concession to operate the national distillery from the government of
Mora in 1859. He formed a society with another Frenchman, Leopoldo MOUl'Cn to
manage the distillery. Duran was also involved in this partncrship.32 De Vars' first wife
was Rita Castillo, whose sisters were mmied to members of the Quiros and Escalante
families. De Vars kinship links were extended to the Bonilla family after his second
marriage to Jacinta Bonilla.

Among the prominent members of the German community during the Mora years
were Francisco Kurtzc and Fernando Strcber. Kume was an engineer who designed and

supervised the construction of the two major buildings built in the 1850s, the National
Palace and the liquor distillery, and other major public works. Strcber was a well-read
lawyer who made important contributions to the development of the Costa Rican legal
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institutions. Both Kunze and Streber along with Alejandro Von BOlow mived in Costa
Rica in the early 1850s. These three people were agents representing the interests of a

company fmmed in Berlin in 1849 to establish a colony of German immigrants in Costa
Rica. The large number of settlers that this project ex colonization aimed at bringing into
Costa Rica never came but this plan prompted the arrival of sevm1 eme1p1enelll'S.
Included in this group wen: Guillenno Nanne, who had some business connections with
Mora. and Otto Von Schroter. 33

Von Schroter established a business fum with Edward Joy, one of the prominent
Englishmen in mid-ninercenth cennuy Costa Rica. Edward W. Allprcss was also among
the English merchants. Allpress manied Vicente Aguilar's oldest daughter and

established a business firm with bis father-in-law in 1857.34
A person who was also linked to the German colonization projects was Crisanto

Medina, an Argentinean who mived in Costa Rica in the 1840s. He settled in

Puncarenas, the Pacific port. and at first dedicated himself to c:ommetee. Medina got
involved in the coloomtion plans in the early 1850s when he obtained a vast extension
of land fran the government in a region called Miravallcs, locau:d in the northeastern pan
of Costa Rica. Medina worlccd in association with the Berlin colonization company to
promote the establishment of German settlers in Miravalles.35 Regardless of the efforts
to attract immigrams, the Miravalles settlement project never mumialimi. Medina got
involved in another project with the government in 1857. This time it was a project to
create a bank. This project was implemented but bad a shcxt life because several factors

forced the closure of the bank a few months af1i:r it was opened. The failure of the bank
in 1858 got Medin.a involved in a bitter business dispute with the firm of Satumino

Tmoco and Francisco Iglesias which bad significant role in the overthrow of Mora's
government. 36
Many foreigners established themselves in Costa Rica to serve as agents of those
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commercial firms to whom the elite exponed its coffee production. Among these
individuals was the Bolivian Eduardo Bceche who was the agent of the Scottish firm of
"John Thompson Wattson & Co." Beeche represented the interests of the branch that
this firm had in Valparaiso, Oule. Beeche also was Chile's consul to Costa Rica at the

same time that he became involved in coffee cultivation and c:omu::.eu..e. He settled
permanently in Costa Rica and mmied Juan Rafael Mora's niece Dorila Argilello in
1858.37
While these aforementioned leading members of the mid-nineteenth century Costa
Rican society were by no means men of the people, they did not constitute a haughty elite
in this period. The distance that scparaacd the coffee planters and merchants from the

mass of the people was far less imposing when Mora and his generation were in power
than at the end of the nineteenth century. The coffee-based export agriculture brought

about an unprecedented economic growth that transfmncd Costa Rica completely. The
impact of coffee expcm was so important that by the 1890s Costa Rica had very little
resemblance to the backward, isolated region it had been when it separated from Spain in

1821.
The economic prosperity derived from the coffee boom, to be sure, began to
affect the lifestyles, consumption habits, and customs of the elite from its beginnings. As
early as the l 8SOs there was a tendency to imitate European pattc:ms of life through the

impon of a great variety of goods unknown before in Costa Rica. These goods ranged

from furniture, pianos and cognac to the west fashions in clothing. The openings of
new economic hori7.0ns, nonetheless, did immediately not change established patterns of
interaction and social behavior. President Mora and other prominent merchants, for
example, continued to wait on the customers in their stores themselves. In fact, to the
astonishment of foreign travelers, on Saturdays, the busiest market day, it was possible
to find Mora in his

store cutting pieces of cloth fcr his customers who came in from the

23

countryside. One of these foreigners wu W-tlhem Marr, a German who first visited

Costa Rica in 1852 Marr WU appalled by the shopkeeping activities and the marketplace mentality of the country's m>st distinguished mm and ccnsidered it a great obstacle
for development. He pointed out that on market day, the justices of the Supreme Court

sold cotton stockings, the Minisu:r of Fmance Manuel Jose Carazo tried to convince
potential buyers of the good quality of his drinking glasses, while military officcn sold
nails and ~ and physicians had remedies and soda ref.rcshments for sale in the
main pl87.a of San Josd.38

Man- considered that the talents of intelligent and well-read

men like Minister Caram were being wasted because they spent m>st of their time

bargaining with their customers instead of pursuing m,re important activities.39
Man- and other foreign visitors were even more shocked by the favorite

entertainment of the Costa Rican elite in the 18505, the cockfight. Some coffee planters
and merchants, to be sure, gathered in the evenings at the only hotel that existed in the
capital at that time to socialize, drink, and gamble. But the elite's main meeting place
was at the weekly cockfights on Sunday afternoons. Marr wrote that be had a chance to
meet many of the prominent social and political figures at the cockfight On the day Marr
visited the cockfight he found there President Mora and his brother Josd Joaqu{n, along
with many other leading coffee planters and merchants. Marr wrote that present in the

same building where the cockfight was taking place were also individuals of the lower
social classes. Marr manifested his disapproval and contempt for the way in which the
elite members mingled with the ordinary people and bet for their favorite cocks against
poor and barefoot men.40

The unaffected and open way in which the prominent coffee planters and
merchants dealt with the mass of the people in the mid-nineteenth century was due in
large pan to the economic conditions of the colonial period that ~vented the
development of a highly stratified society. The ancestors of the coffee planters and
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merchants were not far better off than the ordinary people and in many cases had to till
the land themselves to survi'YC due to the lack of a large laborforce.41 AJ amaaer of fact,
there was not a considaable separad.on between upper and Iowa' classes in Costa Rica

beftX"e the development of the export agriculture. It was the wealth pncrared by coffee
that gradually set the members of the elite apart from the rest of the people.
The Mora years fell within the period of transition from the economy of
subsistence to the export economy. The earnings from coffee exports had not changed
yet the local economic conditions which had forced the elite to diversify its ventures in
order to increase the possibilities of obtaining profits. Even though the members of the

elite were investing increasingly in coffee cultivation during the 1850s they continued to
be actively involved in sugar cane production, cattle raising, mining, and commerce. In

addition to diversify their ventures. these coffee planters and merchants, like their
~

reinfmced their network of kinship and business links to strengthen their

fortunes and reDted to the government fer an additional source of income.
These men. however, were able to accomplish politically something their
forefathers could not achieve during the colonial period. The coffee planters and
merchants shaped and oriented the political institutions of the Costa Rican yoWlg republic
to further their economic interests. The elite strengthened the state apparatus and
provided it with the resoun:cs to create the infrastructure that the continued growth of

coffee exports demanded. The Mora years marked the beginning of that process of
· transfcxmation of the ·swe into the main promoter of economic development which took

place throughout the second half of the nineteenth century.
The analysis of the presidency of Mora will show that some of the main
foundations for the consolidation of the national state were laid during the 1850s. It will
point out also that in the early decades of the development of the export agriculture, when
coffee earnings had not solved yet problems such as the 1aclc of cum:ncy, the

25

accomplishment of some long tenn goals wu posq,oned by the elite's endeavor to use to
the government's funds to cover ii, UIJDY'dja!e financial needs.

~ enxrrinati0'\ of

Mora's administration will demonsttale duu be and many coffee plamas and merchants
participaicd actiwly in the implemenwion mkey points of the pm:rnment's agenda. That
situation blurred the line sepanting the privare businesses of the elite from the

administration of public affairs and was crucial in the political struggle among the coffee
planters and merchants that prompted Mora's overthrow in 1859.
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19 Ovil de

CliAP1"ER 'IWO

nm POUTICAL AND ECONOMIC CAREER OF
JUAN RAFAEL MORA

The CaJ1:CI' of Juan Rafael Mora constituted a very good example of the liberal way
in which coffee planters and merchants mixed economics and politics to further both their

personal interests and those of the elite in general. In Mora's case, however, his
combination of business with politics created a fmmula that WOIXed rcmaibbly well for
him and the elite for almost a decade. At the basis of that formula were Mora's strong
character, pragmatism and leadership quali~ and his clear understanding of the
economic and political needs of the country.
Mora began his incursion into the field of commerce when he opened a general
stcxc in San Jos6 in 1833. Dming the early years of bis commercial activities Mora
attempted on two different occasions to establish business partnerships with other

merchants to expand his ventures. These initial efforts were fruitless but Mora finally
was able to form a company with Vicente Aguilar in 1842. 1 By that time Mora had
begun to expand his businesses by traveling to Jamaica where he took gold and silver
from the mines of Montes dcl Aguacate and exchanged these metals for manufactured
goods which he later sold in Costa Rica. He had to travel abroad and do the transactions
himself due to the absence of agents and representatives of fcxcign firms in Costa Rica.

who became active there only after the expansion of coffee exports. At the same time that

and developing several coffee haciendas through the purchase of small plots of land and
consolidating them into larger units. These haciendas were located in the outskirts of San
Jose, most of them in Pavas siruated west of the capital and others in the southern part of
town, in a place called La Isla. 2
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Mora's associatim with Aguilar enabled both of them to have a solid start in the
coffee expcxt business. Their firm, known as "Mora & Aguilar," began its operatiOllS
with a capital of 18,000 ~ which were the equivalent of 3,600 pounds sterling and
became of one the largest export and import companies in the 1840s.3 Aguilar and Mora

were able to take a lead in the export business by increasing the volume of their coffee

shipments through the purchase of coffee produced on other growers' haciendas. Chile
was the first market for Costa Rican coffee and was the most impcxtant one until coffee
began to be shipped directly to Great Britain after 1844. Consequently, soon after the
establishment of his partnership with Aguilar, Mora traveled to the Orilean port of
Valparaiso with an impcxtant cargo of coffee in 1843. He went there to explore the
possibilities of establishing commen:ial links m behalf of the company "Men & Aguilar"
with one of the major export firms there. Men accomplished his goal since he was able

to sell his coffee cargo to the agentS of the Glasgow firm of "John Thompson Wattson &
Co." These agents provided the firm "Mora & Aguilar" with credit mainly in the form of
advaDCC3 of merchandise that Mora took back to CoS1a Rica in we 1843.

After this

initial trip, Mora made several others in the following five years, taking advantage of the

newly-established business conncctiOllS in Chile. On those trips Mora carried out
transactions on behalf of the company, and also took orders for goods from other Costa
Rican merchants and purchased merchandise for his own store.4
Men started to participate in politics while he was developing his commercial

connections abroad. He began his political career in the 1840s, a decade charac1erizcd by
a very restive political climate.. The political instability of the 1840s was manifested in the
fact that seven different people headed the executive ~ in a period of nine years and

none of them was able to complete his term. As a matter of fact, President Braulio
Carrillo was overthrown in April. 184~ by the Honduran General Francisco Moram. At
the time Marmo was living in exile in New Granada. but he had not abandoned his plans
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of resurrecting the Central American Federal Republic. Consequently. Moraun regarded
the invitations of Carrillo's opponents to carry out a military coup as an excellent

opportunity to regain power in Central America. Treason amon1 the goyemmcm troopS
facilitaeed Moraun's invasion and rapid take OYCr of power in Costa Rica. He was

appointed chief of state in July, 1842, but unfonunau:ly for M<X'IDII. two months later he
was ousted by another anned movement. and was executed in San Jose.5 After these
violent events, Jose Mana Alfaro was chosen as inb:rim president until Francisco Marfa
Oreamuno was elected in 1844. But Oreamuno resigned after twenty-five days in office
and was succeeded by Rafael Gallegos. Galle~ in tum, was overthrown by another
military coup in 1846 that brought Jose Mana Alfaro to power once again.6

Mora was elected member of the constiment assembly summoned in 1846 to draft
a new constitution after the coup that ousted Gallegos. When this new constimtion was
adopted all the individuals who took part in the constituent assembly, including Mora.
became members of Congress. The elections held in 1847 were won by Jose Mana
Castro who chose Jose Mana Alfaro as vice-president. Alfaro, however, resigned in
September, 1847 and Men was elected to replace Alfaro.
Mora served as vice-president in an administration that was also charactcri.zcd by
political unrest. The two years of the government of Jose Mana Castro, from 1847 to
1849. in fact, were marked by several attempted revolts and constant rumors of
conspiracies. The reasons that led Jose Mana Alfaro to resign to the vice-presidency
were also responsible for a great deal of the instability of the Castro years. Alfaro was
the member of one of the leading families of the city of Alajucla. Alfaro along with his
brother Florentino, who was a military commander, had participated actively in the events
that led to Morazan's invasion and to the fall of Gallegos. The coup that ousted Gallegos
and put Jose Marla Alfaro in power as interim president. indeed, was led by his brother,
Florentino Alfaro. Due to his active involvement in the overthrow of Gallegos, Jose
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Mana Alfaro was expecting to be confirmed as president when elections were held in

1847. But it was Jos6 Marla Castro and not Alfaro who wu elected. This rejection
planted the seed of political resentment that turned the military fm:es of Alajuela under the
command of the Alfaro brothers into a continuous source of unrest.7
The tmmoil of the 1840s had transformed Alajuela in a military stronghold since
an imponant number of armaments and ammunition had been concennied there in the
course of the constant rise and fall of governments that charactem.ed this decade.

President Castto, in an attempt to reduce the military power of Alajuela ordered the
transfer to San Jose of all the armaments with the exception of the rifles that each
militiaman kept at home. This move increased the resentment of the A1faros and their
suppa,i:rs and marked the beginning of several failed revolts against Castto's
govcmmcnt.8 One of these rebellions provided Mora with the opportunity to
dcmonstrare his political skills, and especially his ability to take control rapidly of a

critical situation.
Certainly, in March 1848 while Mora was serving as acting president he took
rapid and effective measures to supress a rebellion of a group of Alajuelans who tried to
overthrow Castro while he was in Puntarenas. However, the rebels' plans failed
because immediately after be learned of the uprising. Mora suspended all constitutional

guaran~ declared a swc of emergency, and ordered that every man between the ages
of founeen to fifty should repcxt within three hours to the military commanders of each
town to defend the government. 'Ibe government 1rOOpS marched to Alajuela and the

rebellion movement wu suffocated.9
In June. 1848, a few months after Mora played that crucial role in suppressing
the revolt. he resigned as vice-president. Mara's resignation has been intcpreted as a
result of his differences with Castro regarding the punishment applied to the men

involved in the failed rebellion of March of that same year. Mora thought that it was

34

necessary to use an iron hand to preserve law and order while Castro tended to favor a
more tolerant approach.10 To a large extent, Castro's relucwx:e to use force was
responsible for the fall of his government in November, 1849. Castro's fall, however,

was not the result of a revolt that «iginu:d in Alajuela er any other armed m:wement, but
the outcome of a belligerant opposition within the elite circles that wanted a stronger man
in charge of the executive office. That man was Juan Rafael Mora.
The events that preceded the election of Mora reveal some of the ways in which

the coffee planter and merchant elite manipulated the constitutional principles and

government instirutions to achieve its goals. ~ in most places, the elite excluded the
mass of the people from participating in elections and in the government by restricting
citi2enship to property owners. The constitution of 1848, in force when Mora was elected
president, granted cimenship to males twenty-one years or older provided that they
owned property valued at least 300 pesos. or had a minirn,1m annual income of 150
pesos. A literacy qualification was added to these requisites in 1853. The right to v~
however, was limited to male citi2ens twenty•five years or older that 1NeI'C head of the
family, literate and had a mioirnurn of 1,000 pesos in properties.11
In 1849, Congress was made up of twelve representatives who served six years
and were elected through indirect elections. The men who served in Congress during the
last months of Castro's administration had engaged in a series of political maneuvers that

aimed at appointing Mora as vice-president when it was imminent that Castro was going
to hand in his resignation having been pn:ssured by an increasing opposition. The way to

Mora's election was opened when Castro's vice-president Manuel Jose Caram resigned
in October, 1849. Congress called for an election to choose Carazo's successor. Mora

was elected in early November, 1849, but the results of the elections were not made
public until two weeks later, on the day of Castro's resignation.
The resignation of president Castro was precipitated by the warnings of Jose
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Manuel Quiros, the commanding officer of the military bmack of San Jose. Quiros went
to visit Castro at his house and told him to leave office voluntarily, otherwise be would be

ousted by a coup and sent in10 exiJe.12 In the praence of such threat. Castro notified
Congress of his decision 10 su:p down from p0'lf'Cl' il1101Ntiately. The congressmen
accepted Castto's resignation on November 16, 1849, and shonly after announced the
election of Mora as vice-president and called on him to take the oath of office. The
constitution of 1848 stipulated that in the absence of the president because of death,
resignation, or any other reason. the vicc•president should take his place. In the case of
Castto's resignation. nonetheless, Congress altered the constitutional procedures by
calling for an election for president. Mora. who was already entitled co take the
pretidency, was elccu:d by a majority of voees.13 The decision of these congressmen to

go through an unncccssary procedure indicates that they wan1ed Mora's election to be
sanctioned by all means available.
By late 1849 when he was elected president, Mora was facing financial troubles
originating mainly by the fall in the price c:L coffee in the European market during the
previous year. Mora had recently dissolved his partnership with Vicente Aguilar but had
continued doing business by himself with the firm of "John Thompsai Wattson & Co."
in Chile. On his last trip to Valparaiso before be was elected, Mora found out that the

debit balance in the account that he had with the Thompson firm was much higher than he

anticipated. It was at that time when Mora learned that the last coffee cargo that the

company Mora and Aguilar had left on consignment with the Thompson firm bad been
sold in Europe at half of the price assessed at the moment when the contract to have the
cargo sent overseas was signed. The amount of the losses was considerable taking into
account that this was a cargo of 33,562 quintals of coffee. The losses amounted to about
lS0,000 pesos, the equivalent of approximately 30,000 pounds sterling.14 The capital
with which Mora was doing business transactions had been supplied largely by "John
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Thompson Wauson &: Co." Mora bad received advances of cash and merchandise over
the profits that would result from the coffee sales in Europe. Consequently, the fall in the

price of coffee reduced not only the amount of profits that would cover part of Mora's
debt to the Thompson firm but also the capital that he would haw available for business
operations at home.
Hence. Mora bad a considerable financial obligation to bis creditors abroad at the

time when his name was being strongly supponcd as the successor of Castro. Vicente
Aguilar claimed years later that Mora's financial troubles played a major role in his
decision to look for the presidency in 1849. Aguilar declared that his former business
partner Mora was about to be sued by the Thompson firm far the payment of lS0,000
pesos when he took power. IS There is no specific information in the notarial records
that corroborates Aguilar assertions about Mora's financial difficulties in the late 1840s.

Nonetheless, there is evidence in those reca-ds which indicall:S that Mora had
considerable cn:dit obligations at home and had defaulted on some of them. Mora, for
example, owed more than 20,000 pesos to Eduardo Wallcrstcin, a German merchant who
resided in Costa Rica.16. Mora's transactions in these records show that during this
period be sold some of his coffee haciendas. That Mora did not replace those haciendas

immediateJy is further indication of an unstable financial situation.

Consequently, there was very likely a great deal of economic interest behind
Mora's political ambition since the presidency implied receiving a steady income and the
possibility of using public fund, liberally to cope with his personal financial troubles.
Mora's personal motivations to seek public office, however, were combined with his
clear understanding of the functioning of politics and notable leadenhip qualities. This

combinati011 gave origin to a political formula that led the elite to support strongly Mora's
election and the main policies of his administration. This political formula proved to

worlc out very effectively for Mora and the elite for almost ten years. Mora, in fact, was
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elected for a second presidential term in April, 1853.17
Mora's strong character and Pfflgmltism. mi1ed very well the interest of the elite
in a hist0rical moment in which the use of fon:e wu pivotal for preparing the terrain for

the consolidation of the authority of national sta1e. Mora, unlike his predecescr Ios6

Mana Cu~ did not hesiwe to use an iron hand when the circwmtances demanded it or
to violate the constitution if that wu the fas1eSt way to achieve a goal. In comparison

with other Latin American countries. Costa Rica's political histmy in the nineteenth
century is notable for the absence of prolonged. bloody civil wars. Nonetheless, the
events of the 1840s revealed that as in other places, during the formative stage of the
national swc the executive power was al the mercy of regional a>nflicts, persaial
ambitions and political rivalries.
The firm incmporation into the world mmet in the second half of the nineteenth
century hastened the process of consolidation of the national stare in Latin America. In
the early stages of this process the stare made its presence felt mainly as an instrument for

repression and social comro1 in charge of eliminating the obstacles that were hindering the
development of the new economic oponunitics opened by the markets abroad.18 The
increasing preponderance that the institutiats designed fer the reinfcrccment and
legitimation of centtal power had within the government of Mora corresponded to that
early stage of the process of consolidation of the national stare.
Mora. to be sure, from the very moment that he took power in December, 1849,
underscored that the creation and prcservation of political stability would be the priorities
of his govemmenL The positivist fcrmula of "Order and progress" was frequently
quoted in Mora's annual reports to Congress. President Mora pointed out in these reports
that coffee exports were growing and becoming the core of the national economy al the

same time that they were unleashing a steady flow of material progress. Mora
emphasiz.ed that order was a sine QJll non for progress and for Costa Rica's
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transformation into a "civilized" country such u the European nations and United States.
The first measures implemented by Mora 10 crea!e the conditions for maintenance

of Older involved important refonns 10 the orpnization of the military. Mora declared
that a great deal of the instability of the previous years had been due 10 the loosening of
the bonds of discipline and obedience among the military officers. This situati~

according to Mora, had transformed the army into an instrument of factions that
promoted regional divisions and conflicts and wu a constant threat to the man in the

presidency instead of being the backbone of bis authority. Consequently, Mora said that
he was determined to eliminate those elements that had altered the army's functions and to
tum it into a subordinate and obedient body .19

The existence of only one military barrack in San Jose, the Cuaru;l Principal , was

one of the reasons for the weakened loyalty of the military officers toward the
government. This situation had turned the comrnandirJg officer of this barrack into a very
influential individual with enough power to act independently and frequently against the
president's orders.20 Therefore, Mora established a second barrack in San Jose in April,
1850 to reduce the power of the commanding officer of the Cuanel Principal who was at
that time Jose Manuel Quiros. Mora CKdered that all cannons except one. and all the

rifles, and ammunition be transferred from the existing bamck to the new one called

Cuarb;l de Artillert'a. Quiros and some of bis officen resented this measure which was a
clear indication of Mora's lack of trust of their loyalty and support to his administration.
Quiros' discontent led him to make a series of demands to Mora and even to threaten him

with a coup. Mora responded by dismissing Quiros and other officers who suppated
their commander from their military posts. The conflict with Quiros, nonetheless, did not
end there since the deposed commander organized a revolt in early June. I 850. But this
movement failed, and Quiros and his supponers were imprisoned and sent abroad into
exile. 21 This measure definitively resolved the problem and Mora gained absolute control
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over the bamlcb. Mora entrusted the post of commander in chief of San Ios6 to his
brother-in-law Ios6 Mana Caiias and later to his lx'otber 1096 Ioaqu{n Mora.
The mxpnization of the barracks was followed by tnemm:s oriented towards

making the military a professional. well-ttamed and well-«{Uipped body. The Costa
Rican army by the mid nine11:Cnth century was still cxpnim1 under the Spanish colonial

system of militias. Only a small group of men served in what was called the permanent
force. The rest of the military fcxce was made up of civilians who participatcd in
periodic training exercises but were cal.led to semce only in the event of an emergency to
back up the permanent force. Z2 There were about 5,£,00 men in these militias in the early
1850s and Mc:ra attempted to inaeasc this number up to 9,000. However, he only was
able to increase them to 7,500 men during his administtarioo. Likewise, Mora enacted
new regulations for these militias in Deccmber.1850 that aimed at turning them from a
group of mmtly barefoot peasants who bad vecy little notion of martial discipline into

mere IXOfessional armed ~mces. The establishment of a milialry school in San Ios6 in

1852 under the supervision of Fernando Salisch, a retiJed German officer, to train the
militias constiruu:d an example of Men's effmt to reinfcxce the armed fon:es. 23
The Costa Rican army in the 1850!, nonetheless. was strengthened mainly

through the purchase d imponant amounts of armament and ammunitions. The annual
l'Cpcx1S of the Minislc:r of Finance and War to Coogress throl1ghout this decade mentioned

that the government was buying arms both to modernize and to enlarge its arsenals.
Important sums of money, in fact, were invested in these arms purchases in England.

1be total price of those purchased in 1854, for example amounted to 4,712 pounds
sterling. This purchase included two cannons and other artillery equipment. SOO Minie
rifles with bayonets, 300 barrels of gunpowder, and fifty barrels of bullets and other
types of ammunitions.24 The impcxuti.on of such large quantities of arms in the first half

of the 18SOs was justified by the Men administration as aucial for maintaining the
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political S1ability recently reestablished thanks to the elimination d. the elements that had
been a source of unrest in the past. Mora's Minister of Fi.nancc and War Manuel Jose

Carazo, in fact, explained that the government was taking advantage of the climate of
stability to implement the "well-known principle Si vis pacem, para bellmn , if who wish

peace, prepare for war. "25 Later in that decade the constant military build up was
justified as pivotal for Costa Rica's defense against any threat to its stability coming from

abroad.
The priority placed on the military within Mora's govcmmcnt is evident in the

records of the amount of money allocated in the national budget for the armed forces
during the 1850s. The military consumed the largest amount of the government's
revenues with the exception of the money destined to pay the salaries of public
employees. The importance of the military expenses is shown in Table 2.
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TABLE2

MJUI'ARY BUDGET IN COSTA RICAN PESOS
INTiiE 1850s

Year

budget

total revenues % of toeal
revenues

1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857

54,900

229,406
272,623
485,957
360,172
490,097
506,920
655,028

66,000
78,000
86,000
88,000
81,000
92,000

23%
24%

16%
23%

17%
15%
14%

Source: Archivo Nacional de Costa Rica. Congreso, nos. 5233, 7873, 7231, 20838,
5158, 7843 and Hacienda 6438. Information for 1858 and 1859 is missing in the
documentation.

The budgets of 1856 and 1857 did not include the additional sums allocated to
finance the military campaigns against Wtlliam Walker; nor do figures in Table 2 include
the money spent in the purchase of armament dming this period. The figures in Table 2

become even more meaningful when compared to the amounts allocated f<r education
during that period. The national budget during the 1850s only included an average of

5,000 pesos a year to be destined to the establishment and financing of elementary
schools.26

Mora's policies regarding the military iroved to be very effective in eJi~naring
the focus of unrest and armed opposition of the previous years. The 1850s, surely, were

a decade of political stability which was the outcome of the use of fon::e, measures taken
to reconcile regional factions and Men's popularity. The problem of the discontent of the

Alfaro brothers and other leading Alajuelans disappeared during Men's government
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because he revoked most of the orders and decrees of fonner president Castro regarding

Alajuela which had generated a lot of resentment and opposition.'n The fact that Jos6

Mana Alfaro and his brother Florentino, the camnaoding officer of the barrack of
Alajuela, were friends and suppo11e1s \lf Mora also played an imponant role in the

stability that characteriz.ed his administration.
The military build up of the 1850s imposed a substantial financial burden which

demanded the reorganization of the means of collecting public revenues. At the middle of
the nineteenth century the bulk of Costa Rica's public finances was made up of income

generated from the government monopoly on liqucr and tobacco. The determination of
the coffee planter and merchant elite to avoid all direct taxation on landed wealth or
income, ~ led it to keep and reinforce these monopolies which had been established

by the Spanish authorities during the colonial period.

The most profitable of these two monopolies was the one on liqua sales.
Consequently, Mora implemented a sc:rie of measures to rcaganize it and make it even
more productive. Up to 1850 the government had authom.ed the distillation of liquor

from sugar cane in homes and haciendas by people who paid a fee to do so. These
people acquired the right to distill liquor with the condition that they later sold their
production to the government since the retail sale of aeµardicntc was exclusively on its
hands. The existence of numerous illegal distilleries and the icluctancc of some
individuals to sell their liquor production to the government made it necessary to hire
inspectors and other officers to enforce the laws icgarding the monopoly. This situation

in the long run generated mare expcmcs to the public treasury than the expected results,
and the problem of the illegal distillation and sale of liquor continued unresolved.

Hence, in July, 1850, Mora enacted a decree prohibiting all private distillation
and establishing a national liqucr distillery to be operated by a contractor. This private

contractcr would sell all the liquor production to the government since Mora's decree did
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not eliminale its privileges as the exclusive retailer of alcoholic beverages.

This

reorganization of the liqucr monopoly came into effect in January, 1851 and in part. aimed
at eliminating the cost of paying officials to wau:h for illegal distilleries. In addition and

just as imponan~ the new regulations aimed also at increasing the amount of liquor
produced and improving the quality of the liquor through the inttcduction of better
devices and more hygienic procedures in the elaboration of the alcoholic beverages.28

The creation of a national distillery operated by a private contractor proved to be
very effective from the point of view of the inacase in public revenues derived from

liquor sales. The annual repcxu of Mora's Miniscer of Fmance to Congress emphasiz.ed
that public revenues had grown S11:adily since the establishment of the national distillery.

The minis1er declared that the new distillery, indeed. had reduced costs and increased

liquor production. The imponant increase in the the public revenues derived from liquor
sales in 1850s is shown in Table 3.
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TABLE3

REVENUES OF 1HE LIQUOR DISTD.J.ERY
1850-18<,0
IN COSTA RICAN PESOS
Year

liquor revenues

total government
revenues

%oftotal
revenues

1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860

42,150
SS,601
72,702
74,993
103,312
110,100
72,305
181,182
178,225

193,522
229,406
27~623
485,957
360,172
490,097
506,920
655,028
615,923

21.4%
24.2%
26.6%
15.4%
28.6%
22.4%
14.2%
27.6%
28,9%

111,868

400,000

27.9%

Source: Archivo Nacional de Costa Rica. Congreso nos. 5233, 7873, 7483, 5097,
5158, 5934, 7018.

Maa, his Minister of Finance, Manuel Jose Caram and his Minister of Interior,
Joaqu!n Bernardo Calvo, proudly pointed out in their annual repons to Congress in the

first half of the 1850s that the implemcnt2tion of the ccnttal points in the government's
agenda had had a very firm start thanks to the profits yielded by the liquor industry
which had made the public treasury thrive. During first six years of the Mora
administration, certainly, the condition of the public treasury was sound. In fact, Cost2
Rica at that time did not have a foreign debt or any other substantial burden upon its
national finances that could have taken resources away from the government. Therefore,
while the funds of the public treasury were not ~uge they were enough to cover the basic
expenses of the government, and also to finance the military build up, the improvement of
the road to Puntarenas and other projects related to the development of the export
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agriculture.
The sound condition of the public treasury during the first half of the 1850s was

crucial as well in the smooth implementation of bodl Mora's personal goals and those of
the coffee plan1CrS and merchants without majer conflicts of interest. As a matter of fact,

some measures and dispositions that accompanied Mora's cff<rt to strengthen the
executive power indicaie that he was able to divert substantial sums of money from the
public treasury for his personal use.
The strengthening of the executive power that took place parallel to the

reinforcement of the military, as in most of Latin Amcri~ was a process that combined
the expansion of the powers of the president with measures that tended to inculcate the

acceptance and respect to his authority. This eff<rt to instill respect fer the high-ranking
authorities was manifesa:d in the construction of the National Palace, a sumptuous
building that was finished in 1855, to home the offices of the president and his two
~

and the Congress. This endeavor was manifested also in the idea that public

officers should be well-mnuneraicd to penorm their duties with dignity.29 The
emphasis on the need to increase the salaries of public officers as a way to highlight their

authority c:onstituU:d a very appropriate anu:cedcnt for the approval in Congress of
considerable sums of money fer Mora in the form of discretionary funds.
1be congressmen who were closer to Mora and his strongest supponers in the

early years of his government included Miguel Mora, the president's brother, Satumino

Tmoco, Rafael Barroeta. Tomu Sandoval, Modesto Guev~ Santiago Fern~z,
Lucas Alvarado, and Francisco Mana Oreamtmo who was the vice-president and served
also as president of Congress. These members of Congress played an important role in

Mora's misuse of public funds since they threw a veil of legality over it by actively
supporting a series of motions to raise Mora's salary and assign him discretionary
funds.
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In June,185~ in fact, Lucas Alvarado poinled out in Congress that the salary of
the president, which was then 3,000 pesos a year, had not been modified since 1841
when the salaries of the other public employees were raised. Alvarado's commentary
gave origin to a congressional motion for providing Mora with a special allowance to

compensate him "for the constant efforts that he had made to take the public treasury out
of the ruinous conditions in which it was when he took power".30 This motion
remarked that thanks to Mora's decisive actions the treasury had acquired a level of
prosperity not known before. It also underscored that the Mora administration had had

important beneficial effects upon the country. Likcwi~ the motion pointed out that
Mora had saved Costa Rica from falling into anarchy and disorder and had set the country
among the group of politically stable nanons.31
There is a remark in this congressional motion that suggests that the intended
purpose of the motion was other than the one expressed. This remarlc pointed out that the
perftXmaDCC of Mora's public functions bad compelled him to neglect his large

agricultural and commercial cntelprises, and that this had caused a remarkable damage to
his personal interests. The document added that the republic could not permit that "the

economic sacrifices of such an illustrious patriot be passed over unnoticed." 32
The congressional motion to reward Mora f<r important achievements of his
administration contended likewise that the accomplishments of his governments had
obligated Mora to use his personal capital to pay for unexpected expenses related to his
presidential duties.

The document considcrcd that Costa Rica should followed the ·

example of other countries that had assigned their rulers a sum from the public treasury
to cover extraordinary expenses. This motion added that in those countries the rulers had

no obligation to account for the way in which the allowance was spent because it usually
was intended to carry out measures to preserve order and tranquility and those matters
should be kept confidential.33 This commentary provided a very convenient argument to
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make Mora unaccountable for considerable amounts of money that he received throughout
the 1850s as discretionary funds.
As a maner of fact. Congress issued a decree 011 July 1, 1852 giving Mora 3,000

pesos for discretionary funds and declared that thereafter the amount of this allowance
should be fixed each year.34 The following year, in June, 1853, Congress declared that
it had resolved to grant Mora a raise of 2,000 pesos because his salary was not included
in the dispositions that increased the salaries of other public employees in 1852. Thus,

this disposition increased Mora's yearly salary from 3,000 to 5,000 pesos.35 The
motion that proposed the raise pointed out that Mora's "politeness and tact" had prevented
him from authorizing an increase for humelf. The proposal praised once more Mora's

government by emphasizing that the raise wu necessary to give the president "a
testimony of approval of his accurate administration of public affairs. "36 Men,

according to this motion, deserved recognition fer the way in which in the last three
years, "public revenues had thrived, internal peace had prevailed, and the government
had been beneficial to the country".37 Likewise, Congress in a separate decree approved

an allowance for Mora of 4,000 pesos of discretionmy funds for the year 1853.38
That the amount of these discretionary funds grew very rapidly in a short lapse is

another indication that this allowance was intended to serve purposes that were different
from what Congress manifested. The discretionary funds increased from 4,000 to 6,000

pesos in 1854, and the latter amount was also allocated in 1855. However, in 1856
Congress augmented the allowance to 10,000 pesos declaring that the war in Nicaragua
posed increasing demands to the procection of the 11:ffitorial integrity of the country.
This same amount was approved in 1857 fer discretionary funds for the president since

Congress considered that the war in Nicaragua continued to pose a serious threat to Costa

Rica's sovereignty. The funds assigned to Mora in 1858 amounted to 8,000 pesos but in
the following year, in 1859 they were increased to 10,000 pesos.39
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Therefore, Mora began his peritXi of government in we 1849 earning a yearly
salary of 3,000 pesos. When he wu overthrown in 1859 he had an annual income of

15,000 pesos, which was the combination of his salary with the discretionary funds

allowance. The exaggerated increase of Mora's income becomes evident when r, • • •• a.-4
with the salaries of other high ranking officials. This is illustrated in Tables 4 and 5.

TABLE4

YEARLY INCOME OF PRESIDENT MORA
1849·1859
IN COSTA RICAN PESOS
year

total incomel

1849·1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859

3,000
6,000
9,000
11,000
11,000
15,000
13,000
15,000
15,000

!Salary plus discretionary funds.

Source: Gobiemo de Cosm Rica. Cglg;tj6n de Leyes y Decn;tos, vols. 12·16.

49

TABLE5

YEARLY SALARIES OF CML AND MILITARY OFFICERS
INTIIE 1850s
IN COSTA RICAN PESOS
Public officer
Vice-president
Ministers
Congressmen
Regent of Supreme Court
Justices

1,800

1,920
520
1.200-2,300
1,080-1,800
600
2,000
1,800
1,500
800
650
600

Judges
Army Major General
Brigadier

Colonels
Lieutenant Colonels
Sargent Majors

Captains-

Source: Gobiemo de Costa Rica. Colccci6n de Lem y Decretos. vol.12.

The salaries of the members of the Supreme Court were the only ones that were
increased three times during the 1850s. The assignment of new functions to the Justices

of the Supreme Cowt in 1856, in fact. was accompanied by a modification of their
salaries. The Supreme Court Regent's salary was increased to 1,(,()() pesos, the District
Attorney's to 1,42.S pesos. the salary of the newly appointed President of the Court of
Second Instance was established on 1,3(,() pesos, and those of other four Justices were

augmented to 1,314 pesos.40 Mora's government resolved to increase the salaries of the
members of the Supreme Court one a:ae ti.me in 1858 as a pan of the reorganization of
the Judicary and as the administration put it "in recognitim to their high-rank and
responsibilities in the delicate task of administering justice".4 1 The salary of the Regent

was augmented to 2,300 pesos, those of the District Attorney and the President of the

Court of Second Instance to 1,900 pesos and those of the Justices to 1,800 pesos.42
Regardless of the substantial raise in the salaries of the Justices of Supreme Court
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those hikes were not in proportion with the increase of Mora's. In fact, there was an
increase of almost a 1 ~ in the Regent of the Supreme Court's salary while Mora's
raises were at~- The presidential duties and responsibilities of Mon and his efforts
to foster the development of the country's political and economic institutions in no way

justified such huge raises in his salary along with the allocation of an allowance for
discretionary funds. The other Congressional justification to grant Mora discretionary
funds dealt with expenses that he might have in his task of maintaining public order. It

was not necessary either to approve discretionary funds for that purpose because the
government allocated considerable amounts of money for military expenses in the 1850s.
This fact as well strongly suggests that the discretionary funds were intended to supply
Mora with additional capital from the national treasury since these allowance and his
salary were paid in advance and with preference over any other public expense during his

administration.43
Even though there was no solid ground from the point of vie_w of the public
needs to give Mora discretionary funds, the favorable economic conditions that prevailed
during the first half of the 1850s made possible the payment of such funds and his huge
salary without imposing a burden too heavy on the public treasury. These prosperous

coµditions, however, disappeared as a result of Mora's decision to get Costa Rica
involved in the war that was being fought in Nicaragua against the American filibuster
William Walker. This crusade for the defense of Central America's sovereignty proved to
be very expensive. The military campai~ indeed, exhausted in a period of a few

months the resoun:es of what up to that moment had, been a sound public treasury. The
war against Walk.er marlced a turning point in the Mora administration because it
significantly altered the course of Costa Rica's internal affairs. For more than a year the
priorities of the government revolved around national defense while other important
aspects of the public administration were neglected. But the war is also significant
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because it marted the beginning of the decomposition of the combination of elements that
earlier on had propitiated Mora's rise to power. The breakup of the political consensus
among the coffee planters and merchants towards Mora began when he went ahead with
his plans to launch an offensive attack against Walker in 1856. Men got Costa Rica
involved in a military confrontation with Walker against the opinion of most of the
leading members of the elite.
William Walker, a native of Tennessee. was an adventurer who believed fervently

in the Manifest Destiny doctrine. Walker had adopted the idea that it was in the interest of

civilization to conquer and dominate people who were not capable of developing the

resources of their natives lands. This caiviction led Walker to organize an invasion to
Baja California in 1853 in an aurmpt to establish an independent ICpUblic on Mexican
soil. Walker was rapidly defeated by the Mexican anny and fled bade to the United

Sla!CS. This military expedition. however, gave Walker renown in the circles of the

adventures which took him to Nicamgua in June, 1855. N'aragua was at that time tom
by a civil war benveen a liberal faction concenttaied in the ncxthem city of Le6n and a
conservative one which was very strong in the city of Granada located in the south of that
counay. The liberals saw in Walker and bis army of adventurers an excellent ally to

strengthen their fon:es and defeat their caitenders and consequently called Walker to

N'u:aragua to back them up. Soon after Walker arrived in Nicaragua and joined the liberal
forces he assumed political and military cmtrol of the region that was dominaied by this
faction.
The news of Walker's takeover of the liberal faction and his rapid progress
towards the caitrol of the tat of Nicaragua aleru:d the ocher Central American
goyemments. Walker represented a serious th.teat to the independence of all the region

since he had already made public bis dc1ermination to unify all the Central American
countries into one republic and annex it to the Slave States of the United States.
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Consequently, the other Central American governments began to e:xchange letters and
communications about the situation in Nicaragua and to consider the possibility of joining

efforts to oust Walkcr from that country. President Mora took the initiative in these plans
to organize a combined offensive against Walbr. He was kept well-informed of the
events in Nicaragua through Costa Rica's envoy to the United Scates and other sources.
The strong presence of Walker's forces in the proximity of Nicaragua's border

with Costa Rica and a series of diplomatic incidents with him increased Mora's fears of
an imminent invasion in early 1856. The relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua
became very tense after Mora refused to receive an envoy of Wal.km who had been sent
to try to convince his government that Walker did not harbor any plans fer a military
aggression against Costa Rica. When he was ordered to leave Costa Rican tenitory

without having had a chance to talk to Mora, Walker's envoy threatened military
retaliation. Thcref<re, in February, lS,6 Mora requested Congress to grant him extended

presidential powers to <rganize a military expedition to defend the ncxthem border and to
march to Nicaragua if that became necessary. Mora wu convinced that once Costa Rica
began the offensive against Walker the other Central American countries would also send
troops and that the Nicaraguan people would as well join the faces fighting against the

American intruders. He thought that a united Ccnttal American front would defeat
Walker and his men easily and in a shon period of time. Mora, however, was
overconfident about the military support of the other countries which came several
months after Costa Rica got involved in the war in Nicaragua.
The armed confrontations with Walker's army began soon after Mora and the
Costa Rican troops marched to the border in late March, 1856. The first combat took
place within Costa Rican tmitory, since Walker's men had already invaded this country
when Mora and the army were in their way to the border. After a surprise attack and
rapid defeat of Walker's men in Guanacaste, Mora marched with the troops into
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Nicaragua where they engaged in several confrontations and vanquished the enemy forces
in the city of Rivas. The Costa Rican army remained in Nicaragua 1D1til we April, 1856

when the outbreak of an epidemic of cholera mcrbus forced Men to order the retmn of
the troops to Costa Rica. The cholera epidemjc extended to Costa Rica during June and
July, 1856, taking a high toll among the population. In fact, approximately 10,000

people died as a con3CQUence of this epidemic. Because of the epidemic Men was
unable to resume the military offensive against Walker until early November,1856.
Mora did not accompany the army in this second offensive which was fought on two
different fronts. One group of soldiers went to the nortbcastem part of the Costa ~ to
the San Juan River region which was an strategic point. This river sened at that time as

an intcroceanic route coMecting the Atlantic and the Pacific and was Wal.m's lifeline.
The control of the San Juan River by the Costa Rican fcxces consequently cut off the
supply line of arms and food to the Americans. The other front was localed in
southwestern Nicaragua where the Costa Ricans were finally joined in the fight by troops
from the other Ccnttal American countries in early 1857. The combined offensive on
both fronts weakened considerably the American forces and Walbr SU!l'Cndered in May,

1857.44
This victory over Walker filled Mora with pride and turned him into a national

hero for later generations. Nonetheless, Mora paid a very high political price for this
triumph. Most of the leading coffee planters were against the idea of an offensive attack
against Walker because they considered that Costa Rica <lid not have the capability to

finance a war abroad. These men also had reservations about Mora's capacity to direct
such enterprise due to his lack of military training and experience. These prominent

members of the elite were opposed to the war because they feared as well that it would
take the already shon supply of labor away from productive activities and would have

other unpredictable consequences.
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The preparation far the military campaigns in Nicaragua, as the elite anticipated,

demanded the imposition of two forced internal loans to increase the resources of the
public tteasury. Mora, in fact, in February 1856 enacted a deaee imposing a forced loan
of 100,000 pesos on the residents of the four main cities. San Jos6 was asked to
conaibute 45,000 pesos, Cartago and Heredia, 20,000 pesos each, and AJajuela, 15,000
pesos. Mora appointed a commission of five people in each city to make a list of the
individuals that would have to

pay the conaibution and to determine the amount of the

conaibutions ac..-ording to the income of each person. The individuals that wen: chosen
to pay were compelled to do so within a month. If they failed to do so they would be
obliged to pay double the amount established, and would lose the right to receive any
interest on their money. A second forced loan for 50,000 pesos was imposed in late

A~ 1856.45 The internal loans generated discontent among the elite not only because
of the imposition of a mandatory contribution but because the goyemmcnt paid them back
in bonds instead of cash.46 The mobilization of troops to the northern border also
disrupted the nmmal development of economic activities because the government forced
citizens to provide the army with food supplies, horses and oxen. The transponation of
goods, for example, was affected because the government confiscated cans to move

troops or armamen~.
The disagreements concerning the war against Walker, and the consequences of
these military campaigns estranged several men who had been among Mora's strongest
supparn:n during the early years of his government. The most visible separation was
that of Mora's Minister of Fman~ Manuel

Jose Carazo.

Caram was one of the people

who insisted that the war against Walker demanded military capabilities that Costa Rica

lacked He remained in office during the time that Mora and the army were in Nicaragua.
Caram, however, was very distressed by the news that he received from Mora regarding
the number of deaths. Carazo was quoted as saying that he had warned Mora and
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everybody else that Costa Rica's unpreparedness for a war abroad was going to result in

a high death toll but nobody bad paid aaention.47 Caram raigned in June, 1856, soon
after Mora returned from Nicaragua.

The war alienaled Mm from seven! prmninent coffee plamm and merchants but
that in itself was not responsible for the rupture of comensus that pnmpltd Mora's

overthrow. It was the financial crisis brought about by the war that changed the
conditions of Mora's political formula which had functioned successfully up to that
moment. The war against Walker, cenainly, exhausb:d the resources of the public
treasury and created a deficit that slowed down the implementation of Mora's agenda.

The new Minister of Fmance Rafael G. Escalante repancd to Congress in 1857 that the
military emergency of the previous year had consumed most of the resources of the

treasury, acated an internal debt of ahmst 100,000 pesos and imposed new financial

burdens on the government Escalante pointed out that as a result of the war the
administration had acquired the obligation to pay compensations to the widows and
families of the dead soldiers, and salaries and indemnities to the militiamen.41
This difficult national financial situation was in no way transitory; it outlasted the

Mora administration. Mora. nooethelcss, during the last years of his government
concentrated all bis efforts in the implementation of measures aimed at solving the
financial aisis. Pivotal in the endeavor to cope with the critical financial situation were

the measures taken to keep the national distillery operating with profit, to establish an

issuing bank. and to sell some municipal and communal lands.

But Mora in the late 1850s was not only facing the problem of running a country
with a depleted public treasury. He was also having serio~s personal financial troubles
and the critical conditions of the national treasury made it impossible for Mora to resort to .
it for funds to cover his major credit obligations. The most important evidence of Mora's

financial difficulties was the sale of two of bis largest coffee haciendas located in Pavas to
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pay his creditors in 1857.
The transactions ex properties registered by Mera in the notarial reccrds during the

first half of the 1850s show that be was buying properties in Pavas to substitute those he
had been forced to sell in 1848. Indeed. soon after Mora became president be bought a
hacienda of twenty-four hectares in Pavas cultivated with 28,000 shrubs of coffee for
4,300 pesos.49 Pending credit obligations. however, frust:ran:d Mora's plans to enlarge
his coffee haciendas in Pavas.
Mora himself acknowledged publicly that his debts to foreign crediurs forced
him to sell two of his main coffee haciendas.so Even though Mora did not specify in that

public commentaiy who were those foreign creditors information in the notarial records
strongly suggests that one of them wu Eduardo Wallers1ein, a German merchant who
was Costa Rica's consul to London during the 1850s. That information also indicates
that Mora sold one his coffee haciendas in Pavu to Mariano Montealegre in March. 1857,

to pay a debt of 4,000 pounds sterling to WalJerstein.51 The coffee hacienda sold to

Mariano Montealegre had eighty hectares. The sale included the hacienda's two-story
house with the furniture and all the household items that were inside the dwelling. the
buildings where coffee grains were dried and processed for exponation, several oxcarts
and tools, and fifteen hectares of pasture land Montealegre bought this hacienda for
37.SOO pesos that he paid to Mora in cash, coffee and drafts drawn on pounds sterling.
Mora. indeed, received 2,SOO pesos in cash at the moment of the transaction, and 1.500
quintals of coffee in April,1858, worth 15,000 pesos. Likewise, Montealegre covered

the remaining 20,000 pesos of his debt to Mora with drafts for 3,846 pounds sterling. 52
. The other coffee hacienda in Pavu that Mora was forced to sell was purchased by
the partners of the firm "John Thompson Wattson & Co." of Valparaiso, Chile. This firm
had been Mora's principal foreign creditor dming the 1840s and 18SOs. Eduardo
Bceche, who was the agent in Costa Rica for the Thompson firm, in fact. bought this
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hacienda for 3.SOO quintals of coffee in Ocu>bcr,1857. Beecbe administered the hacienda
for many years on behalf of partners of the Thompson firm. The document conc:cming
this transaction did not disclose the size of this coffee hacienda but it pointed out that the

sale included two houses, a small pasture land, and a coffee mill that Mora "bad recently
received from Europe" with its tools and spare pans.53
The fact that Men had been investing in the purchase of equipment f<r processing

coffee, such as the aforementioned mill, indicates as well that his immediate plans by
1857 involved the improvcmen~ not the sale of his haciendas in Pavas. The sale of bis
stock in a mining venture points out also that Men had an urgency for money at the time

that he sold the two haciendas in Pavas. On January 19, 1857 Mora sold to Vicente

Aguilar: his half of a mine that they both owned in a place called Quebrada Honda for
10,000 pesos. Aguilar gave Men 8,000 pesos in cash and 2,000 pesos in goods.54
Mora also borrowed 6,000 pesos from Mariano Montealegre in March. 1857, and few
months later be sold a warehouse that he owned in Puntarenas to Juan Lazzo for 3,500
pesos.55 Those transactions and the fact that Men filed a lawsuit against Vicente Aguilar
in December, 1857 for compensation for losses in business operations that had taken

place almost ten years bef<x'e provide additional evidence that Mera was severely in need
of money.

Mora's financial troubles coincided with the crisis of the public tteasmy, and

consequently he miented the implementation of measures aimed at solving the national
eccoomic problems in ways that would faciliWI: abo bis own financial IeCOVer)'. The
accomplishment of this dual goal, however, wu met with strong opposition among
several leading members of the elite and that contributed substantially to the fall of

Mora's g_ovcrnmcnt in 1859. Men's determination to promote his personal financial

recoveey amid the national crisis, in fact. gave origin to serious clashes of economic
interests with those members of the elite involved in the operation of the liquor distillery,
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and those affccu:d by the failure of the bank and the sale of public lands.
The analysis of the main issues behind those conflicts of in=ests will conttibute

in clarifying the nature of the political conflict that Jed to Ma-a's ovenbrow as well as the
elements that served as the basis for the consensus that bad charac1am:d his

administration earlier on.
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CHAPrER mREB

mE BUSINESS OF THE UQUOR
DISTn.LERY AND POLITICS IN 1liE 1850s

The measures taken by Mora in 1851 to sttenghcen the government's monopoly
on liquor distillation and sales served very well the intended purpose of increasing the
revenues of the public treasury during his administration. The concentration of all liquor
production in one national distillery had other imponant economic consequences as well.
The establishment of a national distillery created a sizeable and steady domestic marlcct for

sugar cane, the basic raw material for the production of alcoholic beverages. Moreover.
the contract for the operation of that distillery enabled some members of the elite to have
direct participation in one of the most profitable business at that time. The operation of
the liquor distillery, in fact, represented a major source of money to finance the expansion

of coffee ventures in the context of a local economy in which currency was limited.
This analysis of the operation of the national distillery under a private
concessionaire during the 1850s points out that it was a source of consensus and conflict

between Mora's government and the handful of leading coffee planters and men:hants
who obtained this lucrative contract. The main reason for this was that the same
limitations of the local economy that led the government and some leading members of the
elite to depend upon the liquor distillery as the major source of capital restrained the
financial capabilities of that business. In the period of transition from the economy of
subsistence to an expon one, in fact, agricultmal techniques were deficient, there were
no good roads connecting the couna-yside with the main towns. and there was a labor
shortage. Those factors set imponant obstacles to the development of agricultural

ventures oriented towards the domestic market. Those obstacles were manifested in the
problems that the liquor contractors faced in relation to the supply of sugar cane and
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other raw maierials. These problems along with those regarding the purchase and
installation of the distillery equipment frequently reduced the profits of the contractors and put them at odds with Mora's government. The conflicts between Men and the
contractors over profits, losses, and fines for not supplying the government with agreed
quantities of liquor were serious enough to tum 'the former concessionaires into Mora's
main political opponents by the late 1850s.

The radical shift in the relations between Mora and Satumino TIDOCo, the first
member of the elite who obtained the contract to operate the liquor distillery in the 1850s
clearly illustrates the weight of economic issues on political conflicts. TlllOCO obtained
the contract to operate the national distillery fer a period of four yem in a public auction

held in October, 1851 in which he was the only bidder. He was a member of Congress
at that time and one of Mora's strongest supporters in the Legislature. Tinoco also had

personal relations with Mora through his indirect kinship links with the president's
brother, Jose Joaquin Mora, who served as bondsman for Tmoco's obligation with the

government as liquor conuacur.
Tmoco's contract with the government gave him the right to operate the distillery
from July l,185~ to July 31, 1856. He assumed the responsibility of selling a monthly

quota of liquor, that had to meet cenain standards of quality, to the government at a
previously arranged price.

Tmoco gave a bond of 10,000 pesos as a guarantee for the

building, equipment, and the instruments used for distillation, all of which were provided
by the government. The contract stipulaied that the concessionaire would have to pay a
fine of 10,000 pesos in the case that be could not fulfill his obligations.1
The caitract with the government gave the concessionaire the libeny to make

arrangements directly with private individuals f<r the supply of brown sugar and other
raw materials needed for liquor production and for other purposes related to the business.
Tinoco established a partnership with tw0 other members of the elite, Ram6n Quiros and
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Nicolas Ulloa, to operate the distillery in association with them. Quiros and Ulloa
obtained the right to sell Tmoco four hundred quintals of brown sugar each month to be
used in the elaboration of liquors. Tmoco's two associates and other suppliers of brown
sugar bad problems fulfilling their assigned quocas because the production of their

plantations frequently was less than what they anticipated. The owners of larger sugar
plantations very often signed contracts with individuals who had assumed the obligation
to supply brown sugar to the distillery. These contracts gave the larger planters the right
to sell their sugar cane to the distillery in the event that the smaller ones could not meet

their obligations. Vicente Aguilar, one of the wealthiest members of the elite, was among
those larger sugar planters. He signed an agreement with Nico1's Ulloa in 1853 to serve

as bondsman in the latter's obligations to Tmoco. By serving as Ulloa's bondsman,
Aguilar also acquired the right to have access to the privileges and benefits implied in the
conttact to operate the distillery.2 Aguilar, in fact. participaied very actively, although

indirectly, in the business of the liquor distillery throughout the 1850s.
Regardless of Aguilar's participation as supplier of brown sugar when Ulloa
failed to fulfill his obligation, Tinoco frequently could not meet the monthly liqua- quota
that he had to deliver to the government. Aguilar's deliveries, in f~ were not enough to

mm up for the shortage of brown sugar that resulted from irregular supplies from other
individuals. These problems reduced the profitableness of the distillery operation

because Tmoco, as contractor, had to pay tines to the government fa- the liquor shortage.
The low supply of brown sugar, for example. made it impossible for Tmoco to deliver

the agreed number of bottles of liquor during May and June, 1855. As a result of that

Tmoco had to pay a fine of 8,000 pesos to the government.3
The losses brought about by the irregular supply of brown sugar led Tinoco to
request the government to cancel his contract to operate the distillery in June,1855.

Tmoco declared that he was even willing to pay the 10,000 pesos fine stipulated in the
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contract for breaching it if that was the easiest way to invalidate completely bis obligations
to the government.

Mora, however, did not accept Tmoco's request. Mora was

quoted in an official communication u saying that be was aware of all the difficulties that

nnoco had had for delivering liquor to the government because of the low supply of
brown sugar. Mora declared that be wanted "to reconcile" the inb:rCSt of the public
treasury with

the private interests of the contractcr since Tmoco had made all the possible

effons to fulfill his obligations and to prevent a larger shortage of liquor in the previous
six months. Mora, nonetheless, was firm in his position of not allowing T"lllOCO to

cancel bis contract. Mora came up with a response to Tmoco's request that involved
signing a new contract to keep the distillery running under the same management until the

expiration of Tmoco's concession in 1856. The govemment insis1ed that new contract
with T"moco "would guarantee the treasury the revenues that came from liquor sales
without serious harm to the interests of the contractor and with little sacrifice for public

finances. "4 The terms of this new con~ nonetheless, were not very favorable for
Tmoco because he was made liable to pay 6,00) pesos in damages for the inegular liquor
deliveries dilling the first half of 1855.

The government agreed to reduce the amount of

liquor that T"moco had to provide during the rest of that year and made other concessions
in relation to the quality and the price of the product. But the liability to pay fines for
future shortages of liquor was not eJirnioatcd from the revised contract. 5
The central issue behind Tmoco's decision to cancel the contract was that the

government kept demanding the payment of fines as soon u he did not deliver the agreed
quota of liquor. But the administtation did not pay Tmoco with the same promptness for
the liquor that was delivered regularly. As a rnatn:r of fact, the government was usually

behind in the payments of the liquor delivered.6

Mora's uncompromising attitude that

forced Tmoco to continue as contractor of the distillery even though he was losing money
marked the deterioration of the harmonious relations that had existed between them
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before. The tensions between Ma-a and Tinoco increased in April, 1856, when Tinoco
requested a government audit of the national distillery account. The reason for that
request was that the government had kept charging Tmoco damages for the shortage of
liquor without first calculating the total value of the liquor delivered. Mma responded to
that request by ordering the suspension of payments to Tmoco for the liquor delivered in
May and June, 1856, which amounted to 9,000 pesos. The government's excuse for the
suspension of that payment was that there apparently had been a shortage of five
thousand bottles of liquor in June.7

The fact that the administration withheld the

paymentof9,000 pesos enraged Tinoco who alleged that the shortage of liquor, to a great
extent, was the government's fault. Tinoco bad imported brown sugar from El Salvador
to solve the problem of the local shon supply but because of the military emergency at
that ~ he was not able to transpOrt the sugar from Puntarenas to San Jose. By mid1856 Costa Rica, in fact, was involved in the war against Walker, and as a result of that
military emergency the government confiscaa:d the oxcarts that TlDOCO sent to Puntarenas
to transpcxt the sugar and used them to load arms and supplies for the troops. 8

Mora's order to suspend the payments for the liquor delivered by Tinoco
provoked a political incident that has remained a bit obscme in the historical works

dealing with this period. In mid-June 1856, soon after Mma gave that order, Tmoco and
his brother-in-law, Francisco Mana Iglesias were anesu:d after the government accused

them of planning a conspiracy to overthrow Mora. Iglesias was also Tmoco's business
partner and as such actively participated in the operation of the distillery. The govcmmcnt
published a document written by lglesiu in which he criticized the administration and
made serious charges against Mora. These charges went from misappropriating public

funds, despotism, favoritism, and political pcrsecu~on, to commiting strategical C1TOl'S
which had increased the death toll during the military confrontations with Walker in
Nicaragua in March and April, 1856.9
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After bis arrest, Iglesias defended himself saying that the document that the

government had published and labeled u a "re'IOlutionary act" was just a piece of paper
containing personal thoughts that he bad ne\"ef made public. Iglesias declared that he had
given the document in discussion to Vicente Herrera after be was arrested. Herrera was a
friend of Iglesias who was a member of the Supreme Court at that time and had a highranking post in one of the military barracb. Acaxding to lgl~ Herrera visited him in
prison and asked him for the alleged revolutionary proclamation on three different

opportunities. Herrera told Iglesias that Mora wanted to sec the proclamation "out of
curiosity" and that the contents of that document were not going to be used against him in
comt.10 Iglesias

trusted Herrera's word and handed over the document. Iglesias declared

that he was convinced that his reluctance to comply with Mora's request would have

worsened bis situation. which was already difficulL Men, however, did not honor his
word and the document wu published u a proof that Iglesias and Tmoco were actually

involved in a conspiracy against his government. When Iglesias }X'OCl:Sted and declared
that he had been victim of a bettayal on the pan d

Mara. he wu accused of slandering

the presidenL Court proceedings were bekl to prosecute Iglesias fer that serious charge.
That this incident ievolved around the clashes of ecanomic interests ielated to the
liquor payments is brought to light in Iglesias' defense against the slander accusation.

Iglesias' defense, in fact. wu centered on denying the government's charge that he and

TlDOCO had purposely delayed the delivery of the liqucr production in order to damage
the in1aeSU d the public treasury. Iglesias emphasized dial the shortage of liqucr was
due to problems in the supply of brown sugar to refute the accusation that he and Tmoco
had instigaied discontent among the people by depriving the treasury of its main source of
ievenues. Iglesias and Tmoco also bad to defend themselves against the charge that they
lacb:d patriotism because they bad allegedly refused to deliver liquor to the government in

a moment when the country desperately needed the earnings from it to finance the war
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against Wallrzr.11 The coun ne'IU de11en:nintd if IaJesiu and T.moco were guilty of
conspiring apinst the pemmeilt became Mera ordered the ctisrnt111t mthe clmp

before the judp pw a n y ~ Men, sbowin1 the arlmnrinea dw frequendy
charadaimi bis political behavior, ordered Tmoco and IaJesiu to leave the coumry

hrnnrdiau:ty. 'Iberefore TlDOCO and Iglesias IDOYed to GuaremaJa in 1856 and remained
there until the fall of Men's goyemmcnt.12
The earnings from liquor sales iD=ased significantly during the fim half of the
1850s and constituted the main soun:c of revenues of the g0\'el'DJDC11t.13

Mora's

government, however, was frequently behind in payments to Tmoco even though the
administration was receiving a subsianrial amount of money fn:m retail sales al ak:cholic
beverages. The fact that the government financed the implementation of projects that had
priority in Men's agenda. such u the military build up, with revenues from the liquor

distillery very likely accounted for those delays in the payments. 'lbe inconveniences
created by those delays probably .were not very serious or 100 detrimental to Tmoco's
interests as liquor contractor when the ccnditions of the public treasury were sound.

TlDOCO received the payments even if it was not at the moment that be sold the liquor.
Mora's decision to get Costa Rica involYCd in a war in Nicaragua in early 1856 set a

heavy burden upon the national finances that changed that situation. Mora's reluctance in
mid-1856 to negotiate an agr=ment with Tinoco in relation to liquor deliveries and his
decision to withhold the sums of money that the administration owed him indicate that
the war bad already affected the conditions of the public treasury. The new financial

burdens increased the government's dependence upon liquor revenues at that critical
moment up to the point at which it began to affect the interests of Tinoco and.his
associates.
The problems faced by Tinoco and his associates during the first half of the
1850s, nonetheless, did not discourage other members of the elite from participating in
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the liquor distillery business afterwards. As a matter of fact, the events n:wed to the

alleged conspiracy of Tinoco and Iglesias took place a few weeks befcre the expiration of
the their contract which ended officially on July 31, 1856. Bnmo Carranza assumed the

operation of the distillery u the new conttactor the next day, that is on August 1, 1856.
~

another prominent member of the elite, was also among Mora's strong and

loyal suppot leis and served in an adviscry council that Mora appointed in the early

1850s.14 Like his predecessor Tinoco, Carranza was the only bidder in the public
auction for the contract to operate the national distillery. This auction was held in May,
1854, two years before the expiration of Tmoco's contract because the government had
plans to constrUct a building for the distillcry, which at that time was operating in an old

warehouse. Consequently, the government wanted the new concessionary to begin
working well in advance on the design of the building and the importation of new

distillation equipment.

Camnza associated with Nicol'5 Saenz. another leading coffee planter and
merchant, and the French merchant Victor Dujanlin to operate the distillery. The

govcmment granted Carranza and his partners the right to import exempted from all duties
the goods necessary to put the new distillery into operation, and agreed to provide the

containers for delivering the liquor.15 However, for Carranza the operation of the
distillery was not a business devoid of conflicts and problems. Carranza bad serious

disagreements with his partner Dujanlin just before their contract with the go\'CffllDCnt
went into effect. Dujardin bad been the partner in charge c:L purchasing in France the
distillery equipment to be installed in the

new building. This new building was designed

by Francisco KU1'tZC. a German engineer who resided in Costa Ri~ and who supervised

its construction by the goYemmCnt. Dujardin bad a coofrontation with Carranza over
what the former considered as defects in the construction of the ovens in the new
distillery building and the latter regarded simply as modifications of the original design.
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Carranza defended the modifications as necessary because the equipment design sent by
Dujardin from Europe demanded a larger investment than the government could afford.

Therefore, Kunze as the engineer responsible for the work had made the necessary
changes in the ovens but without altering the basic design.

This disagreement was

followed by Cmanza's accusations that Dujardin had not purchased the stills and other
apparatus according to the specifications of the contract and had hired two French experts

that had not installed the equipment properly.16 These disagreements led Dujardin to
withdraw his participation in the partnership to operate the distillery.

But at the same time that Dujardin separated from the operation of the distillery,

Vicente Aguilar became actively involved in the liquor business as creditor of Bruno

Camnza. By October, 1856, Carranza had a debt of 9,637 pesos to Aguilar. They
signed a contract that same month according to which Aguilar loaned Carranza 5,363
pesos to increase the total amount of the debt to 15,000 pesos. In return for this new
loan. Carranza gave Aguilar cme eighth part of the contract to supply liquors to the
government. The document signed by Aguilar and Carranza declared that Aguilar would

participate in the contract "as much as it would suit his interests", and he would not be
liable for the financial obligations stipulated in it. These obligations were mainly the

payment of fines for not meeting the monthly liquor quota:· Aguilar also acquired the
right to supply the national distillery with up to one fourth of all the brown sugar. honey
or juices required for the elaboration of liquors.

The accord had another very

advantageaus coodition for Aguilar since it specified that Cammza would pay him a
higher price f<r these raw materials than he would pay to the other suppliers.17 Aguilar's
participation in the liqu<r distillery was not limited to supplying large amounts of brown
sugar dming the time that Carranza was the concessionaire. Aguilar also became an
important supplier through his commercial firm "Aguilar & Allpress" of some of the
goods required for the distillation. including the imported stills, drugs, and essences used
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in the liquors.
Cammza's contract with the government gave him the right to operate the
distillery for eight years. But in July, 1859, after only three years in charge of the liquor

business, Cammza n:quesll:d the cancellation of his obligation. Carranza sent a letter to
the government explaining that several obstacl~ but mainly the lack of monetary

rcsomces, prevenll:d him from continuing with the operation of the distillery.18
Cam.ma was not explicit in the narure of his financial troubles but the fact that his debt to
Aguilar had increased to about 33,000 pesos by 1859 indicates that he had had to keep
bonowing money to manage the distillcry.19

The active involvement that Aguilar had had in the liquor business throughout the
1850s, and especially the considerable investments that he had in it as Cammza's creditor
indicate that this was a profitable venture for him. Aguilar's strong interest in the liquor

business was reflected in the request that be made to the government in 1859 for running
the distillery after Carranza decided to cancel bis contract. . Aguilar, however, was not
the only person in1efl:Sted in replacing Cmanza. The official document that cancelled

Cammza's liquor contract , in fact, pointed out that two people, Vicente Aguilar and
Carlos Salazar bad made offers to the government to manage the national distillery. This

public document declared the government had discussed both proposals and rejected
Aguilar's because the offer made by Carlos Salu.ar "had more advantages for the public
treasury. "20 This document did not elaborate on the tenns of Aguilar's proposal to

supply liquor to the government or on why Salazar's was more advantagCOUS.

The contract that Salazar signed with the government stated that he was acting on
behalf of Leomo De Vars and Leopoldo Mouren, two French-born merchants residents in

San Jose. Salazar,~ soon after signing the contract to run the distillery transferred
to De Vars and Mouren all the rights and obligations stipulall:d in it. Consequently, De

Vars and Mouren got the concession to run the national distillery for eight years,
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beginning on August 1, 1859. They assumed the obligation to pay the former contractor
Carranza 54,000 pesos in several installments f<r the distillery equipment, drugs, raw

marerials and other articles that were in the plant's facilities. As the new contractors, De
Vars and Momen also assumed also the obligation to pay Cananza's debts with the firm
"Aguilar & Allpress", and with other people. This new conttact stipulated as well that
at the end of the eight-year period, the private contractors would hand all equipment and

apparatus of the distillery over to the government and those would become property of
the state. The contractors would receive a compensation of 15,000 pesos in monthly

installments of 2,000 pesos as payment for the cquipmenL21
The issue of Mora's participation in the business of the liquor distillery during the
1850s came to light after the fall of his government and revolved around this contract
signed in 1859 by Salazar, De Vars and Momcn. A.fta Mora was ovenhrown, he was
accused of corruption and favcritism. These charges were illustrated by pointing out that

Mora had received 20,000 pesos in cash from the individuals who bid fer the liquor
contract in 1859. The payment allegedly was made by these individuals to receive more
advantageous conditions in the terms of their contract with the government22 This
accusation, however, pointed out not only Mora's corruption but also the wrongdoing on
the part of the liquor contractors since it added that, thanks to the gratuity granted to
Mora, they had obtained a concession that was largely detrimental to the public
treasury. 23
The suggestion that the liquor contractors, who were leading members of the elite,
had been accomplices of Mora's unethical behavior by ~lying with his demands made

necessary a clarification. This clarification, which appeared in the newspaper Nueya Era
did not mention Leonzo De Vars, Leopoldo Mouren, or Carlos Salazar by name.

Nonetheless, it pointed out that the individuals who got the liquor contract in 1859 were
not at fault for the damage that Mora's corruption had caused the public treasury. The
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explanatory remada emphamed that these concessionaires probably were not aware of
the secret maneuvcrings through which the 20,000 pesos entered into Mora's private
treasury. That commentary argued that the money was included in the 54,000 pesos that
the new cootracton paid to Bruno Cammza fer the distillery equipment and other

apparatus. The clarification in the newspaper implied that because the transference of
money took place through Men's "secret maneuverings," De Vars, Mouren y Salazar
did not know about the payment of that compensation. The explanatory note

underscored that the intended purpose of elaborating on the issues related to the liqucr
distillery was to elucidate the truth about Mora's COffllption and not to offend the people

involved in that particular contract.24 This clarification implied that Cmanza knew
about the deviation of the 20,000 pesos but excluded him from any wroodoing by

describing him also u a victim of Mora's abuses of power.
This accusation about the payment of a gratuity to Men in remm for the liquor
contract was accompanied by other charges about his participation in the business. These
charges claimed that Mora bad managed to have considerable involvement in all the
contracts granted to private concessionaires to run the distillery during the 1850s as
supplier of sugar cane from his plantations in Alajuela. The only evidence of this,

however, is a document that shows that between 1857 and 1858 Mora had sold 5,155
quintals of brown sugar to the distillery for 23,199 pesos.25 The documents of the
contracts did not have any reference to that issue but it is very likely that there had been
verbal or private agreements in relation to it. This tendency tD present the liquor

contractors as victims of Mora's misuse of public funds is challenged by the fact that
when T1DOCO and Camm.a got the contract they were very close to him and they profited

along with Mora and others from that business when conditions of the public treasury
were good. Certainly, regardless ofTmoco's and Carranza's having obtained the liquor

contract in a public auction, they were the only bidders and the procedures suggest that
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the auction was merely a formality to Jegaliz a previous agreement with Mora. The main
accusation that Mora had the practice of borrowing money at will from the treasury of
the national distillery very likely became an issue of confflct only after 1857 when the

national treasury was almost depJeted.26
There was another very important aspect involved in the issue of the 20,000 peso
bribe. By accepting that payment Mora took the operation of the national distillery away
from Aguilar. Aguilar's strong interest in running the distillery indicates that regardless

of the problems related to the supply of brown sugar, Mora's mismanagement from the
revenues of liquor sales, and other difficulties the enccrprise was still profitable in 1859.
Aguilar already had considerable investments in the liquor business and infonnation in the
notarial records points out that he had very solid capital which would have enabled him to
overcome the financial obstacles in the operation of the distillery that had compelled bis
debtor Carranza to cancel bis contract with the government. Once those obstacles were
O\ICICOIDC

Aguilar could have profited from the business. But the financial prospects that

Aguilar might have had concerning the distillery were frustrated by Mora's rejection of
his bid. By 1859, the friendship that in the past had brought Mora and Aguilar together
in a business partnership h:ld turned into animosity as a result of a lawsuit filed by Mora

against Aguilar two years bcfa-e. The biucmess aeated by that lawsuit put Mora in a
position in which he was not going to use bis power for the economic benefit of his
former business panner and give him the contract that he wanted. Aguilar was not
willing to pay a gratuity to Mora either for the liquor contract if that were a condition for
obtaining it. Mora was overconfident about his political power by the late 18SOs and did
not anticipate that bis refusal to accept Aguilar's bid was going to precipitate the fall of his
government. Aguilar was a very influential person who had significant reasons to resent
Mora both as a private person and as president. The loss of the liquor contract provided
an additional and very important reason for Aguilar's discontent toWards Mora and turned
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him into the centtal figure behind the coup that overthrew the president. It was not

coincidence that the military coup took place two weeks after Maa granted the liquor
contract to Salazar, De Vars and Mouren.
The operation of the national distillery during the 1850s illustrau:s that the active
involvement of the coffee planters and merchants as private en~neurs in the
implementation of key points of their political agenda was a source of both consensus
and conflict. Mora established the national distillery to serve as the main source of the
revenues that the government needed for projects such as the construction of roads,
which would fosccr the growth of coffee expons. Many leading members of the elite
strongly suppcn:d the creation of the distillery because it represented an excellent
opportunity to obtain profits from a lucrative business. However, the accomplishment

of the general goals of the elite entered into conflict with the fulfilment of the particular

goals of the liquor contractors when problems such as the iJTegular supply of brown
sugar created liquor shortages. Because the government largely depended upon liquor
revenues to fulfill its main tasks it fined the conttactors for those shortages and that
significantly reduced their profits. The financial crisis of the late 1850s and Mora's

increasing reluctance to negodalc mangcments with the contractors regarding fines
aggravated the conflicts of interests. The clashes that emerged from the operation of the
distillery, in fact, turned the liquor business into one of the pivotal issues in the shifts of

political alliances and loyalties that characterized the politics of the Mora yem.
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CHAPTER FOUR
TiiE ESTABLISHMENT AND BRJEF HISTORY
OF 1HE NATIONAL BANK

The growth of export agriculture required the support of a financial infrastructure
that Costa Rica lacked by the mid-nineteenth century. During the first half of the 1850s
the revenues generated by the government's monopoly on liquor sales managed to make
up for that lack. Those revenues provided Mora's government with a steady source of
funds that enabled the implementation of important measures aimed at promoting the

development of coffee expcxts. The .military campaigns.fought in Nicaragua against
William Walker in 1856 and early 1857, however, imposed a heavy financial b ~_!! on
the public treasury which exhausU:d almost completely its resources at the same time that

created a substantial dcficiL
The financial crisis brought about by the military campaigns against WaJker
hampered the government's ability to defray its basic expenses, stt>pped the

implementation of some important points of Mora's agenda and aggravated the problem
of the lack of currency. That financial aisis, in fact, transformed the establishment of a
b~ into an unpostponable project. The implementation of this project, nonetheless.
encountered several obstacles which made this bank a financial institution with a very
short life. M~ indeed, had problems obtaining capital abroad for the bank to begin its
operations, and was not able to attT3Ct invesun at home. While most of the leading
members of the elite were aware that the expansion of coffee exports demanded the
creation of a bank. they did not support this project because the government would be the
major stockholder.

By the late 1850s Mora had begun to show an increasing tendency towards the

81

monopolization of political power in an attempt to solve his own financial troubles wiLIJ
the help of the scarce public funds. The government's active participation in the bank
opened a new avenue for Mora's misuse of his political power in ways that were
beneficial for him but not so advantageous for the elite in general. Consequently, the
majority of the elite did not want to get involved in the business of the bank. There was,
however, a handful of coffee plantcr3 and men:hants who did strongly suppon Mora's
idea of establishing a bank and invested in this project.
The bankruptcy of a British commercial firm that had had financial links to this
bank gave rise to a business dispute between two of the main investors in Costa Rica
which forced its closure after b~ly a year in operation. Mora's participation in the bank
as head of the government and as private investor got him involved in that business
dispute as well. The clashes of economic interests that resulted from this business
dispute were so strong that they played a crucial role in the fall of Mora's government in
1859. The analysis of the brief history of the bank established by Mora and the business
dispute that resulted from its failure contributes in clarifying a very important issue of the
political conflict that motivated the overthrow of his administration. Moreover, that
examination illustrates how the endeavor of ;he coffee planter and merchant elite to use
the public treasury to obtain compensations for economic losses hindered the achievement
of long-term goals that would have helped it to cope with those losses more effectively.
The implementation of Mora's plan of establishing an issuing bank revolved
around the figure of Crisanto Medina. an Argentine-born merchant resident of Costa
Rica. Medina. who was a personal friend of Mora, had an import and export firm in the
pon of Pun~nas through which he had established business connections abroad. Mora

regarded Medina's connections with foreign commercial firms as an important channel for
obtaining capital abroad to establish the bank. Therefore, Mora negotiated a contract with
Medina towards that end in July, 1857. Medina committed himself to looking for
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investors in Europe and the United States for a bank that would open its doors on January
1. 1858.
The contract between Medina and the goyemmcnt stipulased that the bank would
open with an initial capital of 250,000 pesos and that it could be enlarged to a maximun of
one million pesos. The gtWCl1UDCllt granted Medina the exclusive right to operate the
bank for a period of twenty years. which could be extended if both parties agreed.

The

bank would charge one percent per month interest, which was the maximum stipulated by

law. The government would have credit in the bank up to the equivalent of the fourth
part of all the bank notes in circulation. Also the government would receive ten ~ n t of

the bank's profits at the end of each year. The bank would be able to sell stock to private
individuals for the equivalent of a quarter of all its capital.1

Soon after signing that contract, Medina traveled to Europe and the United States
in scan:h of potential investors for the bank. Regardless of his efforts, Medina was only
able to attract one foreign investor, John Carmichael. a British mcchant established in
Uverpool. Medina's connections with Carmichael dated back to the we 1840s when they

both were involved in a project to establish a colony of foreign settlers on Costa Rica's
Atlantic coast.2 That settlement was never established but Carmichael was able to
develop some commercial links in Central America during the 1850s.
Carmichael agreed on providing an eighth of the total capital with which the bank
would begin its operation. That was an important investment but not enough to establish
the bank. Therefore, Medina and Mora modified the tJ:rms of the contract signed in July,

1857, to make the government a partner in the bank and to encourage the purchase of
stock in the bank among local investors. This revised contract signed in Decembcr,1857,
stipulated that government would take one fourth of the stocks of the bank. which was
scheduled to begin operations no later than February 1, 1858.3
The national treasury was almost depleted by 1857 and C!Jllscquently there were
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no funds u, invest in the bank. The government o f ~ however, had granted Mora a
loan of 18,541 pounds sterling which were the equivalent of about 100,<XX> Costa Rican
pesos, in July 1857. This loan WU originally intended to defray the expenses of the
military campaigns in Nicaragua. Even though the Peruvian Congress appro~ the loan

to Mora's government in mid-1857 several circumstances delayed the deli~ of the
money. This 1~ ~ ani~ in Costa Rica several months after Walker
sunendercd and the war in Nicaragua was over.4 Consequently, Mora decided to use
that money u, pay for the quarter part of the stock that the government would own in
Medina's bank.
The date on which the bank would begin operations, nonethel~ had to be
postpalCd one more time because it wu not until April,1858 when the Costa Rican

government finally recei~ the money from the .Peruvian loan. Mora's Minister of
Fman~ Jos6 Mana Cadas and Crisantt> Medina signed a new contract fer the creation of
the bank on June 1, 1858.

According to the tmns of this contract Medina obtained the

exclusive right to establish a bank for a period'of twenty years. The capital of the bank
would be 100,000 pesos and it could inc:n:ased u, one million pesos through the sale of
stock. The government would borrow half of the initial capital of the bank. that is

50,000 pesos, and would pay interest of one percent per month. The government
would also have the right to borrow half of the capital that would enter in the bank in the
future from the stock sales.
The Banco Nacional Cmtarric;eng • as the bank was named. would have the

power to issue and put into circulation bank noces in a number that would be double the
sum of the cash in hand This ability was granted in compensation for the right of the
government to bolTow half of the bank's capital. The bank notes would be signed and
sealed by the govc:mment and they would be accepted u cash and with preference to

other documents in all government offices. The bank would also have the right to take
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deposits from the public and would be exemp1l:d from all taxes and contributions, even in

case of war.5
On June 1s, 1858, Medina announced in the newspaper OJSoiq de Costa, Rica,
that the bank bad opened its ~ and he inviled the public to buy s10Cks at 100 pesos

each. He also held meetings with the leading coffee planters and merchants to
encourage them to invest in the newly established bank. Medina tried to sell stock in the
bank by emphasizing that it would become the main financial agent fer coffee cultivation
and other major agricultural ventures and for all commercial activities. Medina pointed
out that the all the revenues of the public treasury would enter into the bank which would

administer and invest those funds according to the government's plans. 6 The idea that all
public funds would be conccntratcd in the bank provoked.a negative reaction among the

main circles of the elite. Most coffee planters and merchants were toWly opposed to the
idea of a bank that tacitly would put all public funds in the bands of Mora as the head of

the govcmmcnt and Medina as one of the majcr S10Ckholders.
There was consensus among the elite about the idea of creating an issuing bank
to solve the problem of the lack of currency and to assist the government in its task as the

promotor of the growth of export agriculture. However, by 1858 Mora's political
behavior had changed substantially as a result of~ endeavcr to recover from the
financial reversal that forced him to sell several important properties the previous year.

The resolute attitude with which Mora had handled problems earlier in his administration
had turned into a despotic OllC amid the national financial crisis since he had began to

abuse of his power in an attempt to utilize the scarce public resources exclusively on his
benefit. Therefore, the discontent of the majority of the elite towards the administration of

Mora was growing because it had turned increasingly "despotic, demanding and was
constantly shon of money."7 Most of the members of the elite, to be sure, were not
willing to support a bank that would facilitate Mora's misuse of public funds and provide
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him with another reason to tty to remain in power indefinitely.

Likewise, the prominent coffee plamas and merchants disttus1l:d Medina's
capacity to manage the bank properly became of bis close connections with Men. That
some members of the elite dislibd Medina was also very imp«tant in their reluctance to

invest in the bank. Acccrding to one contemp01my source, Medina regardless of his
eloquence, was not able to attract large numbers of invesurs to his bank because "he was
not popular in the business circle since he had a violent character, was pretentious and
had a tendency to disdain those who did not agree with him. "8 The circumstance that
Medina was a foreigner and not fully integrated into the small group of closely-related
families that made up the elite also contributed to the rejection. That same source poinu:d
out that if Medina had been "the appropriate person," that is one who had had the trust of

the business circle, he would been able to gather the 100,000 pesos that he needed for
the bank and maybe even more.9

The distrust and rejection of the maj<Xity of the elite towards the bank was
retlec11:d in the fact that only fourteen people bad bought stock in the bank by the time it
began operations in June, 1858. These local investors were Juan Rafael Mora, the
Bishop Anselmo Llorente, Jos6 Maria Cas~ Jos6 Maria Canas, Demettio Iglesias,

Mateo Mora, Luciano Peralta, Manuel Antano Bonilla, Anacleta Mayorga. the firm

"T'moco & Co.," Ram6n M~ Carlos Giralt. Domingo Calderon and Manuel Ma'a.10
John Carmichael was still the only prospective fcxeign inYeS101' by the time that the bank
opened. Certainly, in July, 1858, Carmichael gave Olders to 1os6 Guardiola, the agent

that his firm had in C"•oarcrnata, to travel to Costa Rica to inquin: about the operation of the

bank. Carmichael told Guardiola that if he found that the bank was operating properly he

should buy stock in it for 30,000 pesos.11
The money loaned by Peru, which would be used to pay for the government's

stock in the bank, had been sent in a draft issued by the British finn of Anthony Gibbs.
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Mora gave Medina that draft for 18, 541 pounds S1erling and entrusted him to cash it
through the firm in Great B~tain that had emitted it.

Medina, nonetheless, enda'sed that

draft to John Carmichael instead of cashing it. There was no need to eDdone the draft to
Cannichael but Medina probably regarded that u a convenient way to transfer the money
from Great Britain to Costa Rica using Carmichael's commercial channels. Medina took

the equivalent of 10,000 Costa Rican pesos in cash from the 18,541 pounds S1Crling and
left the rest of the money deposited with Carmichael's firm in Liverpool. Medina's
agreement with Carmichael stipulated that the former would draw drafts in Costa Rica
and those would be paid from the sum deposited with the latter in Great Britain.12
The contract that Medina signed with the government stipulated that the bank need
at least 50,000 pesos to begin operation and issue banknotes. The bank, however,

began operations with 16,000 pesos and Carmichael's promise to invest 30,000 pesos.
Medina and Men were confident that Carmichael would very soon send the capital that
he had promised to invest in the bank. Hence, the bank began to issue banknotes and put
them into circulation even though there was no substantial cash deposited to endorse them
The financial situation of John Carmichael, however, was not very solid by the

yct.13

time that he committed himself as one of the most important investors of the bank.
~

by early October, 1858, the 30,000 pesos that Carmichael had promised to invest

had not yet entered into the bank's safe even though it had begun operations four months
before.
By that time Medina had already begun to suspect that the delay in Carmichael's
investment was an indication that this British merchant had financial troubles.
Consequently, when Medina received a notification that Carmichael had temporarily
suspended the payment of the drafts that he had drawn on the account that the Costa
Rican government had with Carmichael's firm in Liverpool, he became increasingly
womcd. As a result of that notification Medin~ as president of the b~ called a
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meeting of stockholders on October 1, 1858, and expressed his fears that the financial
problems of Carmichael could lead to a bankruptcy of the British firm. Medina
announced in that meeting that he had requescect JOl6 Guardiola. Carmichael's agent in

Guatemala. to give him a wriucn guarantee that the capital deposited in Liveipool on
behalf of the Costa Rican government would be piocec:ted in case Carmichael went into
bankruptcy.14
At that time Guardiola was in Cmta Rica where he bad tra.Veled following

Carmichael's orders to carry out some bank-related business. Guardiola took with him a
letter of introduction and a letter of credit addressed to "Tmoco & Co." that he delivered
to Demetrio Iglesias who was the manager of that firm.

The two panners of the firm

"Tmoco and Co." were Satumino Tinoco and Franci3co Marla Iglesias but they were
residing in Guaaemala in exile in 1858. Tinoco and Iglesias. therefore, bad granted
Dcmetrio Iglesias, who wu Francisco's brother and Satmnino's brother-in-law, power
of attorney and entrusted him with the administration of their businesses in Costa Rica.
Guardiola contacted Demettio Iglesias because "Tmoco & Co." was one of Carmichael's
clients and the British merchant wanted to use that local cOOllDtlcial firm as an
intermediary in the purchase of stock in the bank. Guardiola, indeed. requested "Tinoco

and Co." to give 30,000 pesos to Medina on behalf of Carmichael to pay his part of the
stock in the bank.15

"Tmoco & Co." had not given Medina that sum by the time that the meeting of
stockholders was held. However, Demetrio Iglesias offered to work out an agn:cment
with Guardiola to ~ t the sum coaesponding to Carmichael's stock in the bank and
to guarantee that the money deposited in Liverpool would be protected against an ~tual

bankruptcy.16 The document that Iglesias signed with Guardiola on October 2, 1858,
stipulated that "Tmoco & Co." would give Medina S0,000 pesos in the "unlikely and

unforeseen" event that the drafts that Medina had drawn on the account that he had with
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John Carmichael's firm were returned unpaid.17

The document stated that the 30,000

pesos of Carmichael's stock in the bank would be covered from those 50,000 pesos.
Likewise it was pointed out that the additional 20,000 pesos wou1d be subtracted from the
debit that ''Tinoco & Co." had with Carmichael.18

Medina's suspicions about the financial situation of Carmichael's firm were well•
grounded. Indeed, several days after Iglesias signed the document with Guardiola the
drafts that Medina had drawn on the account with Carmichael began to be sent back to

him unpaid. These drafts were returned accompanied by a statement that their payment
had been refused by Carmichael and that Medina was liable for resulting damages and
losses. The news of Carmichael's bankruptcy arrived along with the retmncd drafts.19
Thcrefcre, the document signed by "Tmoco & Co." guaranteeing the payment of 50,000

pesos to Medina came into effect from the moment that it was confirmed that the
Carmichael firm was insolvent.
Contrary to what Medina expected, Demetrio Iglesias refused to comply with the
obligation of paying him the 50,000 pesos. Iglesias argued that the document that he
signed with Guardiola on October 2, 1858 did not make ''Tmoco & Co." responsible for

any payment since that document was not a draft or a bond Medina made Iglesias a
proposal of an arrangement through which "Tinoco & Co." would loan him 50,000 pesos

for a shon term period to keep the bank in business. Medina told Iglesias that if ''Tinoco
& Co.", loaned him that sum of money, the document of October would be invalidated.
Iglesias did not accept this request and firmly maintained his position that ''Tmoco and

Co." did not have any financial obligation with Medina.20

In view of the reluctance of "Tmoco & Co." to fullfil its financial obligation,
Medina tiled a suit in court for the payment of the 50,000 pesos. This lawsuit has been
regarded traditionally as one of the events that provoked the overthrow of Mora's
govemment.21 Despite that this lawsuit has not been the focus of any detailed study.
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The tendency to emphasiz the epic aspects of the war against William Walker has
coottibuted to leaving unclear an issue that is pivocal for a beuer understanding of the
nature of the elite's sttuggle for the control of the govemmem.

Medina .tiled the lawsuit in December, 1858, through his lawyer Lcremo

Mootufar. Julwl Volio, who was TlllOCO's son-in-law and cousin of Francisco and
Demettio Iglesias, defended the interests of "TlllOCO & Co." in that suit. "Tmoco & Co."
presented all the legal arguments imaginable in an auempt to avoid the payment of the
50,000 pesos to Medina. Volio argued initially that Demettio Iglesias as manager of the
firm 'Tinoco & Co." did not have the legal capacity to sign the agreement of October 2,
1858, with Carmichael's agent, Jose Guardiola. That was the document that made

"Tinoco and Co." liable for paying Medina part of his capital if Carmichael went into
bankruptcy. After it was demonstrated that Iglesias had been granted power of attorney
by "TlDOCO and Co," and therefore could legally sign the agxeemcnt, Volio claimed that

the document did not constitute a bond or guarantee of any obligation. The evidence

presented by Medina's lawyer refuted this argument. The laywe:r of "Tinoco & Co.,"
therefore, bad to acknowledge in view of that evidence that the document in discussion,

in fact, established a financial obligation to Medina. Nonethel~ Volio contended that
Medina had used deceitful means to convince Iglesias to sign the document with
Guardiola. 22
Regardless of Volio's

attemptS to portray Demettio Iglesias

as a naive person

who had been a victim of Medina's schemes, Iglesias was surely aware of the legal
implications of the document that be signed with Guardiola. Iglesias was a laywe:r and
had a good knowledge of the business of "Tmoco & Co" because he had been the firm's

book.keeper for several years. Moreover, Iglesias had manifested publicly his

willingness to reach an agreement with Carmichacrs agent reprding the guarantee of the
capital deposited in Great Britain. That agreement had been discussed and supported by
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other stockholders, among them Jose Mana Castro who was a prominentjmiscult.23
Those facts demonstrau:d that Volio's claims wen: p-oundless and indicate also that

"Tmoco & Co." had strong motives to go as far u suggesting that Demcttio Iglesias had
surpassed the legal powers granted by bis relatives to manage their business. Central in
those motives was the effon to conceal that Iglesias had signed the conttact with
Guardiola because the agreement promised to be economically very advantageous for the

firm.
As a matter of fact, Carmichael's decision to invest in the bank that Medina
established on behalf of the government was welcomed with enthusiasm by ''Tmoco &
Co." This firm had done business on a regular basis with Carmichael and had a
substantial debt with him which was the result of several cash and merchandise advances.
Indeed, by mid· 1858, Carmichael had extended the credit of "Tinoco and Co." to 8,000

pounds sterling, which were the equivalent of 41,500 Costa Rican pesos. Carmichael's
participation in the bank wouJd faciliwc the fulfillment of the credit obliguioos that

Tmoco & Co. had with him. The local connections with Carmichael would contribute to
overcoming the commercial limitations imposed by the low level of development of

Costa Rica's financial infrastructure by the mid•ninetcenth cenrury. The absence of a
financial infrastructure frequently made it difficult for the coffee planters and merchants to

pay for their obligations with the forei~ mainly British. creditors. They had to
purchase drafts in pounds sn:rling which had been drawn by foreign merchants and were
in circulation in Costa Rica to be able to pay their debts with the ca:nmcrciaJ firms abroad.
Commonly it was not easy to obtain drafts negotiable abroad since there was not a large
number of them in circulation in Costa Rica.24
Carmichael's involvement in the bank would make less expensive and less risky

the transference of money for his debtor "Tmoco & Co." since the firm would be able to
pay its debts with Costa Rican pesos. The decision of "Tmoco & Co." to give
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Guardiola the 30,000 pesos to purchase suxk in the bank on behalf of Carmichael
actually constituted a partial payment of its credit with this British merchant.25 The fact
I

that the contract between Iglesias and Guardiola implicitly meant the opening of more

direct channel of credit for "Tmoco and Co." has not been brought into light in works that
refer to the dispute between that finn and Medina. regardless of its imp<XtanCe for
understanding the issues behind the lawsuit.26
Another indication that Carmichael's pmticipation in the bank would be
advantageous fer the partners of "Tmoco & Co." was their active involvement in the
creation of that financial institution which the majority of the elite had decided not to
suppa:t. Francisco Iglesias and Satmnino Tmoco had bad serious clashes with Mora in

1856, had suffered some degree of political persecution as a result of the supposed plan
to overthrow his gm,:mment, and had been forced to leave Costa Rica by orders of

Mora. Nevertheless, the firm of Iglesias and Tmoco was among the investcri in the
bank along with odler prominent members of their family and in-laws. The investors in
the Medina's bank, indeed constituted two groups, one centered around Mora which
included three of bis relatives and a few other people close to his administration. The

other group revolved around the Iglesias family and included the Bishop Ucrente, who
was the uncle of Francisco and Demetria Iglesias and Jose Mana Castro.

The

directorate of the bank. in fact, was made up of Crlsanto Medina as ~ Miguel
Mora. the president's brother, as cashier and first accountant, and Demetrio Iglesias as
second accountant and bookkeeper.Z7
Far "TlDOCO & Co." the pmchase of stock in the bank established by Medina in

close association with Mora was a business that held the promise of being very
advantageous. However, a combination of adverse circumstances turned it into one that
gcDCl"l.led substantial economic losses. In fact, Carmichael's bankruptcy proceedings

placed a temparary embargo over a shipment of coffee that belonged to "Tmoco & Co."
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and was deposited in the warehouse of Carmichael's firm in UverpooL28 Francisco
Mana Iglesias was in Europe in mid-1858 conducting business in France and Great

Britain. Iglesias had made an agreement with Carmichael for the ttansportation to Costa
Rica of merchandise Iglesias bad bought on behalf of bis WiillDtiCW firm. "TlilOCO &

Co." cxi,ected the merchandise to anive in Puntarenas by December,1858. This
merchadise was already on board the ship that was going to Costa Rica when Carmichael
went into bankruptcy. The ship and its cargo were also temporarily embargoed by the
trustees of the bankruptcy proceedings. The embargo placed on the ship delayed for a

few months its arrival in Puntarenas. "Tmoco & Co." lost the opportunity to sell out the
cargo during December, which according to the firm, was the best time of the year for
doing it, and a very good month to get a lower freight charge to transpcxt the cargo from
the coast to the interior. In fact, by mid-February, 1859, "Tmoco & Co." was still
awaiting the arrival of the ship carrying merchandise valued at more than ~00 pounds
sterling.29
The losses of "Tmoco & Co." resulting from Carmichael's bankruptcy also
included 10,000 pesos lost after a frec7.e of assets was ordered by the court when Medina
filed the suit The court froze over 90,000 pesos in merchandise in the store of ''Tinoco
and Co." in San Jose and over 70,000 pesos in assets, promissory notes, bonds, and
certificates of the public debt held by the firm. Even though, the merchandise was
returned to "TlDOCO & Co." after the judge decided the lawsuit with Medina in June,
1859, the losses came from the fact that the merchandise was frozen for several months
preventing the firm from selling it during that period.
The coun ruled in favor of Medina and ordered an auction of the frozen

certificates and bonds of the public debt to pay the

so.~ pesos that ''Tinoco & Co."

owed to Medina. The certificates and bonds had a face value of 57, 754.52 pesos. They
were awarded to Medina in June, 1859 for half of the value, that is for 29 ,m.26 pesos
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because there were no bidders in the auction.30
The adjudication of these negotiable documents to Medina implied that he was
able to recover part of the bank's capital that be had deposi1ed with Carmichael thanks to
the court's niling that forced "Tinoco & Co." to fulfill the obligation contnlC1ed with

Guanliola in 1858. Medina. however, did not recover the capital in cash. Consequently,

there was not enough cur:rency in the bank's safe to endorse the bank notes in circulation.
In addition to this, Medina had taken what little capital was in the bank and part of his
own to pay all the drafts that were returned unpaid when Carmichael went into
bankruptcy, plus interests and damages.31
Medina's failure to obtain cash from "Tinoco & Co" made impossible the reopening of the bank, which had been forced to close in late March, 1859, as he cxpcc1ed.
The financial failure of the firm of the prospccti~ foreign investor, the lack of strong
•

suppcxt from the local commercial circ~

and the business dispute between "TlllOCO &

Co." in fact, precipitated the closure of a bank whose foundations had been weak from
the beginning. The difficulties confron1ed by that bank, nonethel~ did not make Mora

desist from his plan of establishing a financial institution
As a matter of fact, Mora signed a contract towards that end on August 4,1859
with Crisanto Medina, on behalf of the firm "Medin.a & Sons." By virtue of this contract
the government would receive 9,798.50 pesos in promissory noces. and 40,201.50

pesos in certificates from ''Medina & Sons" as if they were casb.32 These negotiable
documents would be deposited in the Adminim::w;i6n Principal, which was the

governmental office that collected all the re~mJCS of the public treasury. Once the
documents were recei~ as cash they would yield a monthly interest of one percent

wluch would be paid to "Medina & Sons" yearly. 1bcsc promissory notes and
certificalCS would become part of the capital with which the new bank would begin its
operations. Medina got a document stating that the government owed the firm "Medina &
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Sons" S0,000 pesos, and that he was entitled to receive that amount plus interests in cash
if the bank was not established after a period of one year. 33 1bc project to establish
another bank. however, could not be implemented during the ~nment of Mora
because he was overthrown on August 14, 1859, ten days after signing the contract with
"Medina & Sons."
Even though that contract never went into effect it was used by the partners of the
firm "Tinoco & Co." as an instrument to obtain compensations from the public treasury

for the losses that resulted from the agreement with Carmichael and the failure of the
bank. The partners of that firm managed to obtain those compensations through the
political influence derived from the high-ranking public offices that Francisco Iglesias and
Julian Volio held in the administrations thai followed Mora's. The significance of this
issue for explaning and understanding the ccnttal argument of this study makes it
necessary to extend the discussion of the business dispute between Medina and Tinoco
beyond the fall of Mora's govcmmcnt.

By August, 1859, when Mora was overthrown, the dispute between Medina and
Tinoco had not been completely settled. The court ruling of June of that year awarded
Medina certificates and hoods for a total value of less than 30,000 pesos. Hence,
"Tmoco & Co," was still owing Medina more than 20,000 after those certificates and
bonds were handed over to the latter by the judge. Medina had a meeting with Juli4n

Volio, in his capacity as lawycrof "Tmoco & Co." on August 13, 1859, the day before
Mora was ousted. to reach an agreement about matters still pending in relation to the
dispute. According to ~ be proposed several solutions to Volio, who took with
him the documents drafted in that meeting and promised to contact him the following day

with his answer. Medina declared that he never heard from Volio after the coup and that
all his attempts to reach an agreement with "Tmoco and Co." were fruitless after that. 34
The main reason behind the refusal of "Tmoco & Co." to settle the pending
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matters with Medina after the OYCrtbrow of Men was that the change in goyemment

tipped the balance of power to the side of its panners. Iglesias and Volio u members of
the Cabinet of Jose! Mana Montealegre, Mora's successor, cenainly, put the political and
legal apparatus at the service of their interests. Iglesias and Volio were able to obtain a
nullification of the court ruling that ordetM "Tmoco & Co." to pay the 50,000 pesos to
Medina and also managed to receive that sum plus interests from the public treasury.
The series of legal actions that led to the misappropriation of public funds by

''Tinoco & Co." began soon after Mora wu ovenhrown. On September 13, 1859, the
new president Montealegre halted the execution of the decree of August 4 of that year.35
This wu the decree that fcxmalized the contract through which the finn "Medina & Sons"

would receive cash for the 50,000 pesos in negotiable documents that it had deposited in
the public treasury.

Montealegre justified that order by saying that the contract between

Mora and "Medina & Sons" was detrimental to the public treasury since Mora's
government had accepted those certificases and bonds at their nominal value when their
real value was lower. There were, to be sure, many irregularities in the contract between

Mora and ''Medina & Sons," the most important of which was the acceptance of the
certificates u if they were cash. Taking into account these irregularities Montealegre's
decision was widely justified. The government was entitled to break the contract and
keep the certificaies and bonds u assets in the public treasury because in some way they

could make up fcx the capital of the Peruvian loan which Mora had given to Medina to

open the bank and which was lost when Carmichael went into bankruptcy.
Mon1ealegre's order to halt the payment of interest to Medina over the certificates
deposited with the government, however, did not repair the damage that the contract in

discussion caused to the public treasury. On the contrary that order served for a
considerable misappropriation of money from public funds. This order, indeed,
prepared the terrain for ''Tmoco & Co." to appeal to the Supreme Court for the
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nullification of the niling of June, 1859 that had made the firm liable to pay Medina
50,000 pesos. The appeal was followed by a petition of "Tmoco & Co." to freeze the

certificates and bonds that Mora's government had n:ceived from "Medina & Soos." The
court accepted the request of "Tmoco & Co." in October,1861, despi1e that the appeal

under way of the lawsuit between Medina and "Tmoco & Co.," and the contract between
"Medina & Sons" and Mora's government were legally two ditfenmt mancrs.36
The Supreme Court declared null and void the decision of the lawsuit between
Medina and "Tinoco & Co." dictated during Mora's government. Consequently, the
Supreme Court ordered the return of the certificates and bonds given to Medina in 1859
to their <Xiginal holders, that is to

"Tinoco & Co. ".'37 The political maneuvering of

Iglesias and Volio, undoubtedly. was pivotal in the Supreme Court's nullification of the

argument that the decision was biased because the judge who had nilcd in the lawsuit in
IIrid-1859 was Manuel Argilello, Mora's nephew. Argilello allegedly had favored the
interests of his uncle's friend Medina in the lawsuit and had forced "TlDOCO & Co." to

pay an obligation for which the firm was not responsible.

Nonetheless, Argiiello's

ruling was not biased because it was demonstrated in court that Medina had all the legal
rights to request the payment of the 50,000 pesos to "Tmoco & Co.", and the auction and

adjudication of the certificates and bonds were carried out according to the law. Hence,
there was no legal basis for the subsequent nullification of the sentence.38 This

nullification moved Medina to file lr new lawsuit which delayed the illegal return to

'Tinoco & Co." ~ the certificates and bonds that were deposib:d in the public treasury.
As a matter of fact, when Medina filed another suit, Iglesias and Volio requested

and obtained a court ruling in 1862 that ordered the sequestration of the 50,000 pesos that

were allegedly deposited in the public treasury. This sequestration meant that the money
in litigation should remained deposited in the tribunals until the court decided which of the
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two parties involved in the lawsuit should be awarded the sum in dispute.39
It was not until August, 1866, and under the administration of Jes Mana Castro
that "Tll10CO & Co." succeeded in obtaining a court ruling that mdel'ed tbe removal of tbe

sequestration and tbe payment of the S0,000 pesos and the interests to the firm.40
Crucial in the enactment of this illegal nlling was tbe fact that the Iglesias family also held

important political offices in tbe government of Castro. Julim Volio was Castro's
Minister of Finance while Francisco Mana Iglesias was the President of Congres~ and

his brother Demctrio, who was Castro's son-in-law, was a member of the Senate. On
August 24, 1866, Volio sent a leum to the AdminimJdgr Principal stating that a judicial
decision had ordered the government to give "Tinoco & Co." the S0,000 pesos that the

administration ~ to Crisanto Medina plus the interest yielded by that sum up to that
date. Volio explained that to comply with that ruling, the government had ordered the

Adminim:w;i6n Principal to cancel the account that Medina had with the government and
to open a new account in favor of "TlDOCO & Co.", and io transfer the money to this new

account after the due interests had been paid.4 1 On the same day, Minister of Finance
Volio signed a contract on behalf of the government with Francisco Mana Iglesias as the
managing partner of the finn "T1110CO & Co." By virtue of this conttact the government

acknowledged the obligation to pay "TlDOCO & Co." 91,900 ~ which was the sum of

the original 50.000 pesos plus the interest accrued up to August,1866. Iglesias agreed to
receive this amount in several installments. The firm would receive 11,900 pesos in cash
at once, and the rest of the money would be paid in fom pans within a period of four

years at an interest of one percent per month. Accolding to the contract on August 31 of
each of the next four years the government would pay 20,000 pesos plus interest to

"TlDOCO & Co." To comply with this obligation the govemment encumbered the national
revenues that came from the custom-house.42 This contract between Volio and Iglesias,
that was so detrimental for the public treasury, was approved by president Castro on the
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same day that it was signed.
The damaging consequences for the national finances brought about by

arrangement between Castro's goyemment and 'Tmoco & Co." went far beyond the
illegal payment of almost 100,000 pesos that, in reality, had never entered the public
treasury in cash. The Costa Rican govemm:m actually paid twice for the same

obligation. As a matter of fact, "Medina & Sons" had a promissory note that Mora had
given that firm fa- the certificates deposited in the public treasury in 1859. This firm
endorsed that promissory note to the London company "Grant, Brodie & Co." on May
3, 1866, after "Medina & Sons" was unable to receive any payment because of the legal
actions of 'Tinoco & Co." 43 "Grant, Brodie & Co." requested the Costa Rican
government the payment of that promissory note in Janumy, 1868. That petition was

rejected by Castro's government with the explanation that the S0,000 pesos deposited by
"Medina & Sons" were no longer in the public treasury. As a result of this n:fusa}. the
British firm sued the Costa Rican government, and in 1869 the court ruled that the public
treasury

should acknowledge and pay the obligation stated in the promissory note held by

"Grant, Brodie & Co. "44 In addition to paying twice for the same obligation. the Costa

Rican government by the late 18(,()s was still indebted to Peru which had supplied the
loan for 18,541 pounds sterling which gave origin to this complicated series of financial
failures and lawsuits.

Iglesias and Volio, just like Mora a decade earlier, went too far in their
manipulation of the legal and political apparatus for their personal ecaiomic benefit. The

open and tenacious ways in which Volio and Iglesias used their political position to
nullify the court ruling of the lawsuit between Medina and 'Tinoco & Co." and to tum all
previous legal actions to their own favor, in fact, raised voices of censorship and
opposition within the elite circles. These voices were heard both in the newspapers and
in Congress where some of its members refused to provide a legal cover for the actions of
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Iglesias and Tinoco which openly plundered a public treasmy that was almost
exhausted.45 Volio's excessive abuse of bis political influence u minister for the benefit
of his family discredited mm so amch that Castro relieved him from bis post in August,
1868. Castro sent Volio to Europe to cany out some "imponam business" there on
behalf of the government.46 But in reality Volio's mission abroad wu intended to
remove him temporarily from the political stage and to abate discontent at home. Ca.mo's
efforts to save Volio's political career and his own administration wiere fruitless.
Certainly, Castro's active participation in the events that led to the payment of almost
100,000 pesos to "Tinoco & Co." contributed importantly to the coup that overthrew him
in 1868.

The failure of the bank showed that the government's task of creating a financial
infrastructure for the expansion of coffee exports was hindered considerably by the
tendency of the elite members to use the public treasury to obtain compensation for their

economic losses when business went wrong. In the case of the bank, the bankruptcy of
John Carmichael in 1858 would not necessarily have meant its clmure if "Tinoco & Co."
have been in a disposition to assume its financial responsibility towards Medina. Instead
of fulfilling their obligation with Medina the partners of that firm waited until the course
of political affairs turned around in their favor and used their public offices to obtain a
reparation with interest from the government. This tendency to missappropriatc public
funds for personal use in the long nm actually weakened those same structures that elite
wu intending to build and strengthen to serve u the foundations of the export economy.
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CllAPI'ER FlVE

THE COLLAPSE OF POLITICAL CONSENSUS

The measures implemented by Mora during the early years of his administration to

strengthen the executive and the military apparatus enabled him to concentraie almost all
political power in his hands. Mora's political stten~ which was pivoatl in the creation
of the climate of stability that characterized the 1SSOs, however, became inaeasingly
detrimental to the interests of the elite in the last two years of his govemmenL Mora's
tendency to use arbitrary means to reap economic benefits from his public office at the
expense of other members of the elite generated a growing discontent that prompted the
fall of his administration.

One of the persons most affected by Mora's excessive misuse of power was his

former business partner Vicente Agtm3!. Mora, in fact, took advantage of his previous
commercial association with Aguilar to sue him in 1857 for reparations and damages in
business dealings that had taken place almost a decade before. Behind that legal action
was an attempt on the part of Mora to solve urgent financial troubles in a moment when
the public treasury was almost exhausted. and therefore no longer able to serve as his

supplier of funds. Even though there was no solid ground for Mora's demands he
managed to obtain 100,000 pesos from Aguilar in an out-of-court settlemcnL The
imposition of that settlement marked the definite rupture of the amicable personal relations

between Mora and Aguilar. The animosity that Mora's political behavior motivated in
Aguilar turned into political rancor two years lat.er when Mora rejected his bid for the
operation of the national distillery and enacted a decree ordering the re-sale of lands in an

area in which Aguilar had several coffee haciendas.
Aguilar, certainly, became Mora's most imponant and influential political enemy
and he was the central figure behind the military coup that ousted him. The discussion of
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the events that gave origin to the political enmity between Mora and Aguilar illustrates the

role played by personal passions in the overthrow of Men. But more importantly it
shows that the limits ex tolerance ex the elite to Mora's abuses of political power were set
by the direct effect that they bad upon the economic in1ereSt of its memben.

The lawsuit that Mora filed against Aguilar in lall: 1857 dealt with business
dealings that were canied out between 1842 and 1848 when they were partners in the
firm "Men & Aguilar." The company was dissolved in February, 1848 by mutual

agreement. Aguilar was the partner who had invested the largest amount of capital during
the firm's years of operation. In fact, at the time the partnership was dissolved, it was
agreed that Mora would pay Aguilar 28,000 pesos in cash and 94,'377 pesos in

mech~ coffee and cash corresponding to his investments. According to that

contract Mora would be responsible for paying the debts that the firm had incurred with
"John Thompson Wattson & Co." in Owe. The only money that Mora was to receive

would come from the eaminp from the sale of the last shipment of coffee and other
goods sent by "Ma-a & Aguilar" to Clile before the company was dissolved. I

The problems between the two former partners began ~ months after the

company was dissolved when Mora received a statement of the account that "Mora &
Aguilar" bad with "John Thompson Wattson & Co." Mora found out that the debt with
the foreign firm was larger than swed in the documents he had signed with Aguilar and

that the profits from the sale of the coffee sent were less than what was specified in the
contract. Mara blamed Aguilar fer the diffi:Z'ence in the figures and began to claim
publicly that his fcrmer partner intentionally bad omit1Di information in the contract of the
dissolution of the company to embezzle money from biJD.2
Mora coafronted Aguilar about the difference in the figures. Mora declared that

Aguilar "confused and ashamed since his wrongdoing had been discovered" agreed to

compensate him and asked him to keep quiet about the incidcnt3 Aguilar, however, said
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that there was no mistake or deliberaie omissicn because

me numbers

in the c:omract

that had dissolved their company rqRSerued th,! esrimattd value ex. the coffee and other
goods before they were sold. The tigmes in the account that Mara received from the
foreign ~ acccrdin1 to Aaui]ar, represented the actual prices ll which mat
merchandise was sold. The fall in the price of coffee in 1848 ICCOUD1ed largely for the
big difference between the estimued and the real value. Aguilar added that he gave Mora
six thousand quintals of coffee, even though he had no obligation to do so. Aguilar said
he did that to compensate his fa:mer partner for the Josses that resulted from the fall in the
price of coffee.4
Aguilar justified his request to Mora to mp quiet about the incident because
Mora's claims of embezzlement hati damaged bis commercial reputation. Mora declared
that he was fully satisfied with the agreement reached since he bad received adequate

compensation. Consequently, Mora manifested that he did not have reasons to damage
Aguilar's honor and reputation and agreed to sign a document that stated that his former
business partner was an honest man. Furthermon:, in January, 1849, Mora signed a
document in which he agreed not to file any claims against Aguilar in the future. S
Mora's declarations indicate that his differences with Aguilar OYer losses and profits in
the company had been settled definitively.

Several years later, however, the business dealings of the dissolved company
became an issue of a heated debate. In 1857 and not long after Mora sold two of his
largest coffee haciendas in Pavas he claimed that he had discoven:d that Aguilar had
misappropriated more than 350,000 pesos from the capital of their company. Mora
declared that with occasion of the payment of his debts to "John Thompson Wanson &

Co." he had gone over the books of the company "Mora & Aguilar'' and was able to
document with the help of a bookkeeper the misappropriation of that considerable amount
ofmoncy.6
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Mora's explanation of why after eight years he suddenly became interested in
going over the boob of the dissolwd company was not very solid. Mora claimed that
after he and Aguilar bad signed the settlement ex 1849 he found out that there were other

imgularities in Aguilar's bookkeeping procedures. Mora explained that soon after be
discovered those imgularities he intended to sue Aguilar but he decided to pay his debts

with "John Thompson Wattson & Co." first. Likewise, Mora declan:d that his election as
president in late 1849 forced him to postpOne the suit against Aguilar because be did not
want to sue him while he was in office. In 1857, Maa said that he could not postponed
the suit any longer because the period stipulated by law to file such claim would expire

soon.7
By late 1857, however, Mora still had plenty of time to file a suit for damages
because the period stipulated by law fer that type of claim was of twenty years. Aguilar

claimed that the reason for Mora's interest in bringing a mancr into court that bad been
already settled was, that at that time, his fcxmcr partner "had a legion of creditcrs nmning
after him" and had used up all means to deal with them and to delay the payment of his
debts. Aguilar said that as a result of that situation Mora saw the possioility of

straightening out his finances at the expense of his form:r business partner's capital.
Aguilar underscored that there was no legal basis fer Mora's demands and that he had
suffcn:d an unfair stripping of a considerable part of his capital because of those claims.8

Aguilar's refutation of Mora's claim., pointed out that the company "Mara &

Aguilar" bad begun operations with a capital of 18,(XX) pesos which was later inaeased
to 30,000 pesos. According to Aguilar, the amount of the initial capital of the company,

the high interests charged by fcxeign creditorS, the small size of the domestic market and
other factors, set important limitations to the profits yielded by the partnership. The
maximum operations of the company, in fact. am>unted only to 31:1,332 pesos. Aguilar
remarked that the company would have needed to reproduce ten times the amount of the
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initial capital to have earned profits in the proportion that Mora claimed, something that
simply had not occurred. The business partnership never yielded enough profits to
permit the alleged misappropriation of 350,000 pesos, in Aguilar's account.9
It is not possible to c:orroborab: the assertions of Mora and Aguilar with the books

of the company since the documentation related to this business dispu~ refers to them but
docs not reproduce all the data of the accounts. Nonetheless, the evidence seems to

indicate that Aguilar's exposition of the accounting of the company was accurate.
Aguilar explained that the first of Mora's claims of embezzlement bade in 1848 were
based in part on his unawareness of the real state of the business. Aguilar contented that
during their partnership, Mora did not separate the transactions that be carried out on
behalf of the company from those that he did on his own. Actually it was the confusion
between Mora's persaial accounts and the accounts of the company and along with his
business practices that led Aguilar to request the dissolution of the company. Aguilar
was very harsh in his opinions of Mora's capabilities as a businessman. He said that
Mora's administration of his business -ventures was characterized by a lack of order and
proper management practices which resulted in his inability to obtain substantial profits.

Those management practices, according to Aguilar, accounted significantly far Mora's
being frequently in debt and his continually opening new credits to pay previous ones. 10
Mora, nevertheless, blamed Aguilar far his financial trouble which forced him to
sell the two large coffee haciendas in Pavas in 18S7. Mora declared that Aguilar had
become very rich at his expense because the inaccurate bookkeeping of the company
enabled Aguilar to misappropriate large amounts of money while he, Mora, became
responsible to pay a huge debt. Mora added that it took him almost ten years to pay the
debt with the foreign creditors but that his time had come to demand a compcnsation.11
Mora's acknowledgement that Aguilar's capital was much more solid than his own is
significant. It indicates that behind Mora's demands, which the data related to the dispute
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suggest were not well-grounded, was an attempt to solve his financial troubles with part
of Aguilar's capital
Aguilar was in Europe when Mora began to camnent publicly about the alleged
discovery of the dishonest management of the company and to take the first steps to sue
his former partner. Thus, on November 25, 1857. soon after Aguilar tetumed to Costa
Rica, he wrote a letter to Mora proposing a private conference to discuss the matter.

Aguilar told Mora in that letn:r that he wanu:d to avoid a lawsuit because he was
convinced that legal disputes always yielded ruinous results for all parties involved.
Aguilar also told Mora that he was willing to reach an agreement since be wanu:d to keep
his good reputation and his properties intact. 12

At the meeting Aguilar initially offered Mora a compensation of ro.ooo pesos.
Mora did not accept it and Aguilar raised the offer to 80,000 pesos. Mora, however, only
accepted the compensation when Aguilar offCJCd biml00,000 pesos. As a result of this

meeting, Aguilar and Mora signed a document on December 18, 1857, in which they
declared the dispute settled. The agreement S1alCd that there had been no

mismanagement on the part of Aguilar. The document said that Mora, to honor the truth
and to prou:ct the honesty and good reputation of Aguilar, declared that his claims
origiruued in losses that bad resulu:d from bad sales of coffee and other goods that had
been expcn:d by the company in the 1840s. Aguilar declared that he was positively

convinced that Mora had suffered coosiderable losses as the partner responsible for
paying all the debts of the dissolved company.

Aguilar added that in view of those losses he had agreed to compensaic Mora
with 100,000 pesos that would be pm in several installments within a period of four

years. These installments would be paid mainly with income that Aguilar n:c:eived from
the liquor distillery and the Factpna de tabaco . the governmental office that administered
the monopoly over retail sales of tobacco. The tcnm of the agreement stated that by
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virtue of that document Mora acknowledged that his claims against Aguilar had been
settled and from then on all books, invoices, receipts and account statements of the
dissolved company were to become null and void

Mora had kept those documents but

he gave them to Aguilar after they both agreed to des1roy them to prevent their use fer
future claims. Mora and Aguilar decla!ed thatt they would keep secret the details and

conditions of the contract that they had signed "voluntarily and under the best
harmony. "13
Mora declared afterwards that the fact that Aguilar took the initiative to settle the
demands out of court was proof that his former partner was guilty and was aware that he

couJd not conceal his misconduct any longer. Aguilar, however, was probably willing to
reach to an agreement with Mora, even when the claims of the latter were groundless, to

avoid a lawsuit that couJd be in court for a long time and could tum out to be even more
damaging to his interests. The clause of the document of the settlement that handed all

boo4 receipts and account statements of the dissolved company OYer to Aguilar
represented a tacit victory for him. That clause, in fact, prevented Mora from using those
documents in the future as an instrument to demand from Aguilar the payment of

additional compensatioo. The first agreement that Aguilar pay reparation to Mora for

losses in the fall of coffee price was justified but the second demand was apparently the
result of Mora's misuse of the company's accounting books. Aguilar, nevertheless, only
fulfilled the financial obligation assumed in December, 1857, while Mora was still in
office. After Mora was o v ~ ~ Aguilar stopped the compensation payments
and requested a court nnJtificatioo of the contract claiming that be had been forced to sign

it under the pressure of Mora's strong political power.14
Another way in which Mora affected the interests of some members of the elite

was through the appropiation of common and municipal lands to replace his coffee
haciendas and enlarge his sugar plantations. The four cities of the Costa Rican central
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valley were smrounded by agricultural villages that were divided into component units
called neighborhoods. By the mid-nineteenth century there was still an important amount
of common lands between the cities and the surrounding villages that provided access to
subsistence to the majority of the population. Even after the initial development of the
export economy access to common land was widespread especially in Canago and
Heredia, and to a lesser but still important in extent in San Jose and Alajuela. Many

people rented plots from these common lands for a small fee payable on an annual basis
to the municipal government. These individuals cultivated the plots and frequently after a
period of many ~ established private ownership aver them.15

The municipal govcrnmcnt of each city had among its tasks the collection of the

annuities charged to individuals for the use and cultivation of common lands. The
municipalities also had control under the vacant lands located within their jurisdictions.
In the late 1850s Mora's government ordered the sale of some vacant and common lands
in the outslcins of San Jose and Alajuela with the purpose of increasing the revenues of
their municipalities. The sale of some of those lands served also the purpose of
facilitating for Mora their appropriatiat by fraudulent means. The common lands in

discussion were located in Pa~ where Mora had some haciendas.
Mota ordcred the division and public auction of part of the common lands in

Pavas to generate funds for the comttuction of an aqueduct in San Jose. The
govemme~ in fact, had signed a contract in A~ 1858 with Guillemx> Nanne and
Francisco Kurttc, two Gennans residents of Costa Rica for the construction of that public
work. The cost of the

a,ueduct was 70,000 pesos to be paid in five installments.

The

first of 15,514 pesos was to be paid at the time of the signing of the contract. The four

other installments of 13,621 pesos would be paid every fom months. The auction of the
common lands would provide the cash that the government would pay the contractors to
begin the construction of the aqueduct 16
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For that reason the government ordered the bidders who took part in the public
auction to pay cash for the plots they bought. Mora was able to get sane of the best and
most conveniently locau:d plocs of the common lands in Pavas through sane iJrcgularities

in the auction proceedings. As a maaa- of fact. one of the main bidders was Guillermo

Nanne, who purchased three large plots that formed a piece of land measuring

-

approximately 202 hectares. The total price of the plocs was1Z236 pesos that Nanne
was supposed to pay in cash. Nanne, nonetheless, did not pay anything for these plots
because he agreed with the government u, receive them in lieu of the first installment of
money that he was going to get according to the terms of the contract u, build the
aqueduct. Nanne received the balance of 15,514 pesos in promissory nores.17

Nanne,

who was a close friend of Mora, kept only half of the piece of land that be had purchased
in Pavas. He sold the other half of the plocs to Mora on May 10, 1858~ for 6,248 pesos

that M<n was to pay in two years. Nanne declared that he had sold Mora 101 hectares of
the land because they planned to fcmn a coffee hacienda on that property and worked it

jointly.

This imgular sale of land to Nanne meant that no payment was made for the

plot in an auction which was allegedly intended to generate funds fer the municipality
and for the aqueduct.18
Mora also managed to acquire a substantial amount of common lands in mid•
1858 through a municipal ruling of the city of AJajucla which ordered the division into
plots and public auction of two municipal pasture ~ one called "Nuestto Amo" and
the other called "Salitral." The ruling staled that the intendai purpose of the division and

sale was to faciliwe fer the residents of Alajuela their access u, and use the land Many
of the plots, to be sure, were purchased by individuals who resided in the outskirts of
Alajuela, in neighborhoods such as San Antonio, San Jose de AJajuela, Santiago, and
San Antonio de Heredia. The people bought plots that measured between thirty•six and
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sixty-two hectares, in some cases two ex three individuals purchased one plot together,

usually a large one. 19

Mora's ownership of the; popenies though, actually took land resources away
from the residents of Alajuela. instead of facilitating their acquisition of plots. Mora

bought fifteen plots which all together measured 781 hectares for 5,919 pesos. The
pasture lands were auctioned for two thirds of the estimab:d value and the buyers were

only obligated to pay one third of the total price of the plot at the time of the purchase.
Consequently Mon paid ooly 1,963 pesos f<X a huge piece ofland.20 The fact that the
plots bought by Mon were contiguous to his sugar cane plantation and cattle hacienda
called "Ojo de Agua" !micates that the sale of the common pasture lands was a wellcalculan:d plan on his part to enlarge those properties through the purchase of land for a
symbolic price.
The irregularities involved in the sale of the common and municipal lands of
Pavas and Alajuela in 1858 raised voices of opposition among the elite's circles. The
issue of the sale of common and municipal lands, however, became really explosive in
August.1859, and precipitated the overthrow of Mora's government. Mora, i n ~
entered a more d3ngemus ground. from the point of view of the interests of the elite,

when he enacted a decree that ordered the owners of plots of land in a vast area of the
outskirts of San Jose to validate their property titles through the payment of special fee.
The properties affected by this decree were located cast of San Jose and
comprised the neighborhoods of San Vicente. San Juan, Guadalupe and Mojon. The
land on which these properties had been developed had been granted by the Spanish
colonial authorities in 1768 to a group of neighbcn of San Jose. These individuals bad
paid the Crown a fee ftr the official recognition of their right to cultivate the land and had
received a collective property title. Therefore, these families and their descendants had

cultivated these common lands since the colonial period. Many of these people later had
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registered the individual properties that their families had W0lked for generations and

thus, bad become legal owners of their plots. Sewral other, howe~, considered

themselves owners by reason of their prolonged occupation and cultivation of the land but
did not have individual legal titles.21

Mora's decree stated that the lands included in the colonial crdinance were at the
time occupied by a group of families who did not pay any ttibute or tax to the city of San

Jose for the use of the plots. In other words Mora did not recognize their ownership of
the land but treated them as merely utilizing common lands. The government claimed that
the decree aimed at solving the problem of the occupation without payment because the
city was in need of funds to finance diverse projects intended for urban improvement.
The Mora administration declared that by virtue of the decree obligating the occupants of

the lands in discussion to pay for the recognition of their property rights, it would be
possible to reconcile public interests with private. Consequently, the deaee ordered that
all the plocs be measumi and appraised to establish the amount that the de facto
proprietcxs would have to pay to legalize their ownership of the land22
This decree of August 6, 1859, far from serving the intended purpose of

reconciling the public and private interests made them clash. The <mer generated great
discontent among these de facto owners because it implicitly meant the expropriation of
their plots. The expansion of coffee cultivation had so substantially increased property
values by that time that the fees fcx- properties titles would have been prohibitive based on
the inflated land price. Consequently people would be forced to sell their plots to pay
their dues to the municipality. The histaical woda of the Mora administration points out
that this threat of a dispossession of the main means of subsistence of many people
hastened the coup because most of them were civilians who made up the militias.23 A

contemporary source contended, indeed, that the decree in discussion led these militiamen
to revolt against the government. 24
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nw the decree generated discontent among some militiamen is significant.

What

is more significant. however, is that among those legitimate property owners who were

affected by the decree of August, 1859 was non other than the prominent and ver,
influential Vicente Aguilar. Mora's former business partner, in fact, owned several
properties in San Vicente, one of the neighborhoods affected by that order. Aguilar had
received a coffee hacienda in San Vicente from his debtor Bnino Cmanza as payment of

a aedit in May, 1857. This hacienda comprised several separa1e pieces of land planted
with coffee that all together measured aproximarely eighty-seven hectares and had a value
of 20,000 pesos. 25 Records of Aguilar's notarized transactions reveal that after he
became the owner of Cam.nza's hacienda, he began to buy small plots in San Vicente.

Aguilar, in fact. registered fourteen transactions involving properties in San Vicente after
May, 1857 and during the next three years. The me of the plots was relatively small
but all together amounted to thilty-dm:e hectares.26

That all the plots bought

were

contiguous to other of Aguilar's properties indicates that the intended purpose of the
pmchases was their gradual consolidation into larga' units.
The vehemence with which Aguilar emphasized later that Mora's government had

seriously amckcd private property through arbitrary acts that were justified by "specious
pretexts" becames significant in light of the information concerning his haciendas in San
Vicente. r7 Aguilar declared that the future administrations should dedicate their efforts
to guarantee that such

usurpation of private property will never again be repeated in

Costa Rica. Aguilar was hopeful that the future goverments would never again decree
the alienation of private properties, "such as the ones in San Vicente, San Juan,
Guadalupe and Moj6n," to pay a huge municipal debt with somebody else's money.28
The eloquence of Aguilar's declarations indicates that that decree provoked a reaction in

him strong enough to make him play an instrumental role in the overthrow of Mora's

government.
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Mora's political actions in the wt two years of his administration that affected
directly or indirectly the private interests of Aguilar and other prominent members of the

elite certainly hastened the breakup of the consensus. Up to that time the elite had
tolerated or been willing to overlook Mora's misuse of power, bis liberal use of the public
treasury for his benefit. his violation of the constitution and other arbitrary act!. What the

coffee planters and merchants were wiwilling to tolerate and ultimately forced them to
overthrow Mora was the threats to their propeny rights. That was evident in a document
published after the coup which declared that the shoncommings of Mora's administration
could be characterized by his laclc of respect for private property. It was underscored
that Men violated the rights that guaranteed private property and work because "he did

not separate his public deeds from his private inteiests. "29
It is interesting that the document that analY7.es the causes of the coup pointed out
that the lack of separation between Mora's private and public roles gave origin to abuses
of power, but it emphasized that those abuses were moderate before 1856.30 The abuses
mentioned in that analysis were related to Mora's tendency to utilize the public treasury as
the main soun:e of capital for his private ventures. The sound condition of the national

finances during early 1850s ~ possible the mismanagement of the public treasury
without damaging din:ctly the interests of the leading members of the elite and was what
definitely enabled some to label as moderate Mora's abuses of power. Moreover that

mismanagement of the public treasury was labeled as moderate because many if not all the
prominent coffee planters and merchants were also benefiting from it.
The document which dealt with the causes of the fall of Mora explained that after
18S6 public treasury was of little help for Mora, "who was submerged in debts and
continually in financial trouble because he squandered all his earnings on ill-calculated
enterprises and businesses. "3 1 Consequently, that document declared, Mora began to
look for new sources of funds to solve his financial troubles. The same source pointed
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out that Mora did not exclude any means to accomplish his goal "reganlless, that the
principles of justice and prudence advised him not to employ some of them. "32
Mora. indeed. applied the lenaCity that accouncr.d for the successful
implcmentatiai of the central point of his agenda, such as the strengthening of the

executive power, in his endeavor to solve his urgent financial situation.33 Mora's
tenacity to pursue goals which fn:quently bcxdered on stubborness, however, turned
against him on this opportunity. The publication that examined the causes of the fall of
Mora's government mentioned in fact. that after 1856 Men no longer paid attention to
"the voices of moderation" and enacted decrees, "against the opinion of many judicious

persons, which despoiled individuals from their private properties"34 This was a clear
reference to the deaee invalidating the propcny titles ex the lands located in the

neighborhoods of San Vicente, San Juan, Guadalupe and Mojdn.
The same document pointed out that after 1856 "the patriotic intentions of the

unaffected republican president began to transform into the instincts of an autocrat "35 It
emphasized that after the war against Walker most of the leading members of society had
withdrawn from the administtation of public aff~ and that Men filled the vacant

positions with adulatory individuals who followed his instructions blindly. The
government then suppressed the freedom of the press, harassed and persecuted political
opponents, and committed other abuses against the individual rights.36
· The military coup was justified in the afolementioned document as the only

avenue opened to prevent Mora from continuing his attacks against property and
individual rights. It explained that by mid-1859 and after almost ten years in office Mora
aimed at remaining in the presidency fer life to cope with his financial troubles and keep
his social position. According to that source, Men expected to achieve that goal
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through constitutional formalities, the
support of his accomplices, the masses that
be thought were loyal to him, the ganisons
that he considered as his private property,
and the gradual destruction of his adversaries.37

The elections were the constirutional formalities mentioned in that document

through which Mora attempted to remain in power indefinitely. By mid-1859 Mora had

managed to secure himself another six-year presidential term by altering the results of
elections held a few months before. The document that justified the coup stated the the

prominent members of society had tolerated Mora's increasing abuses of power after
1856 because they knew his presidential term was soon to end Mora's fraudulent reelection in 1859 destroyed the last possibility to resolve the problem peacefully and made

it necessary "to resort to force to vanquish an illegal face." 38

Mora's lack of respect

for the popular will, acccrding to that same source, was what moved the commanding
officers of the two garrisons of San Jose to rebel against his authority. The document
declared that those military officers had fulfilled their duties properly and had remained

loyal to Mora up to that moment. Afra the clecuxal fraud, the document stated, the revolt
became "an act of legal defense approved by human and divine laws. "39 The popular
will, nonetheless, had actually little or no room at all within the Costa Rican politics of the

nineteenth century because of the oligarchical nature of government. When the military
officers deposed Mora on August 14, 1859 they were in reality acting on behalf of the
same men who had put him in the presidential chair almost ten years before. The decree
invalidating the property titles of many militiamen piompted the coup at the same time that
it provided the high ranking military officers with a justification for their role of
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intermediaries of the prominent members of the elite who could not longer tolerate Mora's
abuses of power.
The overthrow of Mora marked the formal closing of a very important period in
the political and economic history of the Costa Rica. The coup, as a matter of fact, was
the final blow in the detai<X'3tion of the political consensus that s13Ited when Mora began

to surpass the limits of toleruicc of the elite f<x'ccd by his financial problems and his
excessive political ambition. Therefore, the same economic and personal factors that,

combined. had created a suitable political formula to meet the needs of the leading coffee
planters and merchants in late 1849 were responsible fer its collapse ten years later.

The rupture of the consensus, nevertheless, was only in relation to Mora as head
of the government and his abuses of authority that directly affected the interests of the
elite. Mora's program of creating an infrastructure fer the development of the export
economy was not an issue of conflict in the political struggle of the late 1850s. The
overthrow of Mora only meant a. tempouuy crisis in the intr:mal relations of the ruling

coffee planter and merchant elite, one of several that cook place in the second half of the
ninelCCnth century. These periodic and brief crises, far &om weakening the hegemony
of the elite, actually strengthened it. They were periods of aero Io•· datiori and
reestablishment of the equilibrum between the pursuit of the personal goals of the men in
power and those of the elite in general. The momentaty disruptions of "Order and

Progress" were actually adjustments of a path that was traced during the Mora years.
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CHAPI'ERSIX
1llE MILITARY COUP AND nm
EXECUTION OF MORA; nm PRINCIPLES RULING
1llE RELATIONS OF TiiE ELITE

By mid-1859 a serious financial crisis bad significantly hindered Mora's
implementation of measures aimed at fostering agricultural and commercial
development. The political consensus among the leading coffee planters and
merchants towards the administration of Mora bad deteriorated as a result of Mora's
excessive abuses of power which bad begun to affect negatively the interests of the
elite.

The breakup of the consensus, however, took place when Mora showed bis

intentions of remaining in power indefinitely. Mora's reluctance to step down from
power voluntarily prompted a military coup.
The military coup that ousted Mora. however, was an event in which not even
one shot was fired. Mora fell victim to his own endeavor to strengthen the military.
This endeavor led Mora to concentrate almost all power in the two barracks of San
Jose. This decision turned the commanding officers of these barracks into the two
key figures with enough power and influence to

ovcnum Mora's government without

resorting to violence. As a matter a fact. the coup was the result of the betrayal of
Colonel Lorenzo Salazar, the commanding officer of the Cuarb;l dJ;

Artillena . one of

the two barracks of San Jose. Salazar revolted in agreement with Colonel Maximo
Blanco who was the commanding officer of the

Cuartel Princ;ipal. the other barrack of

the capital.
Once Saluar and Blanco agreed on revolting against Mora. they sent a group
of militiamen to his house at dawn on August 14, 1859. Mora was awakened by one
of his servants who told him that outside the house was a military officer who
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demanded to see him urgently. This officer was Sotero Rodnguez who told Mora

Cuartel

there was a disorder in the
required to calm the ttoops.

dg;

Anillerla ,

and that his presence there was

However, when Mora got out of the house he found out

that Rodnguez and the rest of the militiamen had actually come to inform him that he
was no longer president. The militiamen, indeed, told Mora that his rule had been
disavowed by Salazar and they had orders to arrest bim.1
The ttcason of both of the military men whom in the past Mora regarded as
loyal and reliable enough to entrust with the main strongholds of the country, left him
with no possibilities to fight for his own restitution of power. Therefore convinced of
the hopelessness of the situation, Mora did not offer resistance to the

aITCst.

Mora

was briefly held prisoner in one of the barracks and later he was conducted to the
National Palace. Mora remained there for two days along with his brother Jose
Joaqwn, his brother-in-law Jose Mana Canas, and his vice-president Rafael G.
Escalante. After this short stay at the National Palace, the principal figures of the
Mora administration were taken to the port of Puntarenas and sent into exile. 2
That Mora was overthrown by the same men who were in charge of defending
his government has led some to consider his military policies as mistaken measures

that only had negative effects. Historians dealing with Mora's administration, in
fact, have emphasu.ed that his determination to strengthen the army made his
government, and the ones of his successors, very vulnerable to the will of the
military officers. Mora's decision to make the army the main foundation of his

political power, in the opinion of these scholars, gave origin to a praetorianism that
lasted for several

ycars.3

According to this view, the strengthening of the army

during the 1850s ttansformed the military into the arbiters of the political affairs of
the country. It has been pointed out that beginning with the 1859 coup and for the
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next ten years the colonels Salazar and Blanco decided who should be ousted from
power and when.4
The military, certainly, had a decisive role in politics after 1859. Mora's
policies regarding the army, however, did not tum the military into an independent
political force that kept Costa Rica continually at the brink of armed revolt, as some
authors have argued.5

The political events of the decades irnrnediatel.y after the

Mora years show that the military dutifully performed the expected task of serving
as the guarantor of order. But the military fullfilled this task in a way that, although
was very effective, was not the one intended by Mora. lbe military to be sure, as a
repressive force was a very important component of the state apparatus in the
second half of the nineteenth century. The military, nonetheless, functioned more as
an institution that acted as mediator in the internal conflicts of the elite than as the
backbone of the government's authority .

Costa Rica in the second half of the last century was not a country in which
the military had the task of supressing revolts of popular masses armed and
mobilized by a caudillo, or by contending political factions. The threats to the
disruption of order came instead from inside the ruling elite. Those threats
originated, indeed, in the strife of the members of a smal19 very homogeneous9
closely-related ruling elite for the economic benefits derived from holding a highranking public office and other privileges that came along with the control of the
government. The common people that the elite claimed to be representing were
never called to arms in support of any faction of the ruling class. The coffee planters
and merchants ruled over the country as if they were managing a family venture.
These individuals resolved their internal political differences through negotiation and
compromise rather than civil war.
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The strong military apparatus that was built up dwing the Mora years
provided a very important service in that respect. The military kept the equilibrium
between the conservation of political stability and the quarrels of the members of the
elite over the benefits derived from a position in the government.

The existence of

a powerful military. indeed. was instrumental in the consolidation of the coffee
planters and merchants as a dominant class. This military apparatus prevented the

internal conflicts of the elite from evolving into sharp divisions that could have
weakened it economically and politically.
The creation of a strong military force during the 1850s reoriented and set the

limits of the elite's struggle for the control of power in two ways. The military
became the indispensable ally of any faction of the elite willing to overthrow a
government. The commanding officers of the barracks of San Jose represented a
decisive force that any group ·of coffee planters and merchants, interested in
overturning a president, had to recruit to tip the balance of power in their favor. For
the man ousted from the presidency, as happened to Mora in 1859. the military
became an adversary that it was very difficult if not impossible to defeat. In fact. the
existence of a centrali7.ed army condemned to a failure any attempt by a deposed
president to challenge the power of the high-ranking military officers who had taken
sides with his opponents.
Thel859 coup. therefore, marlced an important historical tmning point as it
was the first instance in which the military overturned a government for the direct
benefit of a group of coffee planters and merchants. Historians who have dealt with
the intervention in politics of the Colonels Salazar and Blanco have pointed out that
they were the key figures in the overthrow of Mora. and in the downfall of Jose Marfa
Castro in 1868. These historians, nonetheless, have overlooked a very important

aspect of the political role played by these two military men from the late l 850s to
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the late 1860s. What has been overlooked is the fact that Blanco and Salazar only
played the role of agents that deposed two presidents who bad lost the support of
the majority of the elite. Salazar and Blanco were intermediaries who never held
political office because they did not belong to the circle of the leading coffee planters
and merchants who controlled political power.
The task assigned to Salazar and Blanco, nevenheless, was very important.
They were commissioneC:f to-assume absolute responsibility for the destitution of
Mora and Castro, which in reality had been planned by a group of coffee planters and
merchants discontented with their governments. The leading political figures of the
second half of the nineteenth century manifested continually their belief that order
was a

sine gpa non for progress. Consequently, these individuals did not want to

appear as directly involved in a coup that disrupted constitutional order, no matter
how justified it might have been.

That the coffee planters and merchants

constituted a small elite that was linked together by kinship, business relations, and
friendship provided another very important reason for leaving to the military the
actual task of overthrowing governments. The political conspiracies of a group of

discontented elite members frequently were aimed against their former business
partners, close or distant relatives, or in-laws. Therefore, the military provided a
cover up for the coffee planters and merchants to maintain a public image as citizens
who bad only the deepest respect for constitutional principles and kinship bonds.

In the case of the overthrow of Mora. Colonel Lorenzo Salazar assumed
responsibility for the it in a proclamation which was addressed to the Costa Rican
people and circulated on the same day as the coup. In that proclamation Salazar
explained that he bad remained loyal to the government up to the point in which
Mora, "intoxicated with a manifestly usurped power," began to violate the most
sacred rights of the people. In a clear allusion to Mora's decree ordering the sale of
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lands owned by some militiamen, Salazar said that be could not remain impassive in
the face of the government's attempts to expropriate many legitimate

owners.

Salazar declared that Mora's harassment of his political opponents had also
compelled the military to put an end to that "tyrannical adminisU'ation." Salazar
concluded his proclamation declaring that he

wu confident that a new man would

come "to regenerate the country and to establish liberty with peace, order and
security."6
Mora had been forced by the adverse circumstances to step down from power
after the coup but that in no way did mean that he had resigned himself absolutely to

the idea that he

wu no longer president. Mora up to the day of his death in

September, 1860 continued to claim that he was still the constitutional president of
Costa Rica. This circumstance showed the events that followed Mora's overthrow
to be unusually clarifying of the role that the military played as intermediaries of

some elite members. Inf~ Salazar's claims that he had acted according to the
dictates of his conscience were refuted by Mora soon after the coup.
Mora contended that the real authors of the coup were not the military but "a
few factious individuals" that had bought the loyalties of the commanding officers of
the bamu:ks of San

Jose.7

Mora was more specific in his accusations when he

arrived in El Salvador a week after the coup. He pointed out then that Vicente
Aguilar, Julian Volio, Francisco Mana Iglesias, and Edward Allpress, Aguilar's
business partner and son-in-law, were the individuals responsible for his overthrow.
Mora claimed that these people had commissioned Ram6n Mo~ an obscure
merchant who was a close friend of Salazar, to talk him into deposing his
administration. Mora contended that the plotters had givcnl0,000 pesos to Salazar
as payment for revolting against his government. 8
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A notable contempOrary observer of the political events of the late l 850s
emphasized the idea that the military, in fact. had only served u intermediaries for
a small group of people detennined to oust Mora from power. Lorenzo Montufar, a

Guatemalan lawyer who resided in Costa Rica for many years, wroce in his memoirs
that the downfall of Mora had its roots in events that were not political but economic.
He stated that the coup originated in private interests that "were being discussed
vehemently in court at that time. "9
Montufar was referring to the two most important business disputes of the
period, the one between Mora and his former partner Vicente Aguilar, and the one
between Crisanto Medina and the firm "Tmoco & Co". Montufar argued that
Aguilar planned the coup u a way to avenge from his former partner and avoid
fulfilling the financial obligation that he assumed after settling the dispute with
Mora. IO

Likewise, Montufar contended that the partners of the firm "Tmoco & Co."

were of the opinion that Mora had used his power to influence the court decision that
ordered their firm to pay 50,000 pesos to Medina. Consequently, according to
Montufar, the partners of the firm ''Tmoco & Co." got involved with Aguilar in a
conspiracy to overthrow Mora and destroy bis political influence that was so

damaging their economic interests. Montufar added that these individuals
accomplished their goals by making use of the swords of Colonels Blanco and
Salazar.1 1
Montufar criticized harshly the betrayal of the military officers and casted
serious doubts about their integrity in commentaries he made on the day of the coup.
Montufar was quoted as saying in the presence of his wife and some other people,
that Salazar's loyalty to Mora had been bought for 10,000 pesos. He also said that
Sotero Rodnguez, the officer who mested Mora. had received 5,000 pesos for his
action. After these commentaries, Montufar added that the "brave" military officers
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that deposed Mora and installed

J= Mana Montealegre in the presidency would

oust the latter and place someone else in power if they were offered a substantial
amount of money in retum.12
Montufar

was also quoted as declaring that Julwt Volio was the person who

delivered the sum of money paid to Salazar. According to the same source, Montufar
added that Ram6n Molina was celebrating the successful accomplishment of the

mission assigned to him.13 According to another source, Molina's assignment
included persuading Blanco to take part in the coup.14 Apparently, Bianco's
involvement in the coup was limited to backing up Salazar's revolt. Mora's nephew
Manuel Argiiello, who also left a firsthand account of the events surmunding the
1859 coup, wrote many years later that several people claimed that the military
officers were paid to overthrow his uncle. Argiicllo declared that regardless of this
repeated asscrtioi he personally never had any proof or evidence that Blanco and
Salazar actually sold their loyalty to Mora for a sum of moncy.15 It is very likely,
however, that these military officers received a bonus for caff)'ing out the coup in
addition to their promotion to the rank of generals. What Salazar and Blanco might
have received in return for their actions, however, is not as important as the fact that
they took the lead in ousting Mora on behalf of a group of leading members of the

elite.
The bitterness and animosity that resulted from the business dispute
between Mora and Aguilar, in addition to the conflicts with the members of the
Iglesias family over the losses and profits in the liquor business, and the failure of
the national bank, to be sure, provided these men with important reasons to want
Mora's ovcnhrow.

Whether there were only Aguilar, Volio and Iglesias behind the

initial planning of the coup or if other people were also involved, the fact of the
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matter was that the military took the necessary steps to prepare the terrain for the
transference of power from one group of coffee planters and men:hants to another.
The appointment of the tempOrUy president and the preparations for the
establishment of a new government, nonethele~ were affairs in which only the
leading members of the elite took part. The negotiations with the military and the
selection of the person who would replace the

soon-to-be ousted president were

apparently simultaneous processes. Not only was Colonel Salazar's proclamation
circulated on the day of the coup but another document was issued on the same day
too. While Salazar expressed his confidence that a new man would come to
"regenerate the country," the second document, an act signed by eighty-seven
residents of San Jose!, bore the name of the man already selected to carry out this
regeneration. That the two documents were issued separately is of utmost
significance as it maintains an appearence of independent action by a military
uninfluenced by the political elite.
The act of the residents of San Jose! stated that it should be regarded as a
manifestation of the will of all the country. This document approved Salazar's
actions by declaring that

Juan Rafael Mora was no longer recogni7.ed as the

president of Costa Rica. The signatOries of the act also expressed deep gratitude to
Salazar for the enormous service that he had rendcn:d to the country by deposing
Mora, therefore restoring the liberties that he had usurped.16 The act declared that

Jose Marla Montealegre had been appointed as temporary president.

The document

explained that Montealegre had been given all-embracing powers to govern until
elections were carried out to choose Mora's successor.

Likewise, the act indicated

that the Congress had been declared dissolved and that a constituent assembly

would be summoned shortly. The act of the residents of San J~ stated that in his
capacity of temporary president Montealegre would order Mora, J~ Maria Canas,
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and Manuel Argilello to leave Costa Ria immediately. The exile of these three men
was considered esscnti~ for the preservation of the political stability of the country.
But the document emphasized that the new government was committed to
guaranteeing the lives and properties and other rights of Mora and bis relatives.17
Due to the oligarchical nanue of Costa Rican politics in the nineteenth

century it is not surprising that eighty-seven people declared that their actions
represented the will of the whole population of the country. This act is significant
from the point of view that indicates that while the actual planning of coup might

have involved only a small number of people their decision to oust Mora was
sanctioned by most of the elite. In addition to Vicente Aguilar and Julwl Volio, the
signatories of that act included Jos6 Mana Castro, Manuel Jos6 Carazo, several
members of the Carranza family, Manuel GutiCITCz, Ram6n Quiros and other leading
figures. The circulation of this act soon after the coup suggests that the elite had
reached a consensus about overturning of Mora's government before it took place.
The establishment of that consensus and the smooth transition from one
administration to the next was eased by the nature of the changes in the government
in the second half of the ninctccnth century. The overthrow of a government during
this period meant basically just a change of the individuals who were in key public
offices and not a radical shift in political programs. After &a the disruption of the
constitutional order was only intended to facilitate the alternation in power of the
leading figures of an elite who shared economic, social, and political goals.
The capacity of the coffee planters and merchants to alternate themselves in
power without having to resort to violence is one of the most interesting of their
characteristics as a ruling elite. The struggle for control of power, to be sure, was

very important among the coffee planters and merchants, and frequently divided
them. However, once a remporary conflict over the control of the government was
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resolved, the losers accepted their defeat. The defeat wu easily accepted because
the overthrow of a president did not mean his total and permanent isolation from the
political life of the country of the vanquished but only a. tempormy separation from
power. The possibilities to go back and serve in a high-ranking public office were
always opened to the main political figures and many of them were able to do it.

Jose Maria Castro, for example, was forced to resign his presidential post in 1849,
but was elected once again in 1866 only to be ovenbrown by a coup in 1868. But
even Castro's second forced exit from the presidency did not put an end to his public
life. In fact, he was president of the Supreme Court in the early 1870s and served as
Minister of Foreign Relations &om 1886 to 1890.18

Castro's political career

exemplifies that constant oscillation of many distinguished memben of the elite
from periods of active participation in public affairs as congressmen, ministers, and

presidents to periods of separation from politics because of differences with the men
in power at that moment.

The coffee planters and merchants apparently had another important reason
to step down from power when the political situation turned adverse to them,
especially in the case of a military coup. This reason was closely related to the
elite's preoccupation for the preservation of order and stability. Even when the man
in the presidency thought that he had a legitimate right to remain in office he did not
offer resistance after being informed that the military had disavowed his authority.
To resist the military and to try to recruit men to tight for the presidency would have
meant involving the country in a civil war the consequences of which might have
been ominous. Therefore, no ooe ·wantcd to be blamed for getting the country into
any kind of armed conflict.
Juan Rafael Mora's ambition to remain in power indefinitely made him an
exception to the general rule because it never let him resign himself to the loss of the
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presidency. The fact that Mora repeatedly attempced to regain power gave rise to a
_situation that brings to light the factors that made the other members of the elite to
conform to their fate.

Mora's determination to recover the presidency, indeed.

ttansfonned him into a continual threat to the country's stability. The restive climate
created by Mora reached a point in which the only way to eliminate the focus of
instability was to execute him. Although the execution of Mora wu an action
justified by his political condu~ the government of Montealegre felt the need to
explain the application of that harsh punishment to a former president. and one of the
leading members of the elite.

Some of the elements that were determinant in the

smooth transition of power between the coffee plant.en and merchants come out from
that explanation.
Mora showed the first indications that he was not going to accept his fall
from power without a fight soon after the coup. Immediately after Mora was notified

of the military revolt against his authority, indeed, he began to claim that he was
still the legitimate president of Costa Rica because the people had had no
participation in the coup. He contended that on the contrary, the Costa Rican people
had sided with him and were determined to restore him to power. Mora kept

repeating this assertion over the next founeen months. Two days after the coup,
Mora was conducted to Puntarenas along with his brother Jose Joaquin., his brotherin-law Jose Mana Canas, his nephew Manuel Argilello and his former vicepresident Rafael G. Escalante, in addition to an escort of one hundred militiamen.
On August 19, 1859, Mora and his party were embarked on a ship bound for

Guatemala

Just before the ship left~ Mora made a proclamation addressed to

the diplomatic envoys to Central America in which he reiterated that he had been
despoiled from power violently. Mora in this proclamation asked the "civili.7.ed
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nations of Europe and America" to reject any action taken by the new administration
because the men in power were usurpers that were in the government illeplly.19
Mora disembarked in El Salvador where be was warmly received by
President Gerardo Barrios.

Mora and Barrios had become good friends as a result

of having fought side by side against William Walker in 1856 and 1857. As soon as
he arrived at the Salvadoran pon of La Union, Mora wrote a letter to Barrios to
inform him about the coup. Mora declared in this letter that the overthrow of his
government was the result of a conspiracy of four or five individuals who had lured
the military into revolt.

According to Mora's claims, the Costa Rican people were

determined to spill their blood to reinstate him in power. Mora said that no
insurrection had taken place because he had not given the orders to begin, however,
the people were ready and waiting for instructions of the leaders.20
There was some veracity in Mora's declarations. The prominent participation
that Mora had in the campaigns against Walker won for him the admiration and

esteem of the militiamen. This appreciation and respect moved some low-ranking
military officers to try to put their former leader back in the presidency. The day of
the coup and soon after Mora wu made prisoner, a group of militiamen attempted to
organize a counterrevolution. However, they were apparently discouraged when they
learned that Colonel Salazar had declared that he had orders to kill Mora if there

wu any armed movement in his favor.21
The coup apparently took Mora's supporters by surprise, and they could not
act rapidly enough to offer resistance to Salaz.ar and Blanco. The government's

suppression of several attempts to revolt in the months that followed the coup
indicates that there

'W'Cre

isolated and not very successful reactions to the fall of

Mora. 22 It is not very clear who was acrually behind those failed uprisings and how
important they were, but those movements pointed out that a restive political

136

climate prevailed in Costa Rica in the months that followed the overthrow of Mora.
The restive climate stemmed as well from constant rumors of invasions and revolts
which kept the Montealegre goverment in a continual state of alert. One of the

rumors that circulated in November, 1859, was that Mora had ordered the blockade
of the ports of Puntarenas and Caldera and was on a ship with eighty cannons ready
to be fired. 23
This persistent rumor proved to be false, but it was not very far from the
truth. Certainly, Mora was supposed to pass by Puntarcnas on his way back to El
Salvador from a trip to the east coast of the United States in late December, 1859.
The Montealegre administration feared that Mora's supponers among the militiamen
would take advantage of his presence aboard a ship anchored in the Pacific pon to
revolt against the government. The fears of the government were well-grounded

because there was an imponant group of militiamen loyal to Mora in the province of
Alajuela. There were strong indications that these militias were ready to tum to
Mora's side and to help him march from Puntarcnas to San

Jose.

President

Montealegre ordered Lorenzo Salazar to go with his ttoops to take control over the
towns where militias were allegedly ready to back Mora. According to the account
of Mora's friends who went aboard the ship to talk with

~

he was determined to

disembark because he had been told that there was a group of militiamen wanting

him to tevolt. Mora's friends dissuaded him from the idea of going ashore pointing
out that there was not such a military force.24
The stubbomess of Mora and his inability to accept that the coup was an
irreversible event forced the government of Montealegre to concentrate most of its
efforts and resources on defense instead of orienting them to productive activities.
Therefore, it was imperative for the government to look for a solution to the situation

created by Mora. It was well-known among the leading members of the government
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that the bad state of Mora's personal finances played a very important role in his
schemes to recover power. Consequently, in December, 1859, Jwwi Volio, who
was now one of Montealegre's ministers proposed carrying out negotiations with
Mora to help him financially, taking advantage of the fact that he was on a ship in
Puntarenas. The idea was accepted and Volio wrote a letter to Mora letting him
know that the government had a series of propositions for his consideration. Mora's
close friend, Guillenno Nanne served as intermediary in the negotiations with
Volio.25
The ·government of Montealegre offered to give Mora a life pension, and to
appoint him as a plenipotenciary minister of Costa Rica to the country of his choice.
Likewise, the government was willing to buy all the properties that Mora had in
Costa Rica. Mora would have to renounce the presidency and make a commitment
to not return to Costa Rica without a special permission of the government. 26
According to Volio, he also told Nanne that be would ask the government not to
prosecute Mora for his misuse of public funds and not to demand him the retmn of
what he had misappropriated while in office.27
The efforts of Volio to reach to an agreement were unfruitful and generated

instead more animosity between Mora and the Montealegre administration. On
December 31, 1859, the newspaper

Nueva Era said that Mora rejected Volio's

propositions and gave Nanne a list of conditions that the government should fulfill in
retmn for his promise to abandon his belligerent attitude. The list of conditions was
published in that newspaper and it included a life pension of 4,000 pesos a year, and
the payment of 8,000 pesos for back salaries correspondent to his rank as army
general. Mora also demanded back payment of the salaries of his brother Jose
Joaquin, and Jose Mana Caftas in their capacities of military officers and the salaries
of former vice-president Rafael G. Escalante. Mora wanted that the government to
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purchase from him the arms and ammunitions that he had bought in preparation for
his intended invasion.

He also demanded that the government to respect and

protect his properties in Costa Rica.28
After the publication of these demands. Mora denied that he had ever made
them and declared that these false and slanderous requests reflected an attempt to
dishonor him in front of his friends. Mora contended that he had sent a letter to
Volio in which he made totally different demands. These demands stipulated that
the public affairs of the country should go back to the state that they had been on
August 13, 1859, that is, that Mora would be reinstated in power and all the laws
and orders enacted by the government of Montealegre would be invalidated. The
demands also stated that none of the public officers of the Montealegre
administration would be prosecuted, with the exception of the military officers who

had betrayed him, and Vicente Aguilar. the minister of finance.29
The

same issue of the Nueya Era reprinted the testimonies of Rafael

Alvarado and Guillermo Nanne, the two people who had seen the letter sent by
Mora to Volio. Nanne and Alvarado declared that Mora had actUally made the
demands that he later denied and labeled as false. Nanne declared that the
contradictory behavior of Mora was incomprehensible for him, who had been his
friend and business partner. The only justification that Nanne could think of for
Mora's denial of his earlier demands was that the adverse circumstances had led
him to make mistakes and to act without regard to the consequences. 30
Mora made the serious mistake of assuming an intransigent position
because he misinterpreted the efforts of the government of Montealegre to negotiate
with him as an indication of weakness and lack of support. As a result of Mora's
erroneous perception of the political situation of the Montealegre administration, he
went on with his plans to organize an armed invasion. Mora continued making
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proclamations addressed to the Costa Rican people in which he declared that
downfall of the Montealegre administration wu near, and that he wu counting on
every ordinary citizen to contribute towards that end.31 Mora. his relatives, and
close supporters thought that once the invasion or an internal revolt began. other
focuses of insmrec:tion would break out and the victory over the government forces
would be easier.
The control that Montealegre's government had over the main military forces
of the country , nonetheless, proved that Mora and his group were wrong. The
superiority of the governments forces, which were under the command of Lorenzo
Salazar, was demonstrated in the rapid and effective suppression of the two
attempts of revolt in early 1860. The tint one took place in Guanacaste in midJanuary when small group of people gained control over the baJTack of the town of
Liberia and over the neighboring villages. The leaders of the movement, however,
fled to Nicaragua when they learned that Salazar was on his way to Guanacaste
with his troops. The second movement came in A~ 1860 and was an attempt to

capture the two barracks of San Josd. The plan wu never put into practice because
the government learned about it beforehand and the people involved in the
conspiracy escaped before making any move.32
Unlike the men involved in these failed attempts at revolt who gave up when
they realized that they bad no chance of winning, Mora did not desist from his
endeavor to overturn the government of Montealegre. In fact, the setbacks of early

1860, far from discouraging Mora led him to appeal to the presidents of Guatemala
and Nicaragua for usistance for what turned out to be his last military venture. He
traveled to Guatemala to request military aid from president Rafael Carrera. In the
meantime, Manuel Argilello held conversations with the president of Nicaragua,
Tomas Martinez with the same purpose. While Carrera did not give Mora a definite
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answer, Martinez signed a secret treaty with Argaello. By vinue of this treaty
Martinez made the commitment of lettin1 Mora and Caftas use the border region of
Nicaragua to prepare an invuion of Costa Rica. Marunez authorized Mora and

Cada to recruit one thousand men in the Nicarapan towns close to the border and
to arm them with rifles. When the uprising began, Mart!nez wu going to march into

Costa Rica with the men recruited to back up Mora's men.33 This secret treaty,
however, wu never put into practice. The key figure that actually helped Mora was
the Salvadoran president Gerardo Barrios.
Barrios wrote an urgent letter to president Montealegre on August 26, 1860.

In this letter he informed Montealegre that William Walker had occupied the
Honduran port of Trujillo and that it was necessary for all the Central American
governments to act jointly to expel the American intruder once again. Barrios
requested that Montealegre send him on the next ship available two or three
hundred rifles with the correspondent ammunitions to be used in the offensive
against Walker.34

The Costa Rican government acceded to Barrios' petition and

sent the arms. That petition although based on a real situation was apparently a
pretext to get arms for Mora. Indeed. later it was found that the rifles sent to the
government of El Salvador were the same that Mora took to Costa Rica for the
invasion of mid-September, 1860.
The events relating to the military expedition that would cost Mora his life
are regarded as the most tragic pages of Costa Rica's history. A combination of
factors made Mora's invasion of September, 1860, a venture that was doomed before
it began. Mora and his close relatives embarked in this military adventure without
being fully prepared for it. In some ways they were forced to act precipitately by an
ultimatum that was sent to El Salvador by Mora's supporters. According to this
ultimatum, Mora's followers in Costa Rica had established September 15, as the day
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of the uprising against the government. The plan was to take control of the military
post of Puntarenas to prepare for Mora's arrival. In the meantime, Mora's key
supporters in the villages along the road to the interior were going to encourage the
people to back the revolt, and to join them in the march to the capital. The organizers
of the uprising declared that they would go ahead with the plan even if Mora did not
arrive in Puntarenas on the next ship as they demanded. These people said that if
Mora did not show up and the revolt failed he was going to be remorseful for
abandoning his supporters. These declarations moved Mora to accept the plans and
to arrange an invasion on such shon notice.35

Canas and Arguello had serious objections to the plans of Mora's supponers
in Costa Rica. The most important one was the idea of an invasion centered in
Puntarenas. According to Cadas and Argilelllo, the invasion should to take place in
Guanacaste. They undescorcd that in the eventual case of a defeat it was going to be

more feasible to escape from there to Nicaragua36. The possibilities of an escape
were virtually null in Puntarenas. This pon was located on the tip of a tongue-shape
peninsula and was only connected to the mainland by a narrow spit of land.
Unfortunately for Mora and his men their defeat had a lot to do with the geographical
characteristics of Puntarenas which made the siege of the port very easy.
The determining factor in the defeat of the uprising, nonetheless, was the
advanced knowledge that the government had of it. Mora's supporters were
counting on the circumstance that the Costa Rican militias were largely made up of
reserve troops who kept their rifles at home. According to the plans of the
"revolutionary commitee," as Argilello referred to the organizers of the revolt, they
would mobilize the members of these reserve troops and other people from the
interior to Puntarenas to augment the number of men there. The organizers gathered -

20,000 pesos to give ten pesos to each man to help him pay for his transportation to
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the port. The plan failed not only because someone misappropriated a considerable

part of the money but because one of the leaders of the movement betrayed the

group and informed the government of CM?)' detail of the uprising.37

Indeed. u soon u the government became aware of the plans of Mora's
backers, it ordered the blockade of the road to Puntarenas to prevent the
mobilization of sympathizers towards that port. Simultaneously, General Muimo
Blanco was sent to Puntarenu at the head of t!u= battalions of t!u= hundred men
each and an artillery brigade of one hundred men to confront Mom's forces. Mora

had amved in Puntarenas in September 17, along with six other people. These
people were, Jose Joaqufn Mora, Jose Mana Cams, Manuel Argilello, Oodomiro
Montoya, Antonio Argilello and a Salvadoran colonel. They established their
headquarters in the pon and from there sent orders to the men located in the two
points that were strategical for the defense of their position.

These two points were the Barranca river and the narrowest point of the strip
of land that connected the peninsula of Puntarenas with the mainland, called
Angostura. It has been pointed out that Mora overestimated the response of the

common people to the news of his presence in Punt.arenas. Consequently, Mon.
remained in that port waiting for a massive uprising that never took place instead of
marching to the capital as soon as he had gathered some mcn.38 The sources do
not mention how many of Mora's supporters were able to travel to Puntarcnas before
the government ordered the blockade of the road to the port. The accounts of the
events in Puntarcnas indicate, however, that Mora's forces were very small in
comparison with the government's troops. Therefore, Mora's decision to wait in the

pon reflected more the weakness of his movement than a tactical mistake.
While Mora and his men were waiting for reinforcements, the government
troops were rapidly advancing towards the port. The cowardice of Ignacio Arancibi~
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a Chilean who was the commanding chief of Mora's men assigned to defend the
crossing point of the Barranca river, facilitated the advance of the official troops.
Arancibia panicked and fled after he saw the government's troops getting near and
the men under his command attempted to defend their position but without any
success. The government's troops took conttol over the boat~ in the absence of
a bridge, was the only way to cross the river. After this obstacle was overcome,

General Blanco and his men continued the march to the place called Angostura
where Mora's supporters had made a trench and placed six cannons in it.
The trench of Angostura was the only barrier that protected the access to the

pon and therefore, most of Mora's forces had been sent to that point under the
command of Canas. The Mora brothers remained in Puntarenas

wim a very small

number of men at their disposition. Blanco and the other military officers learned
about the actual situation of the enemy after the capture and questioning of a
Frenchman who was part of forces loyal to Mora. After learning that the pon
constituted an easy target because it was vinually unprotected, the goverment
military officers decided to combine the attack on the trench with an assault on the
town by sea.

Thus, on the night of September 28, Blanco and his troops attacked

the trench at Angostura and and engaged in bloody combat with Mora's forces that
lasted for several hours.

During this time about one hundred men died and other

another hundred were wounded, according to Argilello's firsthand account.39
The superiority of the government's troops forced the withdrawal of Mora's
men who fled to Puntarenas. But when Caftas. Argilcllo, and a few others got to
town there was a lot of chaos and confusion because a group of about fifty men
loyal to the government had disembarked in the port a few homs before and had
tried to capture Mora. Canas and Argilello were informed that Mora and his brother
Jose Joaqufn, however, had managed to escape and were in hiding at the moment.
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Canas, realizing that the situation was hopeless. sought refuge in the house of the
consul of New Granada in Puntarenas. ArgUello wu taken prisoner when he was
discovered on one of the streets of the port trying to learn about the whereabout of
his uncle.40
The small contingent of the government's forces that disembarked in

Puntarenas that night of September 28 had very good knowledge of the situation in
the port. thanks to the information provided by the confession of one of Mora's
supporters who was captured a few a hours before. This information led these men
directly to the house where Mora was staying in Puntarcnas. While the men
guarding the house engaged in gunfue with the government's militiamen, Mora
escaped through the back door and went to the house of Richard Fm'C1', who was the
British consul. and his friend and former business partner. Argilello said in his later
account of these events that on the night of September 28, Juan Rafael and

Jose

Joaqu!n Mora went to Farrer's house and he bid them.41 But Fmer wrote in his
diary that when the Mora brothers appeared in his house that night, he asked them
to leave. According to Fmer, Mora

requested protection under the British flag, but

he had to tell him that that was impossible because he had no authorization to offer
asylum. Likewise, Farrer wrote that he told Mora that bis house offered no security
because it would be the first place where the government troops would look for him

since everybody knew they were friends. Farrer declared that he was relieved
when.Mora left bis house.42
In bis capacity of British consul Farrer did have powers to provide Mora with
the protection he asked for. The last paragraph of his diary's entry of September
30th sheds some light on Farrer's negative attitude towards Mora. Furer wrote
that he could have saved Mora from death had he been a man injustly penccuted for
supporting a fair cause. Nonetheless, Fm'C1' thought that Mora was not in that
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situation, and that in his opinion "he had to die instead of many other people. "43
Farrer's opinion explains the role that
surrender to the government.

~

played in convincing Mora that he should

Apparently, Mora returned to Fam:r's house at

dawn on September 29, to beg him to save his life. Farrer, by his own account, told

Mora that there were no possibilities for him to get out of that difficult situation
alive. Farrer wrote that he then informed Mora that he had talked to Francisco
Mana Iglesias and· Francisco Montealegre, the president's brother, about his
situation.

According to Farrer, these two people had given him their word that if

Mora would tum himself in and assume all the responsibility for the failed uprising,
the other people involved in it would not be punished. Farrer declared that after
listening to that proposal Mora agreed to surrend and asked him to go look for
Iglesias. 44
Montealegre and Iglesias had been appointed by the government as civilian
commissioners to accompany General Blanco and his troops to Puntarenas.
Therefore, Iglesias, in his capacity government representative, met with Mora for an
hour and assured him that the sacrifice of his life would spare those of the others
implicated in the movement.45 Mora turned himself in at nine o'clock in the morning
on September 30, 1860 along with his brother J~ Joaquin.
Immediately after this, according to a military report of these events, a counmartial was summoned to judge the Moras, the Chilean Ignacio Arancibia who had

been captured shortly before, Canas, who had also turned himself in, Argilello, and
other leading figures of their group. The military report did not mention the names of
the members of that court-martial. It only said that this tribunal gave a verbal
sentence in which it condetmned Juan Rafael Mora and Arancibia to be executed at
three o'clock on that same day and left to the government the task of deciding the

punishment of the other people. 46 Mora and Arancibia died that afternoon. The high
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ranking authorities in San Jos6 sentenced Canas to death on October 1, 1860 and he
was executed the next day in Puntarenas. Jos6 Joaqmn Mora and Manuel Argilello
were deported and they went to El Salvador.47
The works written many years after these events to praise the memory of
Mora as the hero of the military campaigns against William Walker have described
his death that afternoon of September 30, 1860 as one of the most unfortunate
episodes of Costa Rica's history.

The exaltation of Mora's figure has led to creating

a myth around his personality and his political can:er. Consequently, these works
contend that Mora was a martyr who fell victim to political passions and hatred.4 8
The later generations, however, were not the only ones for whom it was difficult to
understand the application of the death penalty to Mora. Certainly, the execution of
Mora was an event that immediately became well-known outside Costa Rica and

produced sttong reactions, especially in the other Central American countries. There
the news about Mora's death astonished many people and enraged others since he
was regarded as the greatest defender of the sovereignty of Central America. The
repercussions abroad of that event compelled the government of Montealegre to
explain the reasons that moved the administtation to apply such harsh punishment
to a former president.

The result of this need to legitimate the decision made in relation to Mora
was the publication of a pamphlet titled

Exposici6n hist6rica de Ia r:evoluci6n de 15

de setiembre de1860 The pamphlet is dated March 15, 1861 and was published by
the government. This publication opens a very important door for understanding the
death of Mora and why it represented an exceptional solution to an internal crisis of
the coffee planter and merchant elite. Likewise, this publication brings to light the
elements that let the elite maintain an equilibrium between the conservation of order
and the struggle for the control of the government. Indeed, by explaining an unusual
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even~ this pamphlet enables the identification of factors that normally made the use
of violence unnecessary to solve political differences among the elite. The
aforementioned pamphlet was preceded by the leaflet

Expmjci6n de Ios motivos

para el cambio politico acaec;ido eo 14 de agosto de 1859 published

by the

government in April, 1860. This leaflet was intented to justify the overthrow of Mora,
and as such is also valuable to understand the principles ruling the relations among
the members of the elite.
The changes in the government in the second half of the nineteenth century in
Costa Rica meant only the ttansfcrcncc of power from one group leading coffee
planters and merchants to another. Those changes were accepted by the
vanquished faction of the elite because they, indeed. merely represented an
alternation of the control of the government among a fahiy small circle of people.
That was a crucial element that facilitated the rapid organization of the new
government. Once the new authorities had been appointed, they began fulfilling their
tasks and things went back to normal, even if the former government was deposed
by

a coup.
In the case of Mora's overthrow,

Jose Mana Montealegre

assumed power in

the capacity of temporary president immediately after the coup. In October, 1859,
the constituent assembly began the drafting of a new constitution, which was
adopted in December of the same year. Montealegre was elected president in
elections held in April,1860 and was inaugurated later that month. The elections
also chose the members of Congress and the newly established Senate. The
Montealegre administration, nonetheless, was not able to dedicate completely itself
to "the promotion of agriculture, commctee, intelligence and public spirit under the
influence of fair, liberal, and stable institutions" 49 as it intended, because Mora
never resigned himself to the loss of his political power.
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Mora's stubbomess to recover the presidency forced Montealegre's
government to put into practice every single mechanism that tbe coffee planter and
merchant elite had to reconcile its iniernal discrepancies. !mrnrdiatety after tbe
coup, Mora appeared to have accepted the fact that the elite had turned its back on
him and that the overthrow was an irreversible event. However, SOOD after Mora

went aboard the ship that was going to take him to El Salvadcr in exile. he changed
his attitude. It was then when Mora made the proclamation addressed to the foreign
governments claiming that he was victim of a conspiracy and began to make
accusations. The government's pamphlet of 1861 declared that it was at that
moment when Mora "took his mask off" and showed his real intentions. The leaflet
added that from then on Mora dedicared himself full-time to inciting revolts and

invasions, forcing the government to discuss publicly his personal defects and his
political wrongdoings.SO
The introduction to this leaflet written to justify the coup, in fact. explained
that the Montealegre administration had tried by all means to avoid the public
discussion of the flaws and mismanagements of the previom government.

It

remarked that that attitude originated in the fact that the main concern of the new
govcmmcnt was the normalization of the political situation of the country and not the
promotion of disagreements among the public. This pamphlet asserted that with that
purpose in mind, the government had decided to throw a veil over the abuses and
wrongdoings of Mora's administration instead of prosecuting him. The pamphlet
pointed out that Montcalegre's government was determined "to do without the past"
to avoid the debate of the unpleasant matters and affairs of the Mora years and thus,

be able to focus all the attention in the present and the future.SI
This disposition of the elite to forgive and forget all of what had happened
during the deposed administrations reflected the unwillingness of the leading coffee
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planters and merchants to punish any member of their own group. In the case of
M~ no one was going to point out who was guilty of what because many
members of the elite had participated actively in bis administtation, especially during
his early years in office. The rest of the circle of leading coffee planters and
merchants had tolerated Mora's abuses of power when they were advantageous to a
larger number of people. Therefore, they were not going to condemn something that
they had condoned previously.
This reluctance to denounce and accuse fellow members of the elite stemmed
also from the circumstance that the coffee planters and merchants constituted a
group close! y related by kinship, business relations and friendship ties. The coffee
planters and merchants had no inclinations towards political scandals because those
would have meant casting accusations upon their close or distant relatives, their inlaws or their business partners. Kinship and the other links that tied the members
of the elite together, indeed, abated political antagonisms, and in consequence,
facilitated the reconciliation of contending factions after the overturn of a government.
A veey interesting aspect of this tendency of the elite to promote
reconciliation instead of persecutions and reprisals after a coup is the correlation that
was established and emphasized between that political behavior and the oftentouted characteristics of the Costa Rican people. The coup of 1859 and the execution
of Mora were presented as exceptional events that were contrary to the peaceful
nature and customs of the Costa Ricans. These two events were depicted as
regrettable instances in which political violence had prevailed over the attempts of
conciliation between contending factions. It was underscored that the Montealegre
administration had dealt with Mora's behavior after the coup with "the tolerance that
distinguished the behavior of the inhabitants of the country." This tolerance,
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according to the leaflets published by the government, stemmed from the love that
Costa Ricans had for order and peacc.52
Mora's inability to conform to his political fate put to the test the tolerance,
prudence, and moderation that allegedly governed the comportment of the Costa

Ricans. Mora's endeavor to return to power, ccertainly, forced the elite to break
many of the rules that governed its relationships as a dominant class. The tendency
to avoid political scandals and public embarrassment of former officers also reflected
the respect and deference which seemed to have ruled the relations among the coffee
planters and merchants. The pamphlet that justified Mora's overthrow, in fact,
explained that the "former social position" of the deposed president entitled him to
be treated with consideration. 53 Therefore, after the coup Mora was held prisoner in
the National Palace and not in the barracks, and was visited by his family and friends
without any restrictions. Mora even received presidential discretionary funds after
he was ousted and left the country knowing that his family and properties were
safe.54
The leaflet of April, 1860, pointed out that the government of Montealegre
had initially refrained from publicly criticizing Mora's political behavior regardless of

the serious nature of his abuses of power. The leaflet claimed that government did
not want to reveal negative aspects of Mora's personality, because that might have
hurt his personal feelings and put him in an unpleasant situation.

The pamphlet

added. however, that it had become imperative for the government to explain why
Mora was ousted as a way to refute his accusations that he was victim of a
conspiracy. According to this pamphlet, Mora had demonstrated with his belligerant
attitude that he no longer deserved to be treated with consideration and respect. The
government considered that to maintain silence out of a courtesy for which Mora
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seemed to have no appreciation might have been interpreted as a confirmation of his
"sinister assertions. "SS
The pamphlet that dealt with the circumstances that forced the execution of
Mora remarked that the efforts of the Montealegre administration to persuade him to
abandon his plans of an invasion reach a point at which tolerance became "a risky
magnanimity. "56 The government's acceptance of.Volio's motion to offer Mora a life
pension and other benefits was pointed out as an example of that risky magnanimity.
Certainly, the aforementioned pamphlet acknowledged that Volio's proposals were
out of the ordinary because they not only guaranteed Mora's impunity for his
wrongdoings. but also rewarded and honored a guilty man. The leaflet added that
regardless of that the government agreed to accept Volio's proposals because
"politics had anomalies and demands to which it was necessary to submit even if it
meant doing so with risk and aversion." 57 The official publication quoted above said
that the Montealegre administration agreed to be more generous than what Mora
deserved because the proposals represented a possibility to eliminate the source of
the restive climate that prevailed in the country. The door to any conciliation. was
closed definitely, however. when Mora rejected the government's proposals. He

took a path from which there was no return when be chose to engage the country in
brief civil war.
The pamphlet that explained the antecedents of the coup. to be sure. used
several harsh phrases and adjectives to describe Mora's political behavior.
Nonetheless, it is interesting that regardless of how far Mora went in his
stubbomess to recover power his actions were censured in the newspaper ~

m, the leaflet of 1861. and in other documents

in ways that expressed

compassion more than personal animosity and political hatred. Mora's behavior was
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explained and, to a certain extcn~ justified in these publications as the typical
comwtbllellt of a man whose political ambition had blinded him.
Nµeya

Era, for example, published a commentary three days after the coup

that illustrates this point. The commentary was about the proclamation that Mora
made shortly before leaving the country in which he said that he had been victim of a
political intrigue. The newspaper regretted that the overturn of his government had
not helped Mora realize that he had been a victim of his own political ambition which
"had obfuscated his mind.•• The commentary added that became of this obfuscation,
Mora was not able to face facts properly.58

Also on January, 1860, there was a

commentary in this newspaper in relation to Mora's rejection of the government's
propositions to abandon his belligerant attitude in exchange for a pension for life and
other benefits. The

Nueya Era pointed out that Mora not only did not accept what

was offered as a gesture of conciliation but bad the nerve to make "outrageous
propositions to the government."

The newspaper's commentary added that Mora's

propositions reflected the demands of "a man devoted wholly to deep dreams who
did not want to see the auth. "59 The article even raised the possibility that Mora
was being pushed by certain individuals to swim against the tide of political events.

In fact, it remarked that knowing Mora's intelligence and experience it was likely
that some of Mora's friends were the ones whom in good, or perhaps, bad faith were
encouraging those dreams and illusions. The newspaper commentary suggested
that these people were pieventing Mora from opening his eyes to reality and
expressed hopes that he would be able to open bis eyes before it was too late.60

Julian Volio's failed attempt to reach an agreement between the government
of Montealegre and Mora constitutes another example of this compassionate
attitude towards the deposed piesident. Volio wrote in the

Nueya Era that from the

first day after the overthrow of Mora on, he had regarded him not as .. the despot
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that unfairly and violently had destroyed the fatherland" but as a defeated and fallen
man, a person who inspired him compassion. Volio declared that the compassion
that Mora's fate inspired him led him to forget the attacks and accusations that Mora
had made against his family and to exteod the deposed president a generous hand.
Volio said that after the coup he gave Mora some money for his jomney to El
Salvador and used his influence to protect his family and properties in Costa Rica.
Volio added that it was also his desire to help a man in disgrace that moved him to

ask the government for a monetary compensation and other benefits for Mora. Volio
expressed his great disappointment with Mora's attitude and declared he was no
longer going to intercede for a man who had not appreciated his good intentions.61
By September, 1860 when Mora and his close relatives disembarked in
Puntarenas to lead the revolt that never took place. the government had run out of
tolerance. After more than a year of political unrest originating in constant rumors of
rebellions, it was no longer possible to deal with the intruders with leniency. The
pamphlet of 1861 declared, in fact. that after fourteen months of magnanimity and
moderation, it was imperative to act with energy and determination in relation to
Mora. Consequently, the government ordered the suspension of the constitutional
guarantees and issued a decree outlawing Mora and his supporters.

By virtue of

these orders Mora was transformed into a traitor to his fatherland when he
disembarked in Puntarenas.62

The explanation of the events that led to Mora's

execution emphasized that it had been unnecessary to set up a court-martial to
judge him. He had already condemned himself because the constitution established
that the act of high treason should be punished with the death penalty.63
Regardless of how justified the execution of Mora was, the government felt
that it had the obligation to explain it. This explanation comprised in the pamphlet
published in 1861 began by underscoring one more time that the Costa Rican people
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was not cruel and bloodd'lirsty. On the contrary, the leaflet said, Costa Ricans had

peaceful instincts and moderate and industrious customs. It went on to say,
however, that there were some instances in which powerful motives forced the

Costa Rican people

to separate

momentarily from its peaceful customs.64 The

obstinacy of Mora to recuperate power by force, according to the go~emmcnt,
constituted one of those very few instances in which violence had to be applied to
supress violence.
The climate of political unrest and the brief civil war brought about by Mora's
stubbomess, nonetheless, did not destroy the compassionate feelings that the
government and the elite had towards him. Those writing the publication that dealt
with Mora's execution said that they would discuss it with the respect that the

memory of Mora and Caiias demanded, two people who in the past had had a
prominent place in the political life of the country. This pamphlet pointed out that
these two people fell victims of their own blindness and deviations, and that in their
illegitimate search for power they only found their graves. Mora. the leaflet~
"expiated on the scaffold the obsession that dragged him down into a reluctance to
accept events that were irreversible. "65
The Montealeg:re's government pointed out that the sacrifice of Mora's life
was "a sad but harsh lesson that the people in a feverish moment taught to the men
who persisted in keeping them under its servitude. "66 More accurately. it was the
elite acting on behalf of the ordinary people who taught the lesson. Mora, to be sure,
paid dearly for the political blindness that led him to challenge to the last

consequences the elite's mechanisms to abate conflicts

The efforts that the

Montealegre administration made to avoid a violent solution to the problems related
to Mora, nonetheless, provide a valuable key for understanding the elements that
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ruled the relations among the elite and contributed to keeping the equilibrium
between consensus and conflict.
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CONO..USIONS

The growing demand of the European industrial economy fer raw materials and

foodstuffs in the second half of the ninctecnth centmy gave rise to the development in
Costa Rica of an expat agriculture based on coffee cultivation. As in most of Latin
America dilling that peri~ the reestablishment of the linb to the world market which
had been broken or weakened after independence mmed a tmning point in the country's

political and economic development. Coffee expons not only laid the economic
foundations on which Costa Rica's rest at the present but it also hastened the process of
consolidation of the national state.
The architects of the political institutions that ~ firmly established in the late

nineteenth century were the members of an elite whose economic intcn:sts revolved
around coffee expats. This elite made up of coffee planters and men:hants exened
absoluce control of political power and transformed the government into the fundamental
agent of the development of the expon agriculture. The significant historical role played
by this elite makes the study of the relations of its members crucial for understanding the

major political and economic events of the second half of the nineteenth century.

The political events that revolved around the figure of Juan Rafael Mora were
charactcrizcd by such a radical shift in the relations of the coffee planter and men:hant elite
toward one of its memben that makes the period between 1849 and 1860 very valuable

for the study of those relations. That period began with a consensus among the elite

regarding Mora's election and ended with his overthrow and execution after ahmst ten
years in office. The analysis of the relations among the coffee planters and men:hants
during the Mara administration reveals that role assigned to the government as the main

economic agent for the development of the export agriculture was the source of both
consensus and conflict.
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In the early decades of the expansion of coffee exports the local economy that had

traditionally been of subsislence was of little help for pncratin1 the capital needed to
consolidate them. Consequently, the elite actively worked towards the stmigtbcning of
the state apparatus to bestow on the government with enough financial capabilities to
invest in major infrastructure works such as road construction.
The elite's control of political power at the same time that enabled its leading
members to shape the government to perform the assigned economic role, gave them
direct or indirect access to public funds. The coffee planters and merchants began to

depend largely upon the resources of the public treasury for their own business ventures
and utiliz.ed them so liberally that there was no clear separation between their private

interests and public affairs. That situation increased the struggle for the control of
government among the members of a small, homogeneous elite closely- related by
kinship that tempaatily divided it over how much access to public funds anyone of
them should have.
The discontent of the coffee planten and merchants towards Mon. which ousted
him from power, in fact, was rooted in his tendency in the late 1850s to monopolize the

access to public funds. The analysis of the politics of that period within the broader
context of the determining facttX'S in the relations of the elite clarifies the nature of the
struggle for control of the government and the centtal reason behind events that at first
might appear as simple clashes of individual political ambitions.
The prominent political figures of the nineteenth century, such as Juan Rafael
Mora. whom earlier historical works ideaUzrd and praised as epic characu:rs ~,cting in
isolation, emerged in that broader context as what they actually were, leading actors of
economic and political processes. The economic and political behavior of the elite,
indeed, was determined in large pan by the main factors involved in those processes.

The ways in which the leading coffee planters and merchants responded to those factors
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were pivotal in setting the course of the Costa Rica's history in the late nineteenth century
and early twentieth century.
That the coffee planters and merchants constituted an elite closely-related by
kinship and that the factors generating consensus were strong enough to abate conflicts
were also crucial in the system of political domination that they established. The political
institutions that consolidated in the lace nineteenth century, to be sure, were oligarchical.
Nonetheless, the elite's capability to resolve conflicts through negotiation and
compromise led its members to make the elections one of their main instruments to throw
a veil of legality over their agreements that prevented the outbreak of armed
confrontations. Even though, initially there was no popular participation in the elections,
the important role that they played for the elite, led to the development and strengthening

of the electoral system. By turning elections intt> an instrument of its interests, the elite
made it possible their lan::r evolution intt> the main foundation of the political system of the
present day in which popular participation in the elections is significant.
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